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Abstract
The thesis consists of six chapters.
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter.
Chapter 2 is a survey of the literature on crime and labour markets. In that chapter,
I discuss the seminal work that has been undertaken in that field of research and
discuss the advances in the theoretical and empirical literature. Reviewing the lit-
erature, I identify open research questions. Some of these questions are addressed
in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
Chapter 3 builds on the literature which provides evidence of long-term consequences
for workers who first join the labour market during economic downturns. Using a
range of data sources from the U.S. and UK, we demonstrate a substantial long-run
effect of recessions on criminal behaviour: We find that youth who enter the labour
market during recessions are significantly more likely to become criminal than those
who graduate into a stronger labour market.
Chapter 4 investigates the contemporaneous relationship between unemployment
and crime in the context of increasing unemployment durations in the U.S. I em-
ploy quasi-experimental estimation techniques to study the impact of temporary
unemployment benefit extensions on crime, and to establish the causal link between
unemployment, unemployment durations and crime. The results support the hy-
pothesis that the relationship between unemployment and crime depends on the
duration of unemployment.
Chapter 5 studies the impact of the stop-and-frisk policy in New York City as a
policy that explicitly aims at crime deterrence. Using a range of data sources and
quasi-experimental estimation techniques, we estimate the overall impact of the
policy on crime in New York City. Further, we provide evidence that supports the
hypothesis of racial bias and in particular claims that Afro-Americans face a dis-
proportional probability of a stop-and-frisk encounter. Yet, our estimations suggest
that there is no knock-on effect on crime.
Chapter 6 is a concluding chapter.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Social scientists such as criminologists and sociologists have studied criminality
and the determinants of criminal behaviour for more than two centuries. The eco-
nomic framework for understanding crime dates back as far as the eighteenth and
nineteenth century, when the social philosophers Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) and
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) developed the notions of rational choice and deterrence
in illegal behaviour. They argued that individuals rationally choose to commit crime
if the benefits exceed the cost of such activity. Further, they reasoned that impos-
ing an additional cost to criminal action through punishment could help to deter
individuals from crime. While different schools of thought developed intermittently,
these ideas were taken up in the seminal writings on the economics of crime by
Gary Becker (1968) and George Stigler (1970). Their work laid the foundation of a
growing literature on theoretical and empirical aspects of the economics of crime.
The relationship between legal and illegal activity has received particular atten-
tion by labour economists over the last decades: How do individuals choose between
participation in the labour market on the one hand and crime on the other hand?
What is the margin at which individuals choose between legal and illegal activity:
Is participation in the labour market and in crime mutually exclusive (choice at
the extensive margin) or is the choice of criminal activity a time allocation decision
(choice at the intensive margin)? Who are the individuals at risk of criminal be-
haviour, and how are they affected by the state of the labour market in general
and their individual labour market performance in particular? In chapter 2 of this
dissertation, I review the existing theoretical and empirical literature on labour mar-
kets and crime that addresses these questions. First, I discuss the seminal economic
models of crime as well as subsequent models that take a more dynamic view of
criminal choices. Second, I discuss examples of empirical work on different aspects
of labour markets and crime.
Since the 1960s, the empirical literature on the causal relationship between la-
bour markets and crime has grown considerably. One of the most intuitive features
of that relationship is the causal link between unemployment and crime. Strikingly,
the empirical evidence is not yet rigorous in terms of magnitudes and statistical pre-
cision, but indeed suggests that unemployment increases the probability for criminal
behaviour. Two chapters of this thesis contribute to that literature by investigat-
ing aspects of the link between crime and unemployment which to the best of my
knowledge have not yet been studied in the literature.
Chapter 3 addresses the question of how criminal careers are initiated, and in
particular whether labour market conditions at the time when youth leave school
play a role in forming criminal choices. The literature has demonstrated scarring
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effects of criminal behaviour on labour market opportunities later in life. Yet, we
do not know whether there is a reverse scarring effect: Recessions typically lead
to an increase in youth unemployment rates, leaving high school graduates to face
more difficulties in finding jobs whilst not yet having financial insurance. Hence,
low expectations on returns to legal activity and peer effects might trigger initial
involvement in crime as well as a first encounter with the criminal justice system
(Becker, 1968). Subsequently, knock-on effects might prompt criminal careers and
hence lead to long-term scarring effects.
The empirical analysis of chapter 3 is based on a variety of U.S. and UK data
sources at the individual and birth cohort level. The estimations yield robust evid-
ence that young people who graduate from school during recessions are significantly
more likely to become involved in crime than those who leave school while labour
markets are more buoyant. Moreover, the results lead to the conclusion that reces-
sions do play a role in the making of career criminals, as crime scars from higher
entry level unemployment rates are both long lasting and substantial.
While chapter 3 demonstrates a scarring effect of labour market conditions at the
time of labour market entry on long-term criminal behaviour and criminal careers,
chapter 4 focuses on a more contemporaneous relationship between unemployment
and crime. In particular, I study the impact of recent and unprecedented struc-
tural changes in the U.S. labour market on crime. During the Great Recession,
similarly to previous recessions, unemployment rates were very high. Yet, unlike
previous recessions, there has been a substantial increase in the average duration of
unemployment spells. In particular, one has seen an unprecedented occurrence of
long-term unemployment which stands in clear contrast to European labour markets
with a history of long-term unemployment. These increases in unemployment dura-
tions have been associated with temporary unemployment benefit extensions which
were implemented by policy makers in order to delay the time of benefit exhaustion
in times of financial hardship.
In chapter 4, I use quasi-experimental methods to estimate the impact of these
labour market and policy changes on crime. In line with previous findings in the
literature, I find that higher unemployment is linked to higher crime rates. More
surprisingly, the empirical results suggest that the positive relationship between un-
employment and criminality is driven by the unemployment benefit extensions which
are linked to longer unemployment durations and higher unemployment rates. In
fact, there are models that suggest that the probability of criminal behaviour in-
creases with the duration of unemployment for example due to human capital ef-
fects or behavioural responses. Indeed, I find empirical evidence that the relation-
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ship between unemployment and crime varies with the duration of unemployment.
Hence, I conclude that not only is there a long-term, dynamic relationship between
unemployment and crime as argued in chapter 3, but also the more contemporaneous
link underlies dynamics that have not yet been captured in the empirical literature.
Economists have not only studied the interaction between labour markets and
crime, but also have shown great interest in evaluating mechanisms of deterrence
from crime. While understanding the relationship between unemployment and crime
is important in order to apprehend the implications of labour market policy design on
criminality and the broader prevention of initial criminal behaviour, understanding
crime deterrence mechanisms and their effectiveness is important for policy decision
with respect to the efficient allocation of resources. A particular interest has hence
been shown in the impact of general policing and particular policing policies on
crime.
Chapter 5 is an analysis of a prominent example of such a crime deterrence
policy: The stop-and-frisk policy in New York City. The stop-and-frisk policy allows
police officers to stop, question and frisk pedestrians in New York City based on
a reasonable suspicion. The programme has been argued by some to be one of
the contributing factors to the decline in criminality in the city over the last two
decades. Yet, the stop-and-frisk policy has been controversial in particular with
regard to claims of racial profiling and racial bias: Advocates of the policy argue
that any racial profiling strategy is based on statistical discrimination only, whereas
opponents argue that the policy is subject to racial discrimination. In this chapter,
a variety of New York City data sources and empirical strategies are employed in
order to investigate claims of statistical versus racial discrimination as well as to
evaluate the effectiveness of any existing racial profiling on crime. The empirical
results yield evidence which supports the hypothesis of racial bias with respect to
the probability of being stopped and frisked, yet we do not find any evidence that
there is an associated effect on crime. We conclude that the stop-and-frisk policy
design in New York City is non-optimal as it stands but, the policy being very
controversial, restrain from any broader conclusions.
Overall, in this dissertation I apply a variety of economic concepts and statistical
methods to various aspects of criminal behaviour. In particular, I study different
factors and policies that potentially trigger or deter criminal behaviour. The find-
ings, as previous findings in the literature, are important for policy makers with
regard to policy design and policy evaluation in the context of crime prevention and
efficient resource allocation. In chapter 6, I summarise the findings in this disserta-
tion and discuss the contributions and limitations of the presented research.
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2.1 Introduction
Criminality constitutes a major burden for societies. Not only is crime associated
with negative consequences for individuals involved in the criminal action - both
offenders and victims - but also the economy as a whole. Creating social losses and
inefficiencies, psychological consequences for victims and economic concerns for (ex-
)prisoners, crime bears high costs for an economy. In monetary terms that includes
for example costs for prisons, courts or crime prevention. In his seminal work on
the economics of crime, Becker (1968) describes the net cost of crime caused to a
society as the difference between its harms for the victims and the economy and its
benefits for the offenders and potentially the economy. Whilst the harm of crime
as well as the offenders’ benefits are obvious, an economy’s benefits of crime may
be less so. Yet, it is possible to think of rare, positive externalities of crime such as
the employment effect on police forces or courts. As the net cost of crime increases
in the number of crimes committed, economies have an incentive to prevent crime -
which explains the existence of punishment institutions in an economy.
In order to minimise the cost both for individuals and for the economy, it is thus
important to understand which factors contribute to initiating criminal behaviour.
It is often argued that labour market conditions and experiences - legal opportun-
ities to generate income - are one important factor. In particular, various negative
consequences arise in association with unemployment: Whilst high unemployment
rates for example lead to higher costs for the social security systems, the individual
experience of unemployment might trigger financial constraints, social stigma and a
decline in general wellbeing. That in turn might trigger criminal behaviour. Think-
ing of crime as one pillar in an occupational choice system, reservation wages or
search intensities for legal employment opportunities may then be affected by crime,
either as a potential alternative source of income or by the time and effort already
spent in the search for crime opportunities.
In the following I discuss the existing literature and findings in that field of
research. This survey focuses on theoretical and empirical work on crime and labour
markets in order to detect and outline gaps in the literature and open research
questions. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 reviews
theoretical models in the literature. In particular, I outline the benchmark model
of crime and further discuss dynamic economic models as well as related job search
models. Section 2.3 refers to the empirical literature. The particularities of the
empirical research on crime and labour markets and examples of such research are
discussed. Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 Theoretical Economics of Crime
The theoretical literature on the economics of crime provides valuable insights
for understanding criminal behaviour. Studies have focused on understanding and
modelling crime incentives and the interaction between criminal and non-criminal
behaviour, as well as on crime-related policy and the economic cost of crime. In
the following, I describe the benchmark economic model of crime before discussing
extensions that focus on different aspects of criminal behaviour.
2.2.1 Benchmark Economic Model of Crime
The benchmark economic model of crime is based on the Becker (1968) seminal
model: A rational decision maker chooses between legal and criminal activity, max-
imising his expected utility from either option. The choice is subject to uncertainty
with respect to the gains and losses from legal and criminal activity. If the crime is
successful, the individual gains in utility, while an unsuccessful crime leads to utility
losses in terms of punishment.
The choice under uncertainty can be formalised in a model as follows (Becker,
1968, Freeman, 1999)1: Let Πc denote the gain from successful criminal activity,
wl the earnings from legal activity (here: employment), p the probability of be-
ing caught when committing a crime and P the extend of punishment after being
caught for crime. In this framework, the expected utility of crime and employment,
respectively, can be written as:
E(Ucrime) = (1− p) · U(Πc)− p · U(P ) (2.1)
E(Uempl) = U(wl) (2.2)
According to expected utility theory, a rational decision maker in that model
commits a crime if and only if (2.1) exceeds (2.2), i.e.:
(1− p) · U(Πc)− p · U(P ) > U(wl) (2.3)
The model has proven very useful in highlighting features of criminality: The
decision on criminal activity depends interactively on the probability of being caught,
on the extend of the potential punishment, on the gains from crime and work as
well as on the individual’s utility function. Yet, the model is based on a number of
assumptions that may limit the conclusions that can be drawn from it.
1In order to provide consistency in notation throughout this dissertation, the notation has been
adjusted compared to the original notation in the cited articles.
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First, the model is explicitly static and does not allow for a more dynamic consid-
eration of the crime decision process. That constraints the understanding of criminal
decisions to contemporaneous incentives, but leaves out important dynamic factors
such as those discussed in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. Second, the
model is based on the rationality assumption that underlies expected utility theory.
In the crime context, one may question that assumption: If moral concerns play a
role over and above what is captured by the utility function, the rationality assump-
tion may not be plausible. Third, the model is based on a binary choice between
work (legal activity) and crime (illegal activity). Yet, other than time constraints,
there is no obvious reason for the binary choice assumption to hold: A working
individual is not inhibited from committing a crime other than by allocating time
to legal and illegal activity, respectively. Models that incorporate an extension in
that sense are discussed later in this chapter.
Despite these limitations, the model allows useful insights and provides a baseline
microeconomic model for understanding criminal decision processes and the effect
of criminal justice policies such as policing, sentencing, or imprisonment. In that
sense the model has proven to be a starting point in many empirical analyses in the
economics of crime. Also, the model has subsequently been extended to incorporate
any of the reflections above.
Ehrlich (1973) relaxes the binary choice assumption and suggests a time alloca-
tion model with three possible activity states. In that model, an individual chooses
between a non-risky, legal market activity (choice l), a risky, illegal market activ-
ity (choice c) and a non-market activity as for example consumption or child care
(choice n). In addition, there are two states of the world: Either crime is followed by
punishment at the end of the time period (state 0) or it is not (state 1) where only
illegal market activity depends in its outcome on the state of the world. Here, the
individual’s decision regards the optimal time allocation with respect to the three
non-exclusive activity states. Importantly, an individual can pursue legal, illegal
and non-market activity simultaneously and is limited in his choice only by time
constraints.
Let X0 and X1 denote composite goods in both states of the world, respectively.
These goods are composed of the value of the individual’s assets and the returns
from legal as well as illegal market activity, where the latter depends on the state
of the world. Let t denote the individual’s time constraint, and tl, tc and tn the
time spent in each of the three respective activities. The rational expected utility
maximiser solves the following optimisation problem (Ehrlich, 1973):
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max
tl,tc,tn
{E(U(X0, X1, tn)) = P(state 0) · U(X0, tn) + P(state 1) · U(X1, tn)}
s.t. t = tl + tc + tn, tl ≥ 0, tc ≥ 0 and tn ≥ 0 (2.4)
That model captures a more realistic feature of criminality and the choice of
criminal activity. Criminal activity is a very risky alternative to legal employment
with risk arising from two different sources: First, there is a positive probability
of being caught and punished. Second, there is uncertainty with respect to the
number of arising crime opportunities. In contrast to legal occupational choices,
specialisation on crime might hence be suboptimal. That is reflected in the model
which allows for non-exclusive activities and incorporates features such as risk at-
titudes, captured in the utility function, and punishment probabilities, captured in
the probabilities of the different states of the world.2 Analysing comparative statist-
ics, Ehrlich (1973) derives behavioural implications of the model. Yet, the validity
of these considerations is limited as the model - although providing new insights -
is still relatively basic and relies on strong assumptions and parameter choices.
As discussed above, these seminal microeconomic models rely on strong theoret-
ical assumptions which limit the validity over and above the theoretical framework.
Yet, as Freeman (1999) points out, these rather simplified models allow us to fo-
cus on the allegedly most important parameters and features of criminal behaviour.
The models have provided the micro-foundation of more sophisticated theoretical
models, and have also proven to be an important starting point for a large body of
empirical research.
2.2.2 Peer Effects and Social Interactions
What is the role of social interactions with respect to crime decisions? The
benchmark model as described above does not take social interactions into account.
Yet, recent happenings such as for example the London Riots in 2011 lead us to
believe that social networks become more and more important in the crime context.
It is thus important to understand the nature of network and peer effects in order to
understand crime decisions and the organisation of criminal action. Economists have
modelled these social interactions and peer effects in a game-theoretical framework.
In the following, I outline examples of such models.
2Block and Heineke (1975) extend these ideas to derive a simple model of labour supply where
labour supply decisions depend on wealth, the (stochastic) returns to crime, enforcement, as well
as on the degree and the probability of punishment.
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Sah (1991) provides a model of social interactions and crime focusing on the
perception of punishment probabilities. In that framework, beliefs about punishment
are updated according to the social environment. That means that higher crime
rates lower the subjective probability for an individual to be arrested conditional
on a fixed number of arrests: The criminal perceives the risk of being arrested to
be spread out more the more individuals participate in the crime market. Based on
this notion, higher crime rates might contribute per se to an increase in the uptake
of criminal activity if indeed they affect individuals’ subjective arrest probabilities.
Glaeser et al. (1996) use a social interactions model in order to explain differ-
ences in criminal behaviour over time and space. The authors build their model
on the idea that individuals’ social networks correlate with their crime decisions.
Unlike Sah (1991), they study local instead of global interactions: Here, individuals
are influenced by their direct environment such as local neighbourhoods, friends or
family, rather than by global influences such as the aggregated crime and arrest
rates. Glaeser et al. (1996) find that variations in the crime patterns between cities
can partly be explained by differences in the local networks and interactions.
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) focus on the type of the social network and
its impact on criminal behaviour. Here, the model is set up as a two-stage game:
First, individuals decide exclusively on crime or labour. Second, they decide on how
much effort they put into the criminal activity. Studying sub-game perfect Nash
equilibria, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) find multiple equilibria that stem from
different social network patterns rather than from different networks per se: Social
networks, and in particular co-offending networks, yield positive as well as negative
externalities. For example, positive externalities include knowledge spillovers and
negative externalities the sharing of the loot. These externalities depend on the
structure of the network: An individual who is connected to a wider network is
faced with higher externalities compared to an individuals with fewer links. Calvó-
Armengol and Zenou (2004) argue that these externalities drive the multiplicity
of equilibria that result from their model, more so than the pure existence of the
networks.
The model illustrates the importance of social networks as a feature of criminal
behaviour as observed in recent developments.3 Yet, it relies on relatively strong
assumptions. First, the model is based on a mutually exclusive choice between
crime and labour. As discussed above, this assumption is a simplification and might
3For example, during the London Riots in 2011 social media seemed to play a significant role
in spreading information across networks. Indeed it would be very interesting to not only include
the existence and the type of network in the model, but also to consider the speed of information
sharing and the spatial implications for crime.
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easily be violated. Moreover, employment itself can yield positive and negative
externalities on criminal success: While legal employment might restrain individuals
from crime by lowering incentives and imposing a time constraint, the workplace
can also be thought of as a platform to gather information on future victims or
co-offenders, or simply as a platform for crime opportunities. Incorporating these
ideas into the model could lead to some interesting findings. Second, the model
assumes reciprocal, i.e. symmetrical social interactions. That implies that the social
networks are not hierarchical. Yet, that is a strong assumption with respect to
criminal networks which, to the contrary, typically exhibit rather strong hierarchical
patterns.
Using a similar approach as Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004), Calvó-Armengol
et al. (2007) model the impact of strong ties (family and best friends) and weak
ties (occasionally occurring meetings) on labour market and crime decisions. The
authors develop a "waiting room" model in which unemployment is the "waiting
room" for either employment and crime. Here, a criminal is defined as an indi-
vidual looking for criminal opportunities only and spending no time on legal job
search. An unemployed person is defined as an individual looking full-time for a
job. An individual can make a transition from unemployment to employment or
crime, and from employment or crime to unemployment. Transitions from crime to
employment and vice versa are not possible. Hence, in addition to the assumption
of a mutually exclusive choice between employment and crime the model imposes
restrictions on transitions between the three states employment, unemployment and
crime. Moreover, the model does not allow for information spillovers between peer
groups with respect to employment opportunities while explicitly allowing for those
spillovers with respect to criminal opportunities. That asymmetry implies that the
informative effect of peers is, if at all, negative. While the assumptions of the model
lead to simplifications, the model yet allows us to develop an intuition about the
interactions between labour market outcomes and criminal behaviour. In particular,
it may provide a valuable theoretical framework for empirical research on unemploy-
ment and crime such as described in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
The models outlined so far are based on the idea that the affiliation to a peer
group affects crime decisions. Yet, associated beliefs about an individual’s peer
group might play an important role, too. Verdier and Zenou (2004) provide a game-
theoretical approach in order to explain why discriminated groups commit more
crimes. The notion is based on labour market discrimination and spatial location:
If members of peer groups with higher average crime rates receive lower wages by
their employers due to statistical discrimination, these individuals can only afford
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to live further away from their workplace. That would be the case if a higher
criminal propensity, as perceived by the employer observing the peer group, lowers
the worker’s productivity. Now, the distance to the workplace implies commuting
and transportation costs, further reducing the net wage. Moreover, individuals
living further away from the workplace may be faced with an additional wage cut if
employers assume a decreased productivity due to tiredness after commuting. This
spatial location effect lowers effective wages and increases the propensity of crime,
driving self-fulfilling beliefs in equilibrium.
2.2.3 Dynamic Economic Models of Crime
One of the main drawbacks of the benchmark economic model of crime is that it is
an explicitly static model. Yet, one might be particularly interested in the dynamics
of criminal behaviour. In the following, I outline general equilibrium models as
well as search theoretical models that incorporate dynamic features. These models
moreover allow for simultaneous choices with respect to participation in the labour
as well as the crime market.
General Equilibrium Models
Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) derive a dynamic general equilibrium model of crime
with heterogeneous agents. Here, heterogeneity arises from deviating skill levels
and abilities implying differences with respect to labour income and earnings. By
assumption, individuals receive a stochastic employment opportunity, either em-
ployment or unemployment, in each period. Once they know about their respective
state, i.e. employment or unemployment, they decide about savings as well as crime
participation. The models allows for simultaneous participation in the legal as well
as the illegal market: Individuals can commit crime being employed or unemployed,
and they can become a victim of crime in any state. The authors derive the budget
constraints related to these assumptions, the dynamic programming problem as well
as a stationary equilibrium definition.
While Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) introduce skill heterogeneity with respect to
legal labour markets, Mocan et al. (2005) extend that idea by suggesting a dy-
namic model of differential human capital and criminal activity. Here, individuals
are endowed with legal and criminal activity specific human capital which evolve
over time. Hence, expected income from either employment or crime now depends
on both types of human capital. The authors derive a model in which during un-
employment the legal human capital stock and returns to legal human capital fall
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and involvement in criminal activity rises. That in turn leads to an accumulation of
criminal know-how, and subsequently to increasing returns to crime. In this model,
hysteresis occurs if the criminal human capital stock grows sufficiently large as for
example during a deep recession or long-term unemployment. The authors’ findings
are very useful in understanding the asymmetric relationship between unemploy-
ment and crime where the increase in crime during a recession is typically larger
than the decrease in crime after a recession.
Search-Theoretical Models
How do individuals initially decide about accepting or refusing job and crime
opportunities? Burdett et al. (2003) use a search-theoretical framework in order
to model these decisions. The authors extend the Burdett-Mortensen wage posting
search model, developing a search equilibrium model incorporating crime choices.
Here, the reservation wage is defined as an individual’s threshold wage in order to
accept a job offer. Similarly, the model features a crime reservation wage above
which the opportunity cost of crime is sufficiently high such that individuals do not
commit crime. The model relies on the standard assumptions of a search-theoretical
model. In addition, the authors impose the assumption of a crime-employment-
dichotomy such as discussed above.
The model leads to four different steady state equilibrium scenarios. If unem-
ployment benefits in an economy exceed a certain threshold, then no individual
commits crime in equilibrium: The opportunity cost of committing a crime is too
high, even for the unemployed. Else, there are three scenarios: Only unemployed
individuals commit crime if the wage for the employed is above the crime reservation
wage; everyone commits crime if the wage is below the crime reservation wage; else
all unemployed and some employed individuals commit crime. As Burdett et al.
(2003) conclude, that multiple equilibrium result may explain spatial heterogeneity
in crime.
In a follow-up paper, Burdett et al. (2004) introduce on-the-job-search into the
model. The respective equilibrium outcome changes: While in the previous model
the possibility of criminal activity generates a dispersion of wages around the reser-
vation wage and the crime reservation wage, here there is additional wage dispersion
above the reservation wage or the crime reservation wage.
As in the case of the static models, the assumption of a mutually exclusive
choice between employment and crime limits the validity of these models. Based
on a Pissarides search-theoretical framework, Engelhardt et al. (2008) develop a
theoretical model in which outcomes on the labour as well as the crime market are
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jointly determined. The model is based on a standard search model extended by a
crime component. Here, crime opportunities arrive randomly by assumption. Their
arrival probability depends on the individual’s state: Unemployment, employment
or prison.4 The authors derive the Bellman equations for the respective states, as
well as the decision rules for committing crime. Moreover, they derive an optimal
contract result, arguing that optimal contracts need to enforce individuals to in-
ternalise negative externalities of criminal activity. Here, negative externalities are
caused by losses for the employer once the individual commits crime. For example,
if the criminal worker is sentenced to prison, the employer-employee match is des-
troyed implying costs for the firms looking for a new match. In contrast to the
models above, the authors do not find multiple equilibria.
Criminal behaviour in this model is an endogenous decision which depends on
the labour market status. In particular, the decision between crime and labour
market participation is non-binary: While unemployed individuals are assumed to
have a higher propensity to commit crime than employed individuals, criminal op-
portunities do not only arrive to the unemployed. This is an important extension
compared to previous models.
Building on Burdett et al. (2004) and Engelhardt et al. (2008), Engelhardt (2010)
extends the on-the-job-search model, allowing for additional heterogeneity: Indi-
viduals differ in their valuation of leisure time and firms differ in their productivity.
The author assumes that there are two types of workers with high or low leisure time
valuation, and two types of firms with high or low productivity. As before, there are
three distinctive states: Unemployment, employment and prison. Deriving the Bell-
man equations for each state, Engelhardt (2010) establishes two reservation wages
which indicate the threshold wages for accepting a job or crime opportunity, respect-
ively. Further, there is a leisure time valuation threshold below which individuals
do and above which do not commit crime.
Engelhardt (2010) points out that only two states, employment and unemploy-
ment, lead to an optimal choice problem with respect to crime or employment de-
cisions. Prisoners, however, are assumed to only wait for release from prison. This
assumption simplifies the theoretical model, but may be violated in empirical re-
search mainly for two reasons: First, prisoners optimise their behaviour. Good
conduct in prison is subject to effort (cost), but increases the probability of early re-
lease (benefit). Second, prisoners optimise their participation and effort in in-prison
4Here, the crime opportunity arrival rate equals zero for individuals in prison. However, this
assumption might be violated if indeed criminal human capital is accumulated in prisons ("uni-
versities of crime") and criminal networks are built. This would impact on the future, if not the
present, crime opportunity arrival rate.
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training programmes or day-release job opportunities, as far as available.5
Similarly to Burdett et al. (2003), Engelhardt (2010) finds three equilibria. First,
high-productivity and low-productivity firms offer wages which are high enough
such that employees commit less crime than unemployed individuals. Second, only
high-productivity firms offer wages which are high enough such that employees com-
mit less crime than unemployed individuals or the low-productivity firm employees.
Third, wages and labour market status do not influence the crime propensity at all,
leading to an equilibrium in which all individuals commit the same amount of crime.
Here, the role of leisure valuation is not obvious. Considering only two types of indi-
viduals with fixed leisure time valuations, one type committing crime and the other
type never committing crime, the equilibria are tractable. Yet, it is not obvious
that the third case holds if valuations were continuously measured. In particular, if
the crime propensity depends on the individual’s leisure time valuation, the amount
of time already spent in employment matters. Regarding the crime decision, the
cost of lost leisure time during prison time is important. Hence, emphasising the
interaction of crime and labour supply decisions could be an interesting extension
of the model.
2.3 Empirical Economics of Crime
There is a large body of literature on empirical economics of crime. That lit-
erature faces particularities that are discussed in the following. First, sources and
challenges concerning crime data are described. Moreover, I discuss different sources
of endogeneity which may arise in addition to concerns about data availability and
quality. Second, I present examples of empirical research on the economics of crime
with a particular focus on labour markets.
2.3.1 Crime Data and Sources of Bias
Crime data come from a variety of sources each with respective advantages and
disadvantages. Conventional sources include administrative crime records, data on
prisoners, convictions as well as victimisations and crime surveys. Administrative
data sources include reported crime only and thus suffer from measurement error
with respect to the true number of crimes. While victimisation data are subject to a
similar concern, they still offer an improvement in that respect. However, that type
5This type of optimising behaviour might be particularly important for young prisoners whose
education and employment biographies are short. Indeed, it would be very interesting to empirically
evaluate such programmes with respect to labour and crime market outcomes.
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of data typically does not provide any information on the offender. Self-reported
crime captures criminal action that does or does not show in administrative records,
however suffers from survey response bias.6 Further, researchers have employed less
conventional approaches to collect data on crime. One such example are Krueger and
Pischke (1997) who use newspaper reports on crime against foreigners in Germany
in order to construct a data set. Yet, these approaches can be very costly and their
feasibility in research therefore restricted.
Observational levels of crime vary among the data sources. For example, in
some countries individual level register data including criminal records are available
whereas in other countries that type of information is only accessible at an aggreg-
ated level. While individual level data have a clear informational advantage over
aggregated data, one still needs to take into account the statistical implications of
crime being a low probability event. Aggregation at the spatial, temporal or demo-
graphic level partly overcomes that issue and also typically allows to add variables
from other data sources, one such example being labour market information. Yet,
estimations based on aggregated data have to be interpreted according to the par-
ticular statistical and behavioural assumptions in order to avoid misinterpretations
(Durlauf et al., 2010).
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Standard cross-sectional or time-series estimations using crime data can suffer
from unobserved heterogeneity at the spatial, temporal or demographic level. Indi-
viduals differ in their attitudes towards crime; particular regions and time periods
may be subject to specifics which are not observed, but which correlate with crime.
Panel data allow to control for this unobserved heterogeneity by means of fixed
effects estimation.7 Yet, even fixed effects estimations may still be biased (Levitt,
2001, Bjerk, 2009). In particular, fixed effects estimation relies on the assumption of
exogeneity, i.e. that the assignment to a treatment of interest happens at random.
If that assumption does not hold, the estimates of a fixed effects estimation model
are biased.
Omitted Variables
Related to that is the problem of omitted variables. Which are the contributing
factors to crime? If variables which correlate with crime as well as with the treat-
ment of interest are omitted, the estimates of the respective model are biased. The
6See for example Tabarrok et al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion of that point.
7See for example Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) for an early discussion.
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problem of omitted variables results from a lack of knowledge about contributing
factors to crime on the one hand, and from a lack of data on the other hand. For
example, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Entorf and Winker (2008) discuss
the inclusion of procyclical effects; Mustard (2003) discusses the effect of omitted
variable bias in the context of arrest rates, conviction rates and sentence lengths,
the latter often being neglected in the literature.
Simultaneity and Reversed Causality
One of the main challenges in identifying causal effects on crime is to overcome
simultaneity or reversed causality issues: What is the causal effect of police on crime
if police presence is higher in high crime areas? What is the impact of low wages on
criminal activity if employers in a region with higher crime rates pay lower wages,
because they take potential cost for criminal employees into account? What are
the implications of unemployment for crime participation if employers avoid regions
with higher crime rates which increases local unemployment rates per se? If these
concerns are not taken into account, estimation results are biased. A priori, there is
no consistent opinion about the general direction of the bias which on the contrary
depends on the specific research question (Mustard, 2010).
In so-called reduced form empirical research, quasi-experimental methods on the
one hand and instrumental variable methods on the other hand offer a solution to
overcome endogeneity bias. These econometric models are very useful in order to
retrieve causal estimates, however are subject to two major drawbacks:8 First, it
can be hard to find a suitable quasi-experiment or instrumental variable. Second,
the external validity of quasi-experiment or the instrumental variable approach can
be limited to the particular institutional setting.
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence
In the following, I discuss examples of empirical research on the interaction
between labour markets and crime. One can think of a number of mechanisms
through which criminality relates to labour market outcomes and formulate re-
spective hypotheses. First, there is a scarring effect of crime: Individuals with
criminal records are faced with tougher conditions on the labour market than their
non-criminal counterfactuals. Second, unemployment increases criminal behaviour:
Employment is substituted by criminal activity in terms of time use and income
generation. Third, low wages trigger criminal behaviour: Low wage earners show
8See for example Levitt (2001).
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a higher propensity to generate additional income from criminal activity. In the
following, I discuss examples of empirical research on these hypotheses. Moreover,
I outline empirical research that has been undertaken in order to understand the
interactions between education and crime as well as peer effects on crime.
Scarring Effects of Crime
There is a large body of evidence on scarring effects of criminal records on labour
market outcomes such as employment and wages. An early and prominent example
is found in Grogger (1995), studying the question whether arrests cause a decrease
in earnings and employment or whether the statistical correlation is driven by un-
observed characteristics of the arrestees.9 If these underlying characteristics jointly
correlate with individual crime propensity and labour market performance, the es-
timated scarring effect is biased. Grogger (1995) estimates a fixed effects model
exploiting longitudinal data in order to identify the scarring effects of arrests on
labour market outcomes (see the discussion above).
The study uses longitudinal earning records for the years 1980-1984, provided by
the California Development Department, which are matched to longitudinal criminal
justice records from the California Justice Department’s Adult Criminal Justice
System. In line with the literature the author restricts his analysis to young males,
as this group is the most prone to criminal activity. He defines the treatment group
as individuals who have been arrested in 1984 or earlier, and the control group as
individuals who have been arrested in 1985 or later. Using a distributed lag model,
he estimates the following equation for individual i at time t where y denotes the
labour market outcome (earnings, employment), A the arrest records, X a set of
control variables, µ the fixed effect and η the residual:
yit =
m∑
j=0
Ait−j · βj +Xit · δ + µi + ηit (2.5)
Grogger (1995) finds significant evidence that arrest records decrease both em-
ployment probabilities and earnings. The effects are fairly moderate in their mag-
nitude: Initially there is a 4 per cent decrease in earnings which falls to about 2
to 3 per cent, and eventually fades out. More recent studies support the notion
of a scarring effect of a criminal record on labour market outcomes although, not
surprisingly, magnitudes differ (e.g. Kling (2006) or Baert and Verhofstadt (2015)).
9These correlated, unobserved characteristics actually open ground for new research questions.
Which factors precisely are linked to both labour market and crime outcomes? This would be
highly interesting in the context of job search behaviour and crime prevention.
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Unemployment and Crime
The relationship between unemployment and crime has been subject to a large
number of studies. From the theoretical models, crime can be understood as an
alternative to employment where an unemployed individual substitutes legal em-
ployment by illegal activity. Thus, one might expect compelling empirical evidence
that unemployment increases crime. Yet, as Freeman (1999) writes:
"Thus, unemployment is related to crime, but if your prior was that the
relation was overwhelming, you were wrong. Joblessness is not the overwhelm-
ing determinant of crime that many analysts and the public a priori expected
it to be. Why?"
Even almost ten years later, that puzzle remains and the findings differ in mag-
nitudes, statistical precision and even in signs (Mustard, 2010):
"This literature, which is decades old and contains hundreds of papers, is
characterized by an intriguing puzzle − the large gap between the theory and
empirical work."
In the following, I discuss examples of the existent literature on unemployment
and crime. Two subsequent chapters of this dissertation contribute to that body of
research.
The paper by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) is based on the Becker-Ehrlich
paradigm with a time allocation model of crime and employment. They use a state-
level panel for 50 U.S. states from 1971-1997 with data from the FBI Uniform Crime
Reports, the U.S. Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In order to identify the
causal effect of unemployment on crime, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) employ
two different empirical strategies: First, they estimate an OLS model and tackle
the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by extensively including control variables
and adding state and year fixed effects. Second, they estimate an instrumental
variable model with military spending and state-specific measures of oil price shocks
as instruments. Their baseline estimation equation for state i at time t reads as
follows, where C denotes the crime rate, α and δ the fixed effects, t and t2 a quadratic
time trend, UR the unemployment rate, X a set of control variables and η the
residual:
Cit = αt + δi + ψi · t+ ωi · t2 + γ · URit + β ·Xit + ηit (2.6)
The authors find that the OLS estimation yields elasticities of the property crime
rate with respect to the unemployment rate between 1.6 and 2.4 per cent, and more
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ambiguous results for violent crime. The estimates from the instrumental variable
estimation exceed the OLS estimate in magnitude (2.8 to 5.0 per cent) for property
crime and are more ambiguous for violent crime.10
More recently, Lin (2008) estimates the causal effect of unemployment on crime
using data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, too, however over a longer and
more recent time span. His identification strategy relies on an instrumental vari-
able framework with changes in the real exchange rate, state manufacturing sector
percentages, and state union membership rates as instrumental variables. He finds
elasticities of the property crime rate with respect to unemployment of 4 to 6 per
cent (compared to a 1.8 per cent OLS estimate), and no significant impact on violent
crime.
Fougère et al. (2009) study the relationship between crime rates and (youth)
unemployment in France. The authors construct a panel of reported crimes for the
95 French departments from 1990 to 2000 and match labour market data from the
French Labor Force Survey and the French Public Employment Service. Similar to
the previously discussed papers, Fougère et al. (2009) begin their analysis with a
fixed effects estimation. Their baseline estimating equation for department i and
time t reads as follows, where C denotes the crime rate, X a set of control variables,
UR the unemployment rate, α and δ the fixed effects and η the residual:
Cit = Xit · β + γ · URit + αi + δt + ηit (2.7)
As discussed previously, the results from the fixed effects estimation may be
biased. In order to retrieve causal estimates, Fougère et al. (2009) additionally
estimate an instrumental variable model. Their findings suggest that youth un-
employment, but not overall unemployment, has a positive causal effect on most
property crime rates which is robust to a number of tests.
While the studies cited above rely on spatially aggregated data, Grönqvist (2013)
uses individual level data from Swedish administrative registers in order to estimate
the effect of youth unemployment on crime. He finds sizeable effects on all types
of crime, but in particular for income generating crimes such as property crime and
drug crime. The magnitudes of the effects exceed the magnitudes found in studies
relying on aggregated data. As Grönqvist (2013) points out, this is likely due to
the fact that the individual level estimation allows to disentangle the behavioural
response to unemployment from any underlying general equilibrium effects.
10In the literature on unemployment and crime, there typically is a downward bias of the OLS
estimates compared to IV estimates. This is what is expected following from the reversed causality
problem.
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Two chapters of this dissertation contribute to the literature on the relationship
between unemployment and crime. While the following chapter studies scarring
effects on crime of graduating in times of weak labour markets, the subsequent
chapter studies the causal effect of unemployment and crime in the context of the
Great Recession and explicitly looks at the role of unemployment durations.
Low Wages and Crime
One of the mechanisms behind the unemployment-crime relationship is time real-
location from legal to illegal activity. Another mechanism refers to income genera-
tion. The hypothesis is the following: Unemployment lowers an individual’s income
and hence triggers criminal behaviour. Now, if that is the case one would expect
low wage earners to have a higher crime propensity than higher wage earners, too.
An early approach to this question is found in Grogger (1998). He estimates the
impact of the market wage on crime rates, using U.S. individual level data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The underlying hypothesis suggests that
crime which is triggered by low wages is income related, and hence only property
crime is considered. Grogger (1998) derives three equations from a theoretical,
time allocation model: A wage equation, a crime participation function and the
consumer’s marginal rate of substitution (labour supply). Let wl denote the wage,
wc the returns to crime, wn non-market income, t the allocated time, and η the
residual:
lnwl = X1 · β1 + η1 (2.8)
lnwc = X2 · β2 − α2 · tc + η2 (2.9)
lnMRS = X3 · β31 + β32 · tl + β33 · (wn + wc) + β34 · (t− tc) + η3 (2.10)
Estimating the model, Grogger (1998) finds a robust, causal effect: Lower wages
increase the crime propensity of young men. He draws two main conclusions from
his findings. First, the differential in the share of low wage workers between black
and white young men can partly explain the gap in the respective crime rates.
Second, if low wages increase crime propensities and if wages increase with age,
then the findings can contribute to understanding the strong crime-age patterns
which are typically observed in the data. Yet, it is unlikely that low wages can
fully explain the crime-age pattern. For example, peer effects which are stronger
at young ages or family commitments which are more significant at higher ages,
might constitute additional factors. Here, neither peer effects nor home production
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time are incorporated into the model and thus the findings have to be interpreted
as partial effects.
Note that the model explicitly allows for the possibility that employed individuals
commit crime. Indeed, descriptive statistics show that 94.5% of the young men in
the sample who were generating income from criminal activity were employed at
the same time (Grogger, 1998). This number is rather striking and one might have
expected the share of individuals who commit crime to be significantly higher among
the unemployed than among the employed. These findings support the hypothesis
that low wages may be a stronger predictor of crime than unemployment.
Gould et al. (2002) argue that wages measure the opportunity cost of crime and
should therefore be a valid predictor for criminal propensity. Three mechanisms
can be distinguished. First, there is a substitution mechanism: If legal and crim-
inal activity are substitutes, lower wages incentivise individuals to substitute work
by crime. Second, there is an income mechanism: If wages are low, individuals
are incentivised to top up their income from employment by income from criminal
activity. Third, there is an inverse deterrence mechanism: If the wage represents
the opportunity cost of crime after being caught and punished, lower wages increase
the propensity of crime relative to higher wages.
In their paper, Gould et al. (2002) study the causality between increasing crime
rates and decreasing wages for low-educated, low-paid workers. Their empirical
strategy is based on three distinct approaches: First, they use annual county-level
data from 1979 to 1997 to estimate a fixed effects model of the aggregated crime rate
on state-level average wages and unemployment rates for non-college educated men.
Second, they estimate the model using ten-year changes both in the crime rates as
well as the averages wages and unemployment rates, now at the metropolitan area
level. Third, they use individual-level data and include control variables for personal
characteristics. OLS as well as instrumental variable estimations are carried out,
with area-specific industrial composition, aggregated industrial trends as well as
aggregated demographic changes in industries as instruments.
The findings in the paper suggest that negative wage trends account for more
than 50% of the increase in crime rates (Gould et al., 2002). The results are robust
across the specifications and estimation methods. The authors point out that crime
rates are long-term indices, and hence are more likely to be affected by long-term
wage trends than by unemployment. This notion leads to the question whether
unemployment in itself differentially affects crime: What is the effect of short-term
unemployment versus long-term unemployment on crime? Is the stock of unem-
ployed or the inflow into unemployment the more important predictor of crime
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rates? These questions are addressed to an extend in the subsequent chapters of
this dissertation.
Machin and Meghir (2004) study the effect of aggregated wage rates on the
propensity for crime in the case of the United Kingdom. They formulate a choice
model of employment and crime and derive value functions for the four respective
outcomes: Employment, crime, employment and crime, or neither employment nor
crime. The expected value of any of these outcomes is scaled by the probability of
not being caught after having committed a crime. Further, the propensity of crime
depends on the returns to crime and to employment as well as on the amount of
unemployment benefits, albeit not on the unemployment status per se.
The empirical analysis exploits a panel of recorded property and vehicle crime
offences from police force area data (Criminal Statistics by the Home Office), con-
taining 42 areas in the United Kingdom between 1975 and 1996. Wage information
from the New Earnings Survey (NES) is matched by year and area. Following the
notions from the theoretical model, low-wage workers are more likely to commit
crime than high wage workers. Machin and Meghir (2004) consider the 25th per-
centile of the wage distribution in each area as a proxy of the aggregated low wage
rate. Deriving the logistic probability for each of the four states leads to an expres-
sion of the probability of criminal activity. Aggregating by police force area and
taking log odds ratios, a linear approximation of the crime rate for police force area
i and time t is derived, where C denotes the crime rate, α and δ the fixed effects,
r the returns to crime, w the returns to employment, b the benefit transfers, p the
apprehension probability, X a set of control variables and η the residual:
ln (Cit/1− Cit) = αt + δi + γ1 · rit + γ2 · wit + γ3 · bit + γ4 · Cit−1
+γ5 · pit + β ·Xit + ηit (2.11)
Fixed effects and instrumental variable estimations are carried out and yield
robust, significant negative wage effects with marginal effects between -0.066% and
-0.096% for property crime and smaller but still significant effects for other crime
types. As the authors point out, these effects are sizeable and again suggest that
low wages act as a better predictor for crime than unemployment. Yet, compared
to other European countries during that time period, long-term unemployment was
to a lesser extent a worry in the United Kingdom. That raises similar questions as
above: What is the impact of unemployment and low wages on crime in economies
that are faced with generally longer unemployment spells? A cross-country analysis
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could yield highly interesting insights, although such a study would of course be
challenging with respect to identification.
One of the mechanisms behind the increase in crime with lower wages is the
income mechanisms outlined above. Further, one can argue that jobs at the very
low end of the wage distribution are less time consuming than the jobs at the very
top of the wage distribution. While part of that is a selection effect, there might be
an additional time use or inverse incapacitation effect: Would the same individual
commit less crime if he was in the same low paid job, but for more hours a week?
Distinguishing these effects would be highly policy relevant.
An example for a continental European country analysis is the paper by Entorf
and Spengler (2000). Using state level panel data form Germany11, they explain
crime rates by different determinants including demographic and urban factors, rel-
ative income and (youth) unemployment. Their empirical strategy relies on a static
regression on the one hand, and a dynamic error correction model including state
fixed effects on the other hand. Descriptive statistics suggest that crime rates are
substantially higher in East German states than in West German states. Moreover,
the estimations yield ambiguous results in terms of the impact of unemployment on
crime, but also suggest a crime differential between East and West Germany. The
authors do not have a consistent explanation for that differential which prompts
additional research questions: To what extent are crime rates in East German re-
gions higher due to a cultural or economic shock after the reunification? To what
extent can weaker labour markets in East Germany after 1990 explain the relatively
high crime rates? Or, alternatively, are there unobserved behavioural responses and
changes in the perception of social justice after the reunification which was accom-
panied by a change in political and cultural paradigms? These are research questions
that would be very interesting to tackle in future research.
Education and Crime
So far, I have discussed interactions between labour markets and crime. Educa-
tion as a predictor of labour market outcomes is another important factor in order to
explain criminal behaviour. In the following, I discuss examples of empirical research
that is tailored towards quantifying the causal impact of education on crime.
Lochner (2004) derives a life-cycle time allocation model of crime and human
capital investment. Individuals decide between crime, work and human capital
investment while optimising their expected lifetime utility. He points out that wages
11The sample includes West German states from 1975 to 1996, and East German states from
1993 to 1996. Due to data validity concerns before and right after the reunification, the authors
include East German states only from 1993 onwards.
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as a predictor of crime neglect the fact that in particular the youth are still in a
human capital investment period and do not yet receive the full returns to education.
In particular, he establishes a causality between the skill and education levels and
higher crime rates among young, low-skilled men.
In order to account for potential sources of endogeneity, Lochner (2004) dis-
tinguishes between high-skilled and low-skilled crime. Intuitively, the propensity
for unskilled crime is negatively correlated with the current skill level: Higher skill
levels potentially translate into higher wages which in turn implies high opportunity
cost for unskilled crime. Yet, an increasing number of unskilled crime opportunities
lowers the incentive for human capital investment. These mechanisms are less obvi-
ous for high-skilled crime, and one might in the extreme case even expect a positive
correlation between skill levels and high-skilled crime propensities.12 Using data for
the U.S., Lochner (2004) finds a strong, negative effect of education on crime, con-
firming the human capital hypothesis. Moreover, he finds a strong, negative effect
of cognitive ability on low-skilled crime as well as a positive effect of educational
attainment on high-skill crime.
In line with these findings, Machin et al. (2011) establish three channels of edu-
cational impact on crime: Income effects driven by wages and opportunity cost of
crime, time availability effects or incapacitation effects as well as patience and risk
aversion effects.13 Using data for the United Kingdom, they follow a similar empir-
ical strategy to Lochner and Moretti (2004): In a quasi-experimental setting, they
exploit variations in education due to legal changes in compulsory school leaving
ages. Their strategy identifies the local effect of the additional year in education on
crime for the lower tail of the education distribution.14 The authors find a robust
and significant negative effect of education on the property crime rate, a similar
result to what is found in Lochner and Moretti (2004). Moreover, the results are in
line with those found by Meghir et al. (2011) who use a compulsory school leaving
age reform in Sweden to identify the relationship between educational attainment
and crime, as well as parental educational attainment and crime. In both cases, they
find a strong negative causal effect. The external validity of the quasi-experimental
approach, which identifies local treatment effects, is in general limited to particu-
lar institutional settings. Yet, quasi-experimental research from different countries
yields coherent conclusions so far.
12That might be the case for example for white-collar crimes such as tax evasion or corruption
13As known from the literature on the economics of education, there is a positive correlation
between higher educational attainment and patience.
14The lower tail of the education distribution is likely to represent the relevant treatment group:
Individuals who are affected by the legislative changes, as they would otherwise have dropped out
of school.
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Peer Effects and Crime
What is the empirical evidence for peer effects among offenders? The identific-
ation of peer effects in empirical economics of crime is threatened by the Manski
reflection problem (Manski, 1993): Is the individual influenced by the peers or the
peers by the individual? In other words, is the group of peers more likely to commit
crime because of a criminal member or is that individual more likely to commit
crime because of the group of peers? Glaeser et al. (1996) address the question the-
oretically as discussed above and empirically. In particular, they investigate to what
extend the spatial variance of crime rates can be explained by social interactions, or
rather by unobserved heterogeneity. In their empirical strategy, they use data from
the FBI Uniform Crime Reports and the New York City Police Department and de-
compose the gap between actual and predicted crime rates. The results suggest that
social interactions matter and account for the variance of inter-urban differences in
crime rates.
Interestingly, the authors find that youth crime shows more dependency on so-
cial interactions. Moreover, having established the relevance of social interactions,
Glaeser et al. (1996) point out that it is important to understand the underlying
mechanisms. Discussing several candidates, they conclude that family instability
is one likely medium, rather than schooling, unemployment or arrest rates. This
being an interesting suggestion, the question about the precise channel remains:
Are stronger moral or ethical ties important? Does family stability influence a in-
dividual’s risk behaviour or opportunity cost of crime? Does family stability imply
stronger commitments and therefore does it matter for time allocation?
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter reviews the existent literature on the economics of crime and labour
markets. Moreover, it identifies gaps in the literature and open research questions.
It focusses on theoretical and empirical dimensions of the interaction between crime
and labour market opportunities. The literature on the relationship between crime
and labour markets yields evidence across countries that supports the hypothesis
that labour markets indeed matter for crime outcomes. Still, there are open research
questions with respect to underlying mechanisms as well as the magnitudes of the
effects. Both of these are crucial for broader policy implications.
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Chapter 3. Crime Scars: Recessions and the
Making of Career Criminals
This chapter is based on the discussion paper "Crime Scars: Recessions and the Making of
Career Criminals", available in the IZA, CEP and CEPR discussion paper series. I would like to
thank my co-authors Brian Bell and Stephen Machin for their contributions.
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3.1 Introduction
Do the labour market conditions which the young encounter when they first leave
school play a role in initiating and forming criminal careers? Think of two otherwise
identical school leavers who leave high school in 2010, one in North Dakota and
the other in Michigan. Whilst both have completed education and try to get a job,
the North Dakota school leaver faces a state unemployment rate of only 3.8 percent
compared to 12.7 percent in Michigan. At the margin, the Michigan youngster is
more likely to proceed down the wrong path (no luck finding a job, no welfare to fall
back on, hanging out with similarly unfortunate juveniles, trouble with the police,
some petty larceny etc.) than the North Dakota youngster.
Indeed, this is just the benchmark Becker (1968) model in action: As youths
leave school, they face a trade-off between legal and illegal activities. At higher
unemployment rates, the expected returns to legal activity, i.e. work, are lower. All
else equal, this encourages some youths to commit crime that would otherwise have
successfully avoided such a result in a more buoyant labour market.
What might happen as these same youngsters age? Two obvious mechanisms
link the experience when they enter the labour market with later ones. First, earlier
experiences of crime might increase the stock of criminal knowledge and potentially
reduce the costs of participating in subsequent criminal activity. Second, a previous
criminal record, and thereby less on-the-job human capital accumulation, might
reduce the expected wage in the legal labour market. Both effects can be expected
to increase the likelihood that the individual eventually becomes a career criminal.
There is a substantial body of criminological evidence that points to the im-
portance of the experience of youths for understanding crime patterns. Almost two
hundred years ago, Adolphe Quetelet showed that crime in early nineteenth-century
France peaked when individuals were in their late teens (Quetelet, 1831[1984]). Sub-
sequent research has confirmed the strong age-crime pattern, with crime peaking in
the late teens and declining quite rapidly after that.1 Unsurprisingly, the same pat-
terns emerge in our data. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the average male offender rate
by age for the U.S. and UK from 2000-2010.2 The peak in the offender rate occurs
at age 17 or 18 and declines reasonably smoothly from then on.
1See Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) who develop the notion that crime-age profiles are invariant
over time and space, and the subsequent body of research trying to refute this claim as for example
Greenberg (1985), Hansen (2003) and a meta-study by Pratt and Cullen (2000).
2Full details on the data used in the charts are provided in the following sections of this chapter.
The chart shows the average offender rate, measured in arrests for the U.S. and convictions in the
UK, and defined as the number of offenders divided by the respective population in each age group.
The data is averaged over the time period 2000-2010.
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Note, however, that the offender rate at age 29 is still a lot higher than at age 39,
showing that criminality is not just a feature of teenage years. Existing evidence
points to strong links between criminality in teenage years and subsequent criminal
behaviour.3 We find that in our data, for example, 72 percent of males aged over
25 in the UK who were convicted of a crime in 2002 had a criminal record that
went back to their teenage years. Thus, factors that increase criminal behaviour for
juveniles have scope to raise the lifetime criminal participation rate. The focus of
this paper is on whether the state of the labour market at labour market entry is
such a factor.
In pursuing this research question, our analysis contributes to two distinct strands
of literature. First, there has been an extensive, though partly unresolved, debate
over the link between recessions and crime. This literature has primarily focused on
the issue of whether crime rates, and in particular property crime rates, are coun-
tercyclical. The evidence tends to suggest that the place where one can identify
effects from unemployment to crime is for young adults.4 Thus, Gould et al. (2002)
examine the impact of contemporaneous unemployment and wages on the criminal
behaviour of less educated young males. Exploiting a panel of U.S. counties, they
find significant effects for both wages and unemployment on property and violent
crime. Fougère et al. (2009) find strong effects from youth unemployment, but
not from overall unemployment, on crime in France, while Grönqvist (2013) uses
Swedish register data to show a strong and precisely estimated link between youth
unemployment and crime, both for property and violent crimes.
Second, there is a growing literature on the effects of first entering the labour
market during recessions on outcomes later in life. That literature so far has focused
on whether such workers experience sustained long-run negative consequences. Early
contributions by Ellwood (1982) and Gardecki and Neumark (1998) find somewhat
contrasting evidence on whether initial labour market experience affected subsequent
outcomes, with Ellwood finding significant effects on wages but not on future spells
of unemployment, while Gardecki and Neumark found little evidence of a sustained
negative effect. More recently, Hershbein (2012) finds that a recession reduces start-
ing wages of high-school graduates by about 6 percent, but that this penalty fades
away within six years. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) exploit a large Canadian longitud-
3For more details, see for example the many papers which are cited in the review of Nagin and
Paternoster (2000) that frames the positive link between past and future criminality in terms of
individual heterogeneity and state dependence.
4Indeed, Freeman (1999) notes the relationship across the whole population to be "fragile, at
best". More recent reviews confirm this, and therefore more focus can be placed on youth crime
and unemployment in order to identify labour market effects on crime (see, for example, Mustard
(2010) or Buonanno et al. (2011)).
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inal dataset to show that the cost of a recession for new graduates is substantial
and long lasting. A typical recession, defined as a 5 percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate, is associated with an initial loss of earnings of about 9
percent that halves within 5 years, and eventually fades to zero by 10 years. The
economic mechanism operates via initial placements with lower paying employers
and succeeding recoveries through gradual job mobility to better firms. Graduates
in the lower quintile of the ability distribution suffer permanently lower wages, while
the more able graduates quickly bounce back. Similar results are reported by Kahn
(2010) who uses longitudinal data on U.S. college graduates, though some of her
results suggest that the wage penalty is longer lasting. By contrast, Benedetto et al.
(2010) find no evidence of a persistent impact of graduation-year unemployment on
earnings using U.S. social security earnings data.5
Taking a somewhat different approach, Oyer (2006, 2008) examines the career
paths of particular occupations, namely economists and investment bankers, to as-
sess the importance of initial labour market conditions. He shows that stock market
conditions at the time of graduation have a strong effect on whether MBA stu-
dents directly take jobs at Wall Street, or instead pursue alternatives such as jobs
in consulting firms. Further, he shows that starting a career in investment banking
directly after graduation causes a person to be more likely to stay in the job and
earn significantly more. These effects are substantial in size, amounting to several
million dollars in present value.
Outside of the labour market literature, labour market entry conditions have
been shown to impact other later in life outcomes. Maclean (2013), for example,
finds that males who graduate from high school during a recession show worse health
outcomes at age 40 than those graduating in a more auspicious labour market. This
is true for both self-reported health measures and objective measures of physical
and mental health. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that those who enter
the labour market during a recession are more likely to believe that success in
life depends more on luck than effort, and support more government redistribution.
Again, these effects are seen to be long lasting. The protective effect of education for
cohorts who graduate in recessions is studied by Cutler et al. (2015) in their analysis
of Eurobarometer data. They report evidence of lower wages and life satisfaction
together with higher obesity and a greater propensity to smoke and drink later in
life for individuals who graduate in recession years, with higher education levels
significantly moderating these negative outcomes.
5Also, see the international comparison of unemployment entry effects on labour market out-
comes in the U.S. and Japan by Genda et al. (2010).
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The results which are reported in this chapter uncover a more disturbing long-run
effect of recessions. In the U.S. and in the UK, based on a variety of individual and
cohort level data sources, we find evidence of a systematic empirical link between
crime and entry-level unemployment. It very clearly shows that young people who
leave school in the midst of recessions are significantly more likely to lead a life
of crime than those entering a buoyant labour market. Moreover, these effects
are seen to be long lasting and substantial. Thus, as other economic and social
outcomes are significantly affected by the state of the business cycle at the time when
individuals potentially enter the labour market, so is criminal activity. We conclude
that recessions do play a role in the making of career criminals as crime scars from
higher entry level unemployment rates are both long lasting and substantial.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we discuss potential
mechanisms that link initial conditions at labour market entry and the future path
of criminal behaviour, as well as the underlying dynamics in order to motivate our
empirical research. In section 3.3 we discuss the empirical strategy and the data
sources both for the U.S. and the UK. We present the cohort panel results and
individual-level evidence in sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. Section 3.6 concludes
by summarising the key findings in this chapter.
3.2 Theoretical Background
In the standard Becker (1968) economics of crime model, individuals act as ra-
tional decision makers and choose between legal and illegal activity. Their choice is
based on the expected returns to both options. In this simple yet powerful frame-
work, returns to legal activity are solely determined by the market earnings from
employment whereas returns to illegal activity take into account the potential crime
payoff, the probability of getting caught and the expected sanction if caught. If the
expected return to illegal activity outweighs the expected return to legal activity,
the individual chooses to commit crime.
In the Becker model, higher unemployment reduces the returns to legal activity.
Thus, individuals facing unemployment or higher risk of unemployment may become
more likely to commit crime than they would have been otherwise. That effect is
expected to be higher for youth who typically are less attached to the legal labour
market than older individuals further on in their careers.
The model has proved valuable in highlighting the economic incentives associated
with criminal activity and its basic predictions on incentive and deterrence effects
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on crime has received substantial empirical support.6 Its weakness and limitation
for our purposes is that it is explicitly static. Individuals make a one-off decision
to commit crime or work in the legal sector. There is no process through which
decisions made in the current period have implications both for future decisions and
for the choices available to the individual in later periods.
Mocan et al. (2005) develop a dynamic model that links recessions, human capital
and crime.7 Individuals are lifetime utility maximisers where the source of utility
from consumption and income comes from both the legal and the criminal sector.
Individuals have endowments of legal and criminal human capital, which depreciate
over time. Both types of human capital rise with experience in the sector and
are increased by investment in the respective sectors. The individual’s income is a
function of human capital and rates of return in both sectors. In each period, the
individual solves a dynamic stochastic optimisation problem: First, they decide how
much time to allocate to legal and criminal work and second, they decide on the
optimal level of consumption.
Crime is risky in the sense that a criminal faces a certain probability of being
caught and sent to prison. The probability of prison depends on the skill of the
criminal as measured by criminal human capital and the amount of time spent in
the criminal sector as measured by experience in the sector. While legal human
capital may decline in prison in addition to depreciation effects, for example due to
reputation effects, criminal human capital may increase if criminals in prison learn
from each other.
In this model, recessions impact on crime through the respective dynamic evolu-
tions of both legal and criminal human capital. In that sense, the long-term impact
of recessions on crime differs with the length and the depth of a recession. In a
recession, the returns to legal human capital fall. Following the arguments from the
standard Becker (1968) model, involvement in criminal activity rises depending on
the relative and absolute returns to crime. If involvement in criminal activity in-
creases, the criminal human capital stock is expected to grow while the legal human
capital stock depreciates. Once the recession ends, returns to legal human capital
increase again, and the relative returns to criminal activity decrease.
In a short recession, the stock of legal human capital typically remains signific-
antly higher than the stock of criminal human capital, and the individual exits the
criminal sector. Basically, in such a short recession, the individual is encouraged to
6See for example the reviews of Freeman (1999) and Chalfin and McCrary (2015), together with
the introduction of Cook et al. (2013).
7For alternative dynamic models of crime participation see Flinn (1986), Lee and McCrary
(2009) and Lochner (2004).
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get involved in criminal activity, but is not exposed to these conditions for a long
enough period to develop sufficient criminal capital in order to yield higher returns
in the crime market than in the legal market once the recession ends.
If an individual is exposed to an unexpectedly long recession, the decision between
legal and illegal activity changes in the same way as in a short recession. How-
ever, the individual’s criminal human capital stock grows over a longer time period
whereas the legal human capital stock is expected to decline even more than in a
shorter recession. These two effects may result in higher returns to criminal activity
than to legal activity even after the recession ends. We expect more permanent
effects of a recession on criminal behaviour in that case. In addition, with higher
involvement in criminal activity, the chances of being caught and imprisoned will
rise. As explained above, if imprisoned, an individual’s criminal human capital stock
may rise further in absolute terms, and certainly rises further relative to legal human
capital. In that situation hysteresis can occur and trigger criminal careers.
The mechanisms explained above are likely to be stronger for these individuals
with initially low levels of legal human capital. New entrants to the labour market
have developed less legal human capital and thus are less attached to the legal labour
market. In our empirical analysis, we thus look at cohorts entering the labour market
in different economic conditions and estimate the effect of entering the labour market
in a recession on subsequent crime outcomes.
In the criminology literature there has been extensive focus on the concept of a
criminal career and how it develops with age (see Piquero et al. (2003)). A criminal
career is often characterised by various stages: onset, persistence, escalation or
specialisation and desistance.8 Sampson and Laub (1995, 2005) characterise crime
as a product of persistent individual differences and local life events. They find that
incarceration in later life is strongly related to the difficulty in securing stable work
as individuals entered young adulthood.
Our research question of whether labour market entry conditions matter for crime
fits naturally into this framework. Unemployment at labour market entry, a local life
event, can contribute to the onset of criminal behaviour and/or can encourage the
persistence of those youths that have already begun a criminal career. The long-run
effect of unemployment at labour market entry then depends on the persistence and
desistance effects. There has been less research on the duration of criminal careers.
One study (Piquero et al., 2003) finds that, for offenders with two or more offences,
the average duration of criminal careers was 10.4 years.
8Criminological research that place a focus on particular stages of these crime dynamics includes
Eggleston and Laub (2002), Elliott (1994) and McGee and Farrington (2010).
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In the discussion thus far we have implicitly assumed that unemployment at
labour market entry causes the criminal career to begin at that point, or to intensify
for those youths already active in crime. A complementary alternative would be that
entry unemployment has delayed effects on criminal behaviour. Zara and Farrington
(2010) study a group of late-onset offenders who commit their first crime aged 21 or
over. They find a significant effect of high unemployment at age 16-18 as a predictor
of subsequent offending relative to a non-offending control group. To address this
in our empirical analysis, we consider an approach that is flexible enough to permit
differential timing of the effects of labour market entry unemployment effects on
crime.
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
This section describes the empirical strategy in order to identify the impact of
entering the labour market during recessions on long-term criminal behaviour. First
the modelling approach and second the different data sources are described in detail.
3.3.1 Modelling Approach
Our empirical analysis exploits both individual micro-level data and panel data
on year-of-birth cohorts over space and time. The data are discussed in more detail
below. For the micro-data, we observe cross-sections of individuals and can identify
those who are incarcerated in the U.S. and those who report having ever been
arrested in the UK. Each individual data entry can be matched to the unemployment
rate at the time of the individual’s labour market entry in the area they live. That
allows us to estimate probability models to explore whether this has an effect on
criminal outcomes in later life.
For the panel data, we observe age/birth cohorts as they enter the labour market
and follow them through their (potentially) working lives up to age 39. Our unit of
analysis is defined at the year-of-birth cohort (c), region (r), and calendar year (t)
level, where region refers to states in the U.S. and to standard regions in the UK. We
can estimate the long-run effect of initial labour market conditions by exploiting the
regional variation in entry unemployment rates across cohorts using the following
equation:
ln (CR)crt = αc + αr + αt + αa + βURcr,0 + γXcrt + crt (3.1)
In equation (3.1) the dependent variable ln (CR) is the logarithmic crime rate
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for the cohort, region and time cells. We include fixed effects for the cohort, region,
time and age that are respectively denoted by αc, αr, αt and αa. X is a set of control
variables (defined below) and  is an error term. Labour market entry occurs at date
0, hence URcr,0 denotes the cohort-region specific unemployment rate at that date.
The first pertinent feature of equation (3.1) is that, in common with a number
of other applications when cohorts of different ages are followed over time, it is well
known that one cannot separately identify age, cohort and time effects. We follow
the standard approach of including a full-set of age, cohort and time fixed effects
and arbitrarily dropping one additional cohort effect. Alternatively, we could have
required the cohort-effects to sum to zero (Deaton, 1997). Our results are robust to
this alternative. Secondly, in order to adjust for cohort compositional differences,
we include the X set of covariates at the level of our unit of analysis. In particular,
we adjust for the average share of immigrants, male graduates, black males, married
males and females per cohort in the region over the sample period.9
The model in (3.1) is restrictive in that it assumes that subsequent unemployment
rates experienced by the cohort have no effect on their criminal behaviour. In effect,
the model allows us to estimate the average effect of entering the labour market in a
recession on crime, given the usual pattern of regional unemployment that cohorts
experience after entry. For the focus of this chapter, we are arguably more interested
in the effect of entry unemployment net of subsequent labour market conditions. To
isolate this effect, we can include regional unemployment rates experienced by the
cohort in the years after labour market entry. We measures these as URcr,i , where
i > 0 is the number of years since entry. This gives us a second, more general, model
to estimate:
ln (CR)crt = αc + αr + αt + αa + βURcr,0 + δiURcr,i + γXcrt + crt (3.2)
where i can theoretically take any value up to the latest year observed since
labour market entry. For example, when t = 0 corresponds to age 16, i could run
from 1 to 23 years subsequent to entry up to our maximum age of 39. A fully
saturated unemployment rate model would allow each unemployment rate that the
cohort experienced in every year of their labour market experience to affect their
crime rate. However, we restrict the coefficients on the i-dated unemployment rates
9The specific control variables included are to account for demographic correlates of crime and
changing patterns of immigration. For examples of research papers directly studying the connec-
tions between crime and immigration see Bell et al. (2013), Bianchi et al. (2012) or Mastrobuoni
and Pinotti (2015).
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to affect the cohort crime rate only when the cohort reaches that point in the life-
cycle. For example, the coefficient on regional unemployment five years after the
cohort enters the labour market is restricted to be zero until the cohort actually
reaches five years of experience. This ensures that future unemployment rates cannot
affect current crime, which is intuitively sensible.
Next, we introduce dynamics by further generalising equations (3.1) and (3.2)
to permit the main coefficient of interest β on the initial unemployment rate to
vary with labour market experience/years since assumed labour market entry.10
This enables us to see to what extent the average effect of entry unemployment on a
cohort occurs because of early scarring effects that erode as time since labour market
entry increases or because of more persistent effects across a cohort’s life-cycle:
ln (CR)crt = αc + αr + αt + αa +
E∑
e=1
βe[I(Exp=e) · URcr,0] + γXcrt + crt (3.3)
This specification allows β to vary with potential labour market experience Exp,
for experience groups e = 1,...,E, and measures the extent to which any effect of
initial unemployment on criminal behaviour persists as length of time since labour
market entry increases.
Our final, and most general estimating equation, additionally allows for the un-
employment experienced after labour market entry to have permanent or transitory
effects:
ln (CR)crt = αc + αr + αt + αa +
E∑
e=1
βe[I(Exp=e) · URcr,0]
+
E∑
e=i
δie[I(Exp=e) · URcr,i] + γXcrt + crt (3.4)
In equation (3.4) both the β’s and the δ’s are allowed to depend on the length
of time that passes since the initial and the subsequent unemployment rate were
experienced by the cohort. Again, the effects of subsequent unemployment are
restricted to be zero until the cohort reaches the relevant age.
Note that for all the models (3.1) to (3.4), identification comes from within-cohort
10Potential experience here is defined as years since labour market entry, i.e. age - [age at year
t=0] with t=0 being the assumed labour market entry age as defined below. Hence, the notation
of the age/experience fixed effect in the estimating equations can be interchangeably used as either
αa or αe.
48
Chapter 3. Crime Scars
variations in the labour market entry unemployment rates across states/ regions. We
view this as the most convincing approach that can be taken to produce evidence
with the available data and this therefore forms the basis of most of our results.
However, it could be argued that removing the aggregate national unemployment
rate at labour market entry, as implicitly done by including cohort fixed effects,
removes much of the variation over time. To address this, we also report specifica-
tions using the national unemployment rate at labour market entry and including a
quadratic cohort trend in order to account for changing cohort quality.
3.3.2 Details of U.S. Data
The data for the empirical analysis come from U.S. and UK data sources, re-
spectively. As mentioned above, both individual level data as well as cohort level
data are used. In the following, the U.S. data are described in more detail.
U.S. Panel Data
For the U.S. panel analysis, criminality is measured in arrests. The use of arrests
data is motivated by two considerations: First, consistent annual incarceration data
at the state and cohort level simply do not exist in the United States, see for example
Pfaff (2011). Second, it is of interest to measure criminality broadly and check
that the results are robust. Therefore, we use arrest data from the FBI Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR reports the number of arrests by year, state, age,
gender and type of crime. The original data identifies the number of arrests by law
enforcement agencies within states. We construct a state-level panel on arrests by
aggregating the number of arrests over law enforcement agencies within a state. The
resulting sample runs for all years from 1980 to 2010.
We obtain the number of arrests for property and violent crimes by respectively
aggregating arrests over crime types. Our measure for property crime includes ar-
rests for burglary, larceny, vehicle theft and arson, while our measure for violent
crime includes arrests for murder, rape, robbery and assault. We produce arrest
rates by dividing the number of arrests by the annual population in the observa-
tional unit, and scale by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. Population data is retrieved
from the U.S. Census population estimates.
We sample males aged 16 to 39 from 1980 to 2010. The UCR data are grouped
by age category. From age 16 up to the age of 24, the number of arrests is measured
by single age year. For ages 25 and above, the arrests are aggregated to the number
of arrests in a five-year age bracket, i.e. 25 to 29, 30 to 34, and 35 to 39. In order
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to be able to track the number of arrests per year-of-birth cohort, we therefore
disaggregate the arrest measure to the number of arrests by single age year by
dividing the arrest count by five. The underlying assumption is that year-of-birth
cohorts are homogenous in terms of the number of arrests within the respective age
bracket. In order to be able to track the number of arrests per year-of-birth cohort,
we therefore disaggregate the arrest measure to the number of arrests by single age
year by dividing the arrest count by five for the older age groups. The underlying
assumption is that year-of-birth cohorts are homogenous in terms of the number of
arrests within the respective age bracket.
Since participation in the UCR programme is voluntary for the law enforcement
agencies, data are partly missing either for the whole state or for a number of
law enforcement agencies within a state. Data for some states are systematically
missing, and hence we exclude these states from our analysis.11 Data for some
states are missing for a limited number of years only. For example, Florida reports
arrests until 1995, but not afterwards. Since there is no evidence that would suggest
that these states differ significantly in terms of unemployment rates, we exclude the
respective years only and keep the non-missing years of these states as observations
in the sample, leading to an unbalanced sample. In the example above that means
that we include Florida in our sample until 1995.
Moreover, the UCR reports the total population for each law enforcement agency
in the reported year. Aggregating the UCR population count to the state-year level
and comparing that number to official population counts allows us to identify state-
year observations that cover arrests for less than 95 percent of the state population.
Since these arrest counts are likely to underreport the true number of arrests in that
state and year, we exclude the respective observations from our sample. Whenever
single state-year observations are missing in the resulting sample, we impute values
using a linear interpolation method. Our results are robust to excluding imputed
observations.
U.S. Individual-Level Data
The individual level data on U.S. incarceration comes from the U.S. decennial
Census and American Community Survey (ACS) data. We study all males aged 18-
39 from the 5 percent samples of the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census and the 2008-2012
11We exclude the following states: Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, and Washington. For example, New
York is excluded since New York City (specifically the NYPD) systematically does not report
arrests to the FBI, and thus arrest data at state level would be heavily undercounted.
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ACS from IPUMS-USA.12 We identify the institutionalised population using the
Group Quarters (GQ) variable, and obtain additional covariates from the Census
data including race, marital status, veteran status and education.
The Group Quarters variable consistently identifies the following categories:
Non-group quarter households, institutions (correctional institutions, mental institu-
tions, institutions for the elderly, handicapped and poor), or non-institutional group
quarters (military, college dormitory, rooming house, other). Yet, the Group Quar-
ters variable is only available at a detailed enough level to uniquely identify those
in correctional facilities in the 1980 sample. In subsequent Censuses as well as the
ACS, the institutionalised population includes the following categories: correctional
facilities, nursing homes and mental hospitals, and juvenile institutions. Fortunately
for our purposes, the share of the total institutionalised population accounted for
by those in correctional facilities is very high in our sample.
Table 3.1 shows the institutionalised male population by Group Quarter type
and age.13 In 2000, for example, 95.3 percent of institutionalised males aged 18-
39 where in correctional facilities. Two key points come from table 3.1. First,
incarcerated males aged less than 18 years are much less well identified. This is due
to the fact that juvenile facilities are an important component for this group. We
therefore restrict our analysis of the Census data to those individuals who are aged
between 18 and 39. Second, the 1980 Census has a less tight correspondence between
institutionalisation and incarceration. Yet, this is the Census year that provides the
full Group Quarter coding within the micro files. Hence, as a robustness test we are
able to use only the correctional facility definition in the 1980 Census. In the main
specification, we prefer to use the broader institutionalised measure across all years
in order to maintain consistency. This approach follows the approach suggested by
Borjas et al. (2010).
U.S. Unemployment Data
For both the UCR and the Census data, our samples comprise year-of-birth co-
horts that run from 1941 to 1994.14 Assuming that individuals enter the labour
market at age 16 to 18, labour market entry for each cohort in the sample would
therefore occur between 1957 and 2010. We use data on state-level annual insured
12Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.
13Note that this data comes from published aggregate Census reports that do break up the
categories, but is not available in the IPUMS data release.
14Our first year of data on arrests/incarceration is 1980 and the oldest age we consider is 39, so
this cohort was born in 1941. Similarly our data ends in 2010 and the youngest age is 16, so this
cohort was born in 1994.
51
Chapter 3. Crime Scars
unemployment rates from 1957 until 2010 which are available from the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Financial Data Handbook provided by the U.S. Department of La-
bour, Employment & Training Administration on their website, and match them
both to the UCR and the Census data.15
Two issues arise with the U.S. data. First, since we link the current arrest rate
for a particular cohort in a given state to the initial entry unemployment rate of
that cohort in the same state, we assume that cohorts do not substantially move
across states over time. That means for example that we assume that the criminal
behaviour of the 30 year-old cohort in California in the year 2000 is affected by the
unemployment rate in California in the year 1986, when that cohort entered the
labour market. The empirical validity of this is subject to no inter-state mobility
since school-leaving age. If there is mobility, but it is random since school exit, the
estimates will merely be noisy. However if mobility is driven by self-selection, the
coefficient of interest may be biased. Following Dahl (2002) we present robustness
tests based on mobility data from the U.S. Census.
Second, in our empirical work for the U.S. we use the average unemployment rate
that the cohort experienced at ages 16 to 18 as our measure of entry unemployment.
This is motivated by the observation that the majority of arrested criminals have low
educational attainment and generally do leave school at or around the compulsory
school leaving age. In the U.S. Census data used in the micro-data analysis, 86
percent of those incarcerated over the 1980-2010 sample had high school or less, i.e.
less than 12 years of education, as their highest level of education. Further, since
school-leaving ages differ slightly across time and states and unemployment within
a cohort-state observation is autocorrelated, we use the average unemployment rate
over ages 16 to 18 in order to characterise the state of the labour market that the
cohort first experiences. An alternative would be to use the unemployment rate at
age 16, or indeed age 17 or 18, only. We show that our results are robust to these
alternative definitions of labour market entry unemployment.
3.3.3 Details of UK Data
Our analysis is based not only on U.S. data, but also on UK data. Similar to the
case of the U.S., we exploit both cohort-level data as well as individual level data,
15Unfortunately, that kind of data does not allow us to disaggregate entry unemployment rates by
age, i.e. consider youth unemployment, nor to provide measures of the duration of unemployment.
As an alternative, the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides state level unemployment rates based
on the Current Population Survey from 1977 onwards, to which we data read from the graphs in
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) back to 1963. This robustness check yields very similar results to
the use of insured unemployment rates.
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which are described in the following.
UK Panel Data
Crime data for the UK panel data come from the Offenders Index Database
(OID) and the Police National Computer (PNC). Here, criminality is measured in
the number of convictions. This has the advantage of capturing actual offenders,
of course subject to wrongful conviction, rather than the proportion of a particular
cohort that come into contact with the police as in the case of arrest data in the
U.S.
The OID is a 4-week sample of all convictions in all courts across England and
Wales, with the sample weeks evenly spread across the year. The data contains
a unique personal identifier which allows us to remove multiple convictions for the
same individual, i.e. in the sample in a given year an individual is either convicted or
not, and provides data on gender, date of birth, region of conviction (10 regions) and
offence category. The OID sample runs from 1980 to 2002. From 2003 to 2010, the
OID has been superseded by the PNC. While we do not have access to the individual
level data of the PNC, the Ministry of Justice have provided us with an extract of
the number of individuals convicted in each year, broken down by individual year of
age, gender, region of conviction and offence category. This allows us to merge the
two datasets and to produce a panel covering the years 1980 to 2010.16
We obtain the number of convictions for property and violent crimes by ag-
gregating convictions over crime types. As such, our measure for property crime
includes burglary, theft and handling of stolen goods and criminal damage, while
our measure for violent crime includes violence against the person, sexual offences
and robbery. We produce conviction rates by dividing the number of convictions
by the annual population in the observational unit (year-of-birth by region), and
scale these conviction rates by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. Population data are
obtained from the ONS population estimates. As with the U.S. data, the sample
covers convictions from 1980 to 2010 for 16-39 year-old males. Therefore, individual
year-of-birth cohorts again run from 1941 until 1994.
UK Individual-Level Data
Our individual-level data for the UK comes from the British Crime Survey (BCS).
The BCS is a large, annual cross-sectional survey of 45,000 individuals which is used
16The PNC data is actually provided for the time period 2000 to 2010 which allows us to examine
the overlap between the OID and PNC between 2000 and 2002. Our analysis of this overlap suggests
a very high concordance between the two sources.
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to construct measures of crime victimisation. It is nationally representative and
contains extensive personal demographics.
From 2001 onward, each year a sub-sample of respondents complete a supple-
mentary survey that, among other things, covers contact with law enforcement agen-
cies. In particular, respondents are asked whether they have ever been arrested by
the police. Yet, there is no information on the type of crime for which they were
arrested nor on the eventual outcome. In addition there is no information on when
the arrest occurred, i.e. a 65-year old may have been arrested last week or 50 years
ago. However, as we will use conviction data in the UK panel analysis, it is useful
to have an alternative measure of criminal behaviour to evaluate robustness, as for
example in Lochner and Moretti (2004). In addition, the survey data provides a
broad array of personal characteristics including educational attainment, ethnicity,
marital status, housing status and employment and income measures. We sample
all males aged between 16 and 65.
UK Unemployment Data
As with the U.S. data, we assume that individuals enter the labour market at
the school leaving age. Hence, we consider unemployment rates at labour market
entry from 1957 until 2010. The unemployment rate data from 1975 onwards comes
from the Labour Force Survey. Prior to 1975 the unemployment rate is derived
from the claimant count data. This latter measure covers only those registered
as unemployed and is therefore a more narrow definition than that in the Labour
Force Survey which covers all those actively seeking employment in the previous two
weeks. However, the unemployment rate here is measured for males only and the
discrepancy between the two alternative measures prior to the 1980s is small. We
thus assume that our measure is a valid measure of unemployment.
In contrast to the U.S., there is a standard national school-leaving age in the
UK. We use this compulsory school leaving age to date labour market entry for
each cohort, rather than taking the average unemployment rates of ages 16 to 18.
However, we show that our conclusions are robust to this alternative measure of
labour market entry age. In the main specification, the age of labour market entry
is hence assumed to be 15 for those leaving school by 1972 and 16 for those leaving
from 1973 onward in order to reflect the change in compulsory school leaving age
introduced in the UK in 1973.
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3.4 Cohort Panel Evidence
In the following, the results from the empirical analysis of the cohort panel data,
as described in section 3.3, are presented. The discussion of the U.S. results is
followed by the discussion of the UK results.
3.4.1 United States
We begin our analysis of the U.S. panel data by presenting evidence on the av-
erage effect of initial labour market conditions on criminal activity. In terms of
the equations above, this specification refers to equation (3.1), which restricts the
coefficient β to be the same across all experience groups. The results are shown in
table 3.2. Here, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the crime rate, where the
crime rate is defined based on arrest rates as explained above. Columns (1), (3) and
(5) consider the national unemployment rate at labour market entry while columns
(2), (4) and (6) use the state unemployment rate at labour market entry - our pre-
ferred specification. All regressions include year, state and age fixed effects as well
as a set of variable to control for cohort composition. The national unemployment
rate specifications control for a quadratic cohort trend, while the state unemploy-
ment rate specifications include a full set of cohort fixed effects. The regressions are
weighted by the population of the observational unit and robust standard errors are
clustered at the state-cohort level.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 3.2 show a strong positive estimated coefficient on
the entry unemployment rate, whether we use the national or state-level variation
in entry unemployment. For the state-level entry unemployment rate specification,
shown in column (2), the average arrest rate for a cohort entering the labour market
in a recession is estimated to be around 10.2 percent higher than for a similar
cohort entering into a normal labour market. This is based on a 5 percentage point
increase in unemployment as a measure of recession relative to normal conditions.
The estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
This amounts to a substantial estimate of labour market entry effects on crime,
but in some respects the average effect of recessions may not be the most relevant
parameter of interest. Indeed, within a cohort, there will be a substantial share for
which the marginal effect is zero, since their optimal decision will be unaffected,
i.e. they are at an interior solution that results in no illegal behaviour and the
recession does not move them across the threshold. Thus the estimated average
effect is a combination of a zero effect for a potentially large share of the cohort and
a substantial effect for those who are close to the threshold between legal and illegal
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action in the absence of a recession. Indeed, the results from the analysis of the
individual-level Census data presented in section 3.5 suggest that this is the case, as
the estimated entry-level unemployment effects are seen to be much larger for the
less educated.
The remaining columns of table 3.2 show results for property crime and violent
crime, using both national and state unemployment variation. The results suggest
very similar and statistically significant effects in all cases. In all subsequent results
only those specifications that use state-level unemployment rates are reported, as
we view this as providing the most convincing identification.17
The specification used in table 3.2 implies that subsequent unemployment rates
do not matter, or at least are orthogonal to the entry unemployment rate. There
is no obvious reason for this to be the case and hence we follow the earnings study
of Oreopoulos et al. (2012) in allowing for subsequent unemployment rates to affect
our outcome of interest, crime, in addition to the entry unemployment rate. Hence,
the average unemployment rates for ages 19-21, 22-24 and 25-27 are included. In
essence this means that for a particular cohort we allow for their crime path to be
explained by both the unemployment experienced when entering the labour market
and the unemployment rates they experience over the following 10 years.18
Table 3.4 presents the results of this exercise which corresponds to equation 3.2.
It is perhaps most useful to focus on column (3) where we allow for two changes,
breaking the age 16-18 unemployment rate into its component parts and allowing
for subsequent unemployment rates. On the first of these, when we allow for sep-
arate estimated effects for any individual year of unemployment, the estimates are
imprecise. However the p-value from a hypothesis test of the joint significance of
the three individual year effects is significant at the 1 percent level. The reason is
that there is a high degree of autocorrelation in the within-cohort unemployment
rate. The strong persistence in the autocovariances of unemployment rates within a
cohort-state group is shown in figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Therefore, we prefer
to either use the age 16 effect alone, recognizing that it is picking up effects for age
17 and 18 as well, or to use the three-year average. As columns (1) and (2) show, it
matters little which we choose.
The second key result of column (3) is that none of the subsequent three-year
17We have also broken down property and violent crime into more disaggregated measures of
crime types, i.e. breaking down violent crime into murder, rape, assault and robbery and property
crime into burglary, theft and arson. We find there to be significant positive estimates of entry
level unemployment rates for all crimes with the exception of murder. See table 3.3 for details.
18We have also experimented with including unemployment rates prior to school-leaving age.
Their additional inclusion leaves the estimated impact of entry unemployment intact, remaining
positive and statistically significant.
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average unemployment rates that the cohort experiences have an individually sig-
nificant effect on arrests, although they are all negative. This helps us to better
understand a puzzle in the literature which we referred to in the introduction: The
overall link between crime and unemployment appears fairly weak in many studies.
Our results show that the key effect from unemployment on a cohort’s crime traject-
ory is the early experience of unemployment rather than the average unemployment
experienced over the life-cycle.
The results in tables 3.2 and 3.4 demonstrate a statistically significant and eco-
nomically substantial effect of initial unemployment conditions on the arrest rates
of cohorts over their entire lifetime. Moreover, we are interested in examining the
persistence of this effect: Is the entry unemployment effect primarily driven by a
very large impact on crime in the early years after labour market entry that sub-
sides as the young age and go on to establish a stable legal career? Or is the effect
persistent, with some of those affected by harsh labour market conditions at labour
market entry pushed into a criminal career that becomes self-perpetuating for the
reasons discussed in section 3.2? In order to answer that question, we allow the
coefficient on initial unemployment to vary by years since labour market entry as
described by equation 3.3.
We group experience into four categories (0-5, 6-11, 12-17 and 18-21 years) and
otherwise use an identical regression specification as for the previous table. Exper-
ience is normalised to 0 for ages 16 to 18. The results are shown in table 3.5 with
columns (1) and (2) showing results for all crimes, and columns (3) and (4) for prop-
erty and violent crime respectively. Column (1) is estimated without controlling for
subsequent unemployment rates, whereas columns (2) to (4) allow for these to be
interacted with experience dummies as specified in equation 3.4. There are strong
positive effects of entry unemployment on arrests in the early years in the labour
market that fall as experience increases. However, even a decade after leaving school
there remain significant positive effects from entry unemployment on arrests, par-
ticularly for property crime: Juveniles who leave school in a recession have higher
arrest rates during their first few years in the labour market and higher arrests rates
over a decade later than juveniles who leave school in a buoyant economy.
An alternative specification to examine the persistence of entry unemployment
is to allow for the interaction term with experience to vary by individual years of
experience rather than to group experience into year brackets as done for the estima-
tions shown in table 3.5. Figure 3.5 plots the estimated coefficients together with 95
percent confidence intervals for every year of labour market experience, yet without
allowing for subsequent unemployment rates. Figure 3.6 shows the respective results
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when one allows unemployment rates later in life to enter the regression. There is
a clear drop in the effect after the first few years of labour market entry, yet the
individual year estimates suggest a consistent and longer lasting scarring effect.
As previously discussed, one may have potential concerns about inter-state mo-
bility. More precisely, the presence of mobility raises the question as to what is
the correct, or in other words best measured entry unemployment rate for cohort
c at time t in state s? Thus far we have assumed it was the unemployment rate
in state s at the time that cohort c left high-school. Yet, this ignores mobility and
if potential criminals are likely to move across state boundaries, this could be of
concern. Some of those in cohort c at time t in state s will have completed high-
school in state k and entered the labour market there. For this part of the cohort,
the correct entry unemployment rate is of course the unemployment rate in state
k at the time cohort c left high-school. Dahl (2002) makes the same point with
respect to estimates of state-specific earnings returns to education, which he shows
differ substantially across states. His solution to this mobility problem is to use
reported migration flows across states to correct the estimated returns. We follow
broadly the same procedure here: We use the 5 percent US Census for 1980, 1990
and 2000 and the 2010 ACS to calculate for each cohort c in state s the distribution
of states-of-birth, and use the unemployment rates at age 16 only. Assuming that
state-of-birth and state-at-16 are highly correlated, we generate a mobility-adjusted
entry unemployment rate for cohort c in state s as:
URcs =
K∑
k=1
pcskURck (3.5)
where p is the proportion of cohort c in state s that were born in state k.
Table 3.6 reports estimates using this mobility-adjusted entry unemployment
rate. The results are robust to the new specification, in that a positive and substan-
tial entry-level unemployment rate effect on crime remains. The result for all crimes
as reported in the upper panel of the table is similar, and a little bigger in magnitude
at 2.470 compared to 2.039 from table 3.2, but very much corroborates the earlier
results. In fact, the estimated coefficients on property and violent crime increase a
little, too. Moreover, if we apply the mobility adjustment to the age 16, rather than
age 16 to 18 entry unemployment rate, the results as shown in the lower panel of
table 3.6 remain robust. Hence, this robustness check offers a useful corroboration
of our main results as, if anything, we appear to marginally underestimate the effect
of initial unemployment at labour market entry on crime when we do not adjust for
inter-regional mobility. Note, however, that the differences between mobility adjus-
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ted and non-adjusted estimates are not distinguishable from one another in terms
of statistical significance.
3.4.2 United Kingdom
In this section, the corresponding results for the empirical analysis of the UK
data are presented. We begin with the same specification as reported in table 3.2
for the U.S., the results for the UK being shown in table 3.7. Recall that these
estimates reflect the average effect of initial labour market conditions on criminal
activity, in this case convictions rather than arrests. As with table 3.2, we report
estimates for total crime and for property and violent crime separately and for spe-
cifications using either the national or region-specific entry unemployment rate. The
only specification difference compared to the U.S. analysis is that we allow cohort
composition effects to have different coefficients in London compared to the rest of
the UK. The differences in these estimated coefficients are statistically significant,
suggesting that over time cohort composition and their effects on crime have differed
substantially between London and the rest of the UK.19
As with the U.S. results, we find a statistically significant effect of entry unem-
ployment on overall lifetime crime. Taking the estimated coefficient in Column (2),
a recession that raises the unemployment rate by 5 percentage points would raise
the lifetime conviction rate by 4 percent. We are somewhat skeptical about the
magnitude of the effect when using national entry unemployment as the source of
identification. The difficulty arises because we have to assume a specific functional
form for the cohort effect, whereas, when regional entry unemployment is used, we
can non-parametrically control for the cohort effect, since identification here comes
from within-cohort variation across regions. To see the sensitivity of the results
to this, note that the coefficient on national entry unemployment in column (1) of
table 3.7 is 2.664 (0.189) when we allow a quadratic cohort trend. If instead we
allow a quartic cohort trend this coefficient drops to 1.007 (0.189). Hence, we prefer
to focus on the results that exploit within-cohort variation.
Next, we consider unemployment rates other than that at age 16. The results
are shown in table 3.8. Columns (1) and (2) show that it matters little whether
we use the age 16 unemployment rate or the age 16 to 18 average unemployment
rate to capture entry effects. Columns (3) and (4) illustrate two key results. First,
subsequent unemployment experiences seem to have little effect on overall crime
19An alternative would be to estimate the models using the regional dimension outside of London
only. Such an analysis shows that this generates the same qualitative results as reported here,
although the precision tends to be somewhat higher. We prefer to include London and to directly
control for differences in the effect of cohort composition.
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rates. This suggests that if youths get through their initial experience of the labour
market without turning to crime, they are largely unaffected by subsequent unem-
ployment experiences in terms of criminal behaviour. This is consistent with the
theoretical model under which the rising level of legal versus criminal human capital
increasingly reduces the chances of resorting to crime, and suggests important policy
implications. Second, controlling for subsequent unemployment has no effect on the
size of the entry unemployment effect.
Again, we are interested in the persistence of the entry unemployment effect.
As for table 3.5 for the U.S., we split the data into four experience groups (0-5,
6-11, 12-17 and 18-23 years) and allow the entry effect to differ across these exper-
ience groups. Column (1) of table 3.9 reports the estimates without controlling for
subsequent unemployment whilst columns (2) to (4) control for subsequent unem-
ployment rates interacted with experience as specified in equation 3.4. The estimates
show there to be a strongly persistent effect of entry unemployment on subsequent
criminal convictions. Once again, the key message is that high entry unemployment
contributes to significantly higher crime rates among affected cohorts that are long-
lasting. Over a decade after entry, conviction rates remain significantly higher. For
property crime, the influence eventually dies out after 15 to 20 years post-labour
market entry experience while it remains, and indeed becomes quantitatively more
significant, for violent crime.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the year-by-year effect of entry unemployment as a
cohort spends more time in the labour market. One key difference between the
time-profile of the experience effects for the UK and the U.S. is that the entry un-
employment effect for 16 and 17 year old cohorts is substantially higher than the
average entry unemployment effect in the U.S., but not in the UK. An obvious ex-
planation for this rests with our measure of criminality in the two countries: For the
U.S. analysis we use arrests as a measure of criminality while we use convictions for
the UK analysis. It seems likely that the detrimental effects of entry unemployment
will take substantially more time to feed through to convictions than to arrests:
Youths may be frequently arrested, but avoid the courts until a tipping point has
been reached. In any event, the effects are very similar across the two countries from
the age of 18 onwards.
Table 3.10 focuses on whether all recessions are alike. One feature of the la-
bour market common to European countries over the last forty years, but almost
completely absent for the US until the Great Recession has been the incidence of
long-term unemployment.20 We might expect, and the model of Mocan et al. (2005)
20The subsequent chapter of this dissertation focuses on the impact of a first-time occurrence of
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predicts, that recessions which are characterised by rising rates of long-term unem-
ployment are much worse for potential scaring. Initially, of course, rising unem-
ployment durations regarding the stock of currently unemployed is positive for new
labour market entrants, since the stock of unemployed provides less competition for
available vacancies. However, we might expect this effect to be fleeting before the
negative effects of unemployment duration on new entrants takes its toll. To exam-
ine this we divide the entry unemployment rate into the short-term and long-term
unemployment rate where short-term unemployment covers all those with a current
unemployment spell of less than twelve months. For our entire sample, the average
unemployment rate of 7.4 percent is made up of a short-term rate of 4.6 percent
and a long-term rate of 2.8 percent. The results of table 3.10 show clearly that it is
deep and long recessions which are characterised by high long-term unemployment
that are particularly problematic in terms of crime.21
3.5 Individual-Level Evidence
In the previous section, the results of the cohort panel data both for the U.S.
and the UK have been discussed. The individual-level data analysis, as presented
in the following, adds to the picture developed in the above.
3.5.1 United States
We begin the analysis with the analysis of the U.S. incarceration data. We
use the state-at-birth to identify the state in which the individual went to school
(Dahl, 2002) and hence restrict the data to those individuals born in the United
States. Panel A in table 3.11 reports the key regression results based on the Census
individual-level data and using a linear probability model. Column (1) reports the
results for the full sample of males aged between 18 and 39 whilst the subsequent
three columns focus on samples defined by educational attainment. All regressions
include a full set of year, state of residence, state of birth and cohort effects, a quartic
function in age as well as control variables for race, education, marital status and
veteran status.
The estimated coefficient on the entry unemployment rate in column (1) is 0.031.
The mean of the dependent variable is 0.028, i.e. 2.8 percent of males aged between
18 and 39 are incarcerated. Thus, entering the labour market in a time of reces-
sion, again defined as the unemployment rate being 5 percentage points higher than
long-term unemployment in the U.S. labour market on crime.
21Unfortunately, the U.S. data does not allow us to conduct a similar analysis.
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normal, results in a 5.5 percent increase in the probability of being incarcerated at
the time of subsequent census survey dates. As can be seen from the subsequent
columns, this effect is almost entirely driven by a strong effect for high-school dro-
pouts: A recession increases this group’s probability of incarceration by 7 percent,
from an already high mean of 8.4 percent. These are sizeable effects, keeping in
mind that this is averaged over more than twenty years of the individual’s post-
school experience.
Finally, compared to the previous results, columns (3) and (4) display only weak
effects for those who successfully graduate from high school and no effect at all
for those with 4-years of college - who should of course not be affected by the
unemployment rate at the compulsory school-leaving age. The results in Panel B
show that redefining the 1980 measure of incarceration by explicitly excluding those
not in correctional facilities (see section 3.3 for a detailed discussion) does not alter
the conclusions from this analysis.
The results found from the individual-level data analysis have some additional
and important policy implications: They suggest that policy which focuses explicitly
on the least educated during periods of high unemployment would likely produce
substantially more benefit on crime reduction within that group than the average
estimate from the previously reported panel regressions would imply.
3.5.2 United Kingdom
For the UK, we study individual-level data on self-reported arrests. The data
provide information on the age at which the respondent left full-time education
and so allow us to precisely date the year of labour market entry. The data also
provide an extensive set of personal characteristics, which we would expect to be
correlated with criminal activity. There are two key disadvantages in using this micro
data. First, there is the usual concern associated with the self-reporting of arrests.
However, in the context of this study a potential measurement error from self-
reporting would only bias our estimates if the self-reporting probability varied within
a cohort depending on the initial entry unemployment rate. It seems to us hard to
make such a case. Second, we have no information of when the arrest occurred, as
the survey question is simply whether the individual has ever been arrested. Hence,
the UK individual-level data allow us to estimate the average impact of initial entry
unemployment on the probability of being arrested in adulthood, but does not allow
us to investigate the time pattern of the persistence of such effects.
We estimate probit models with the dependent variable taking the value one if
the respondent reports having ever been arrested by the police. We include survey
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year dummies and an extensive set of personal controls. Table 3.12 reports the
results. Column (1) shows an estimated significant positive coefficient on the entry
unemployment rate: A recession, again defined as a 5 percentage points higher
than normal unemployment rate, is associated with a 5.7 percent increase in the
probability of ever being arrested.
In the second column we restrict attention to those whose highest educational
qualification was achieved at age 16 and who therefore definitely left education at
age 16. Here, we can more closely link exit from education to the initial unemploy-
ment rate, and thus more likely obtain a sample that contains a larger fraction of
individuals at risk of criminal behaviour. As expected, we find a substantially larger
and more precisely estimated impact of entry unemployment for this group: Now,
a recession raises the probability of ever being arrested by 8 percent.
The final column of the table displays the results of a placebo-type experiment.
We examine the arrest record of individuals who report educational qualifications
that required school attendance at least to age 18. This group should not have been
directly affected by the unemployment rate when they were at age 16. Sure enough,
we no longer find a positive effect for these individuals. Indeed, the estimated
coefficient on the entry unemployment rate is indistinguishable from zero, although
the standard error is large.
Overall, the individual-level analysis of the relationship between crime and entry-
level unemployment produces results that are very similar to the cohort panel ana-
lysis of section 3.4. This is true for both countries, despite some differences in the
nature of the data that is available. The individual-level data also permits us to
study variations across individuals with different levels of education in more detail
than the more macro cohort analysis which does not permit such differentiation. It
is highly reassuring that the overall pattern of results are very consistent across the
two approaches.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the first evidence is presented that recessions can lead to sub-
stantial and persistently higher rates of criminal behaviour among those likely to be
most impacted by such conditions, namely those newly entering the labour market.
In contrast to much of the evidence on the long-run effect of initial unemployment
on wages and career trajectories, we find that the effect on criminal behaviour re-
mains substantial, though attenuated, a number of years after labour market entry.
These sizable and persistent entry level unemployment effects thus show that re-
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cessions can produce career criminals. One might argue that our results are also
consistent with a one-time criminal event for individuals in a particular cohort that
happens at different times since leaving school and that the probability of such a
subsequent event is higher if entry level unemployment were higher. Such a view
would however be in conflict with two key empirical findings in the criminology lit-
erature: Late-onset offending is extremely rare and prolific offenders account for a
disproportionate share of total crime. Both are consistent with our interpretation
of the results.
This evidence of a crime scarring effect from unemployment at the time of labour
market entry emerges from empirical analysis of a range of different US and UK
data sources, both at the level of the individual and from longitudinal analysis of
age/birth cohorts over time. The evidence of crime scars demonstrates a rather
more disturbing long-run effect of recessions, and adds to the research picture that
the state of the business cycle when people leave school and enter the labour market
can have profound and sizable impacts on economic and social outcomes across their
life.
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3.7 Figures
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Figure 3.1: Male Offender Rates by Age, U.S.
Note: The figure shows the male arrest rate for the U.S., separately by age and averaged over the period 2000-2010.
Source: UCR and own calculations.
Figure 3.2: Male Offender Rates by Age, UK
Note: The figure shows the male conviction rate for the UK, separately by age and averaged over the period
2000-2010. Source: OID/PNC and own calculations.
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Figure 3.3: Autocovariance Structure of Unemployment Rates, U.S.
Note: The figure shows the auto covariance structure of the unemployment rates in the U.S. since labour market
entry. Source: U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
Figure 3.4: Autocovariance Structure of Unemployment Rates, UK
Note: The figure shows the auto covariance structure of the unemployment rates in the UK since labour market
entry. Source: Labour Force Survey and own calculations.
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Figure 3.5: Entry Unemployment Effects by Experience, U.S.
Note: The figure shows the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on the entry unemployment rate
interacted with years of labour market experience for the U.S. The underlying regressions correspond to estimating
equation 3.3. Source: UCR, U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
Figure 3.6: Entry Unemployment Effects by Experience, U.S.
Controlling for Subsequent Unemployment-Experience Interactions
Note: The figure shows the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on the entry unemployment rate
interacted with years of labour market experience for the U.S., whilst controlling for subsequent unemployment-
labour market experience interactions. The underlying regressions correspond to estimating equation 3.4. Source:
UCR, U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
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Figure 3.7: Entry Unemployment Effects by Experience, UK
Note: The figure shows the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on the entry unemployment rate
interacted with years of labour market experience for the UK. The underlying regressions correspond to estimating
equation 3.3. Source: OID/PNC, Labour Force Survey and own calculations.
Figure 3.8: Entry Unemployment Effects by Experience, UK
Controlling for Subsequent Unemployment-Experience Interactions
Note: The figure shows the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on the entry unemployment rate
interacted with years of labour market experience for the UK, whilst controlling for subsequent unemployment-
labour market experience interactions.. The underlying regressions correspond to estimating equation 3.4. Source:
OID/PNC, Labour Force Survey and own calculations.
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3.8 Tables
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Table 3.1: U.S. Male Population in Group Quarters by Type and Age, 1980-2010
Total Correctional Correctional
Institutionalised Institutionalised as Percent of Total
1980 Census
All 1,232,120 439,720 35.7
15-17 68,300 8,460 12.4
18-21 123,320 89,600 72.7
22-24 104,060 80,240 77.1
25-39 301,980 205,780 68.1
1990 Census
All 1,801,350 1,030,210 57.2
15-17 68,480 16,490 24.1
18-21 149,780 128,940 86.1
22-24 143,890 133,490 92.8
25-39 666,690 581,670 87.2
2000 Census
All 2,534,060 1,806,260 71.3
15-17 87,200 18,960 21.7
18-21 221,660 202,470 91.3
22-24 201,060 195,660 97.3
25-39 951,660 911,050 95.7
2010 Census
All 2,716,877 2,059,020 75.8
15-19 153,924 74,720 48.5
20-24 327,760 308,926 94.3
25-39 971,581 945,065 97.3
Note: The table shows the number of male individuals in group quarters by Census year
and by age. Column (1) shows the total number of institutionalised individuals, column (2)
the number of those who are in correctional facilities and column (3) shows the same figure
as percentage of the total institutionalised population. Source: The numbers for 1980 are
calculated from IPUMS data; those for 1990, 2000 and 2010 come from the U.S. Census
Bureau.
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Table 3.2: U.S. Cohort Panel Estimates, Basic Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime Type: All All Property Property Violent Violent
National Entry U Rate 1.550∗∗∗ 1.419∗ 1.871∗∗∗
at Age 16-18 (0.506) (0.732) (0.519)
State Entry U Rate 2.039∗∗∗ 2.115∗∗∗ 2.156∗∗∗
at Age 16-18 (0.443) (0.598) (0.524)
State Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Quadratic Cohort Trend x - x - x -
Cohort Fixed Effects - x - x - x
Age Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x
Sample Size 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equation 3.1. The dependent variable
is the logarithm of the male arrest rate, as calculated from the UCR data. The sample runs from 1980-2010. In-
dividual year-of-birth cohorts run from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market between the
age of 16 and 18. All insured unemployment rates are measured as the average unemployment rate at the three
potential years of labour market entry. All regressions include year, age and state fixed effects. We include control
variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, black men, married
men and females per cohort in that state 1980-2010). Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the cohort-level national
unemployment rate at labour market entry and include a cohort linear trend. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include
the cohort-level state unemployment rates and include cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
state-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the male cell-population. * indicates significance at the 10 per-
cent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source:
UCR, U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
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Table 3.4: U.S. Cohort Panel Estimates,
Allowing for Subsequent Unemployment Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime Type: All All All All
State Entry U Rate at Age 16 1.525∗∗∗ 0.797
(0.381) (0.570)
State Entry U Rate at Age 17 0.236
(0.744)
State Entry U Rate at Age 18 1.481∗∗
(0.678)
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 2.039∗∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.483)
State Entry U Rate at Age 19-21 -0.517 -0.384
(0.536) (0.541)
State Entry U Rate at Age 22-24 -0.882 -0.904∗
(0.538) (0.538)
State Entry U Rate at Age 25-27 -0.783 -0.790
(0.525) (0.524)
p(sum of 16,17, 18 effects = 0) 0.007∗∗∗
State Fixed Effects x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x
Age Fixed Effects x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x
Sample Size 19,487 19,429 19,429 19,429
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equation 3.2. For the
specification, see details as for the column (2) specification of table 3.2. * indicates significance
at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates signific-
ance at the 1 percent level. Source: UCR, U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
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Table 3.5: U.S. Cohort Panel Estimates,
Effects by Labour Market Experience Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime Type: All All Property Violent
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(0-5) 3.609∗∗∗ 3.290∗∗∗ 1.481∗∗ 5.151∗∗∗
(0.626) (0.702) (0.717) (1.124)
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(6-11) 1.962∗∗∗ 1.705∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗ 2.615∗∗∗
(0.535) (0.617) (0.737) (0.821)
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(12-17) 1.475∗∗∗ 1.558∗∗ 2.151∗∗ 0.883
(0.556) (0.643) (0.911) (0.752)
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(18-21) 1.515∗∗∗ 2.421∗∗∗ 3.345∗∗∗ 2.032∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.707) (0.959) (0.859)
State Fixed Effects x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x
Age Fixed Effects x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x
Allowing for subsequent U rates - x x x
Sample Size 19,487 19,429 19,429 19,429
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equations 3.3 and 3.4. For the spe-
cification, see details as for the column (2), (4) and (6) specifications of table 3.2. * indicates significance at
the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent
level. Source: UCR, U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
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Table 3.6: U.S. Cohort Panel Estimates,
Robustness Tests for Mobility and Age of Entry Unemployment
(1) (2) (3)
Crime Type: All Property Violent
A: Age 16-18 Entry U Rate
Mobility Adjusted State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 2.470∗∗∗ 2.016∗∗ 3.288∗∗∗
(0.609) (0.771) (0.776)
B: Age 16 Entry U Rate
Mobility Adjusted State Entry U Rate at Age 16 1.857∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗ 2.621∗∗∗
(0.527) (0.662) (0.668)
State Fixed Effects x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x
Age Fixed Effects x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x
Sample Size Panel A 19,429 19,429 19,429
Sample Size Panel B 19,487 19,487 19,487
Note: The table shows the regressions results corresponding to the mobility adjustment of the entry un-
employment rate as suggested in equation 3.5. For the specification, see details as for the column (2),
(4) and (6) specifications of table 3.2. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates sig-
nificance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source: UCR, U.S.
Department of Labor and own calculations.
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Table 3.7: UK Cohort Panel Estimates, Basic Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime Type: All All Property Property Violent Violent
National Entry U Rate 2.664∗∗∗ 3.443∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
at Age 16 (0.189) (0.249) (0.191)
Region Entry U Rate 0.812∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗ 1.531∗∗∗
at Age 16 (0.277) (0.350) (0.365)
Region Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Quadratic Cohort Trend x - x - x -
Cohort Fixed Effects - x - x - x
Age Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equation 3.1. The dependent variable
is the logarithm of the male conviction rate from the OID/PNC data. The sample runs from 1980-2010. Indi-
vidual year-of-birth cohorts run from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 15/16.
All unemployment rates are measured in the year of labour market entry. We include control variables for cohort
compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, nonwhite men and married men in each
cohort/region, 1980-2010), allowing for differential effects of composition in London. All regressions include year,
age, and region fixed effects. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the cohort-level national unemployment rate at
labour market entry and include a cohort linear trend. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include the cohort-level region
unemployment rates and include cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region-cohort level and
regressions are weighted by the male cell-population. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates
significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source: OID/PNC, Labour
Force Survey and own calculations.
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Table 3.8: UK Cohort Panel Estimates,
Allowing for Subsequent Unemployment Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime Type: All All All All
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16 0.812∗∗∗ 0.862∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.477) (0.281)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 17 0.143
(0.555)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 18 -0.228
(0.471)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 0.770∗∗∗
(0.286)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 19-21 0.048 0.024
(0.219) (0.217)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 22-24 -0.102 -0.105
(0.212) (0.212)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 25-27 0.129 0.129
(0.237) (0.237)
p(sum of 16,17, 18 effects = 0) 0.009∗∗∗
Region Fixed Effects x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x
Age Fixed Effects x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x
Sample Size 7,440 7,410 7,410 7,410
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equation 3.2. For the
specification, see details as for the column (2) specification of table 3.7. * indicates significance
at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance
at the 1 percent level. Source: OID/PNC, Labour Force Survey and own calculations.
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Table 3.9: UK Cohort Panel Estimates,
Effects by Labour Market Experience Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime Type: All All Property Violent
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(0-5) 0.861∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗ 1.034∗
(0.305) (0.316) (0.362) (0.532)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(6-11) 0.914∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗
(0.284) (0.298) (0.365) (0.444)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(12-17) 0.832∗∗ 0.810∗∗ 0.733 1.369∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.358) (0.448) (0.435)
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(18-21) 0.583 0.530 0.124 2.701∗∗∗
(0.369) (0.406) (0.502) (0.504)
Region Fixed Effects x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x
Age Fixed Effects x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x
Allowing for subsequent U rates - x x x
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equations 3.3 and 3.4. For the
specification, see details as for the column (2), (4) and (6) specifications of table 3.7. * indicates significance
at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1
percent level. Source: OID/PNC, Labour Force Survey and own calculations.
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Table 3.10: UK Cohort Panel Estimates,
Short- and Long-Term Entry Unemployment Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Crime Type: All Property Violent
Region Entry Short-Term U Rate at Age 16 -1.188∗ -1.008 -1.074
(0.620) (0.767) (0.933)
Region Entry Long-Term U Rate at Age 16 1.687∗∗∗ 1.466∗∗∗ 2.673∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.474) (0.464)
Region Fixed Effects x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x
Age Fixed Effects x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,440
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equation 3.1 when
we differentiate between short- and long-term unemployment. For the specification, see details
as for the column (2), (4) and (6) specifications of table 3.7. * indicates significance at the 10
percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1
percent level. Source: OID/PNC, Labour Force Survey and own calculations.
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Table 3.11: U.S. Individual-Level Estimates,
Census/ACS Incarceration Regressions, 1980-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: All Males HS Dropouts HS Grads 4yr College
A. Aged 18 and Over
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 0.031∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.017 -0.004
(0.015) (0.053) (0.025) (0.009)
B. Aged 18 and Over, 1980 Redefined
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 0.026∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.010
(0.015) (0.052) (0.024) (0.008)
Year Effects x x x x
State Effects x x x x
State/Race Effects x x x x
Cohort Effects x x x x
State of Birth Effects x x x x
Age Quartic x x x x
Sample Size 5,760,227 798,692 2,553,430 1,169,645
Note: The table shows the results from estimating probability models as outlined in section 3.3. The dependent vari-
able is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is institutionalised and 0 otherwise. The sample covers males aged 18-39
who are not in school, and born in the United States. Entry unemployment is the unemployment rate at age 16 in the
state of birth. Data are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 5 percent IPUMS US Census and the 2008-2012 IPUMS ACS.
Regressions also include marital status, race, education and veteran status indicators. Standard errors are clustered at
the state/cohort level and regressions are weighted with the Census person weight. * indicates significance at the 10
percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source:
U.S. Census/ACS, U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
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Table 3.12: UK Individual-Level Estimates,
Self-Reported Arrest Regressions, 2001/2 to 2010/11
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Ever Arrested Ever Arrested, Ever Arrested
Age 16 Qualification Age 18+ Qualification
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16 0.246∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.050
(0.123) (0.159) (0.208)
Year Dummies x x x
Personal Controls x x x
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.215 0.303 0.164
Sample Size 22,646 7,984 9,166
Note: The table reports the estimated marginal effects from a probit model as outlined in section 3.3. The depend-
ent variable is a dummy if the individual has ever been arrested and 0 otherwise. Personal controls include age (10
categories), ethnic group (5 categories), education (9 categories where appropriate), student status, marital status (4
categories), income (18 categories), economic status (15 categories), number of children (10 categories), housing tenure
(8 categories), years at address (9 categories), years in area (9 categories), and government office region (10 categor-
ies). The sample covers ages 16 to 65 and pools data from the British Crime Surveys, 2001-2002 to 2010-2011. Re-
gressions use individual sample weights. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the government office region
level. Source: British Crime Survey, Labour Force Survey and own calculations.
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4.1 Introduction
Economists have thought of criminal activity as the supply side of crime markets
(Freeman, 1999). In that sense, crime markets are considered to be alternative labour
markets which offer illegal instead of, or in addition to, legal job opportunities.
Think about two otherwise identical individuals, one of whom becomes unemployed
and the other one remains employed. The unemployed faces lower returns on the
labour market, and at the margin that person is more likely to accept illegal job
opportunities and to engage in crime than the employed counterfactual (Becker,
1968).
Whilst the literature on the impact of unemployment on crime has grown con-
siderably over the last two decades, the empirical evidence is still not indisputable.1
In this chapter, I examine recent and unprecedented structural changes in the U.S.
labour market and study the relationship between labour market conditions and
crime in that context. To begin with, I estimate the causal effect of unemployment
on crime exploiting quasi-experimental variation in unemployment benefit durations
which is caused by temporary policy changes. In line with previous findings, I find
that higher unemployment is linked to higher crime rates. More surprisingly, my
results suggest that this effect is driven by the unemployment benefit extensions
which are associated to longer unemployment durations and higher unemployment
rates on the one hand and which exhibit a crime increasing effect on the other hand.
Indeed, combining these observations I argue that the at first surprising effects on
criminality can be explained by the dramatic increases in unemployment durations
in the United States. Exploiting the given variation in unemployment and unem-
ployment benefit durations, I demonstrate a contemporaneous but yet more dynamic
relationship between unemployment and crime than found in the previous empirical
literature.
To the best of my knowledge this is the first study of the recent structural changes
on the U.S. labour market with respect to crime outcomes, and in particular the
first attempt to evaluate the role of temporary unemployment benefit extensions in
that context. The existing empirical literature has focused on the contemporaneous
link between unemployment and crime, in particular for youth unemployment. The
previous chapter of this dissertation presents evidence for a longer-lasting impact of
unemployment on crime, based on the notion that the experience of unemployment
triggers initial involvement in crime leading to criminal careers. This chapter con-
1See chapter 2 of this dissertation for a more detailed discussion of the literature. Alternatively,
the interested reader might refer to the respective chapter for example in Mustard (2010), or more
recently Chalfin and McCrary (2015) and Draca and Machin (2015).
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tributes to that literature as, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first empirical
paper to explicitly evaluate the relationship between unemployment duration and
crime and to introduce a more dynamic dimension to the analysis.
Why should the probability to engage in crime depend on how long one has
been unemployed for? The standard model of crime argues that unemployment,
or a higher risk of unemployment, lowers the expected returns on the legal labour
market and hence increases the probability of engaging in crime. Yet, the crime
market is a risky alternative to the labour market: If one is caught for crime, then
sanctions, income cuts and social stigma follow. Hence, a frictionless transition from
entering unemployment and turning to crime is unlikely. Again, think about two
otherwise identical individuals who enter unemployment. One of them finds a job
and exits unemployment shortly after, and the other one remains unemployed. At
the margin, the still unemployed individual is more likely to become criminal than
the re-employed counterfactual: Economic conditions become more severe the longer
the individual is unemployed for and human capital depreciation further decreases
expected future wages. Expected legal returns decline and higher expected relative
returns to illegal action now increase the propensity of crime (Becker, 1968, Cantor
and Land, 1985).
Typically, there is initial support through unemployment benefits and from fam-
ily or other social networks when one enters unemployment. Unemployment benefits
are available for a fixed period of time only and when they expire, the individual
faces a cut in income. That mechanism sets strong incentives to search for jobs
and to exit unemployment before the known cutoff date. Again, think about two
otherwise identical unemployed individuals, one of whom receives unemployment
benefits for a longer time period. At the margin, that person is disincentivised, re-
mains unemployed for longer and subsequently becomes more likely to commit crime
than the re-employed counterfactual. However, compared to an otherwise identical
unemployed individual who has expired unemployment benefits, that person is bet-
ter off in financial terms: At the margin, the unemployed who receives benefits is
less likely to commit crime than the counterfactual without benefits, everything else
being equal.
Expected relative returns on the labour market are not only affected by personal
unemployment but also by aggregate labour market conditions: If unemployment
rates are high, competition for jobs is high and expected wages decrease. In turn,
relative returns to crime increase. These effects might be stronger if average unem-
ployment durations are long: Shorter unemployment durations might reflect search
frictions that do not evidently lead to more crime. In contrast, longer durations
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might capture more substantial problems on the labour market and may thus be a
predictor for criminal activity.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 summarises
the existing literature. Section 4.3 presents a conceptual framework for my analysis,
discussing the economic mechanisms that underlie the link between labour markets
and crime and relating the research question to existing models of crime. In sec-
tion 4.4, I describe the U.S. state level data from the Uniform Crime Reports and the
Current Population Survey as well as the unemployment benefit extension policies.
Section 4.5 outlines the empirical strategy. Empirical evidence on the causal effect
of unemployment on crime is presented in section 4.6, the duration dependence of
that relationship is discussed in section 4.7. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Previous Literature
An early economic framework of crime and labour markets is provided by Becker
(1968), Ehrlich (1973) and Block and Heineke (1975).2 More recently, Raphael and
Winter-Ebmer (2001) estimate the relation between unemployment and crime in the
U.S. from 1971 to 1997. Using military spending and oil price shock instruments,
they find elasticities of property crime rates with respect to unemployment rates
between 2.8 and 5.0 percent. Gould et al. (2002) examine the link between crime
rates of young men and unemployment. Using a U.S. panel of counties from 1979
to 1997, they also find significant positive effects. Further, they demonstrate that
low wages are a better predictor for long-term crime patterns than unemployment.
Grönqvist (2013) uses Swedish register data to examine the relation between youth
unemployment and crime. The author finds strong positive effects and demonstrates
that the relation between unemployment and crime is mostly predicted by an in-
crease in available time and opportunities for crime. Bell et al. (2015) study scarring
effects of unemployment at labour market entry on crime outcomes later in life. Us-
ing data both for the United States and the United Kingdom, they find substantial
and persistent effects, as discussed in more detail in chapter 3 of this dissertation.
Using French data from 1990 to 2000 and an industrial structure type instru-
ment, Fougère et al. (2009) find that the youth unemployment rate, but not the
overall unemployment rate, is a strong causal predictor for crime rates. They find
no significant association between the long-term unemployment rate and crime, how-
ever they demonstrate a positive link between not receiving unemployment benefits
2For details on the seminal economic models of crime as well as on a more extensive discussions
of the studies mentioned in the following, see chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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and crime. In contrast, Almén and Nordin (2011) use Swedish panel data on mu-
nicipality level from 1997 to 2009 to examine the relationship between long-term
unemployment and crime and find strong links using a corporate bankruptcies in-
strument.
In terms of the underlying economic mechanisms, this paper relates to the the-
oretical literature on dynamic models of crime. Burdett et al. (2003) derive an
equilibrium search model of crime, inequality and unemployment. They find that
the model generates wage dispersion and multiple equilibria. They use that multi-
plicity to explain different crime rates across otherwise similar neighborhoods, and
to explain the relation between local labour market conditions and crime. In a
follow-up paper, Burdett et al. (2004) extend that model by incorporating on-the-
job-search, again detecting multiple equilibria. Further, they find that an increase
in the unemployment insurance replacement rate increases unemployment and crime
rates, respectively. Mocan et al. (2005) derive a dynamic model taking into account
individual human capital decisions over the life-cycle, differentiating human capital
into legal and criminal human capital. The model predicts that the relationship
between unemployment and crime is asymmetric: Whereas the standard models
predict that a decrease in unemployment leads to a decrease in crime, the authors
find that this is not necessarily the case due to legal human capital depreciation and
criminal knowledge accumulation.
This chapter examines recent structural changes in the U.S. labour market and
temporary changes in unemployment benefit policies and studies the relationship
between labour market conditions and crime in that context. Hence, the findings in
the chapter relate not only to the literature on unemployment and crime, but also to
a long-standing literature on the impact of unemployment benefits on unemployment
durations as well as a more recent literature on the effects of unemployment benefits
on criminal behaviour.
In terms of the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment and unemploy-
ment duration, Katz and Meyer (1990) and Meyer (1990) find a spike in exit rates
from unemployment close to the benefit exhaustion date. More recently and in the
context of the recent changes in the U.S. labour market, Rothstein (2011) provides
evidence that unemployment benefit extensions during the Great Recession had
significant negative, albeit small effects on unemployment exit probabilities. The
author finds that these effects are driven by the long-term unemployed, and that
changes in the unemployment rate due to the extension policies are mainly attrib-
uted to reduced exits from the labour force. Farber and Valletta (2013) confirm
these results, and find similar effects for a milder recession in the earlier 2000s.
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Hagedorn et al. (2015) look at the macro effects of the unemployment benefit ex-
tensions during the Great Recession. In contrast to the other studies, the authors
find that there are large effects of benefit extensions on unemployment which are
driven by the response of the job creation. Schmieder et al. (2012) study the effect
of unemployment insurance extensions on unemployment duration over the business
cycle using German data. The authors find that the moral hazard effect of benefit
extensions is smaller during recessions than in booms. Lalive et al. (2015) study
spillover effects of unemployment insurance extensions in a quasi-experimental set-
ting for Austria. The authors relate their findings to the temporary policy changes
in the U.S. and argue that while existing studies find small macro elasticities of
unemployment durations with respect to the benefit extensions this might be due
to large search externalities and that the micro elasticities might be larger.
In terms of unemployment insurance and crime, Engelhardt et al. (2008) derive
a search model including crimes and optimally determined contracts to study the
effects of labour market and crime policies. The authors find that a more generous
unemployment benefit system reduces the crime rate for the unemployed, and has
a more ambiguous effect on the employed depending on job durations and jail sen-
tences. Polito and Long (2014) study a job search model of unemployment, crime
and social insurance with random criminal opportunities. Modeling these opportun-
ities as a moral hazard problem, they find that under certain conditions decreasing
unemployment benefits reduce the expected return to criminal action compared to
job search. The model implies that it is optimal to front-load benefits and to re-
duce benefits over time. Machin and Marie (2006) empirically study the effect of a
reform in the Jobseekers Allowance in 1996 on crime in England and Wales. The
authors find evidence that the toughening of the unemployment benefit regime leads
to higher crime rates.
4.3 Conceptual Framework
In the standard Becker (1968) economic model of crime, rational decision makers
choose between legal and illegal options in order to maximise utility. The returns
to legal activity are determined by expected returns to the specific activity, e.g.
wages or unemployment benefits. The returns to illegal activity are based on the
anticipated crime payoff, the probability of getting caught and the imminent sanction
in the case of being caught. Agents who are caught for crime might lose returns on
the legal labour market: If previously employed, they can lose their job; if previously
unemployed, they can lose benefit eligibility; in both cases they can end up in prison
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and face labour market discrimination due to a criminal record.3 The individual
chooses to commit crime if the expected utility from illegal activity outweighs the
expected utility from legal activity.4 In that model, higher unemployment lowers
the expected returns from legal activity and hence affects the relative returns to
crime. At the margin, an agent who becomes unemployed, or indeed encounters a
higher risk of unemployment, is more likely to commit crime than otherwise.
The model is explicitly static, yet the effect of unemployment is likely to vary
with the duration of unemployment. Mocan et al. (2005) suggest a dynamic model
of differential human capital and criminal activity. Assume that individuals are en-
dowed with both legal and criminal activity specific human capital. Both evolve over
time depending on participation in either market, on human capital depreciation,
and on investment in legal human capital acquisition. Expected gains from either
legal or criminal activity thus depend on both types of human capital and respective
returns. During unemployment, the legal human capital stock and returns to legal
human capital fall, hence involvement in criminal activity rises. Agents accumu-
late criminal know-how and the criminal human capital stock grows subsequently,
increasing the expected returns to crime.
Here, unemployment impacts on illegitimate behaviour through the evolution
of both legal and criminal human capital. In that sense, the effect varies over the
duration of unemployment: During unemployment, legal human capital depreci-
ates while the criminal human capital stock grows. If the unemployment spell is
short, the agent has an initial incentive to enter the criminal sector, but exits unem-
ployment before returns to criminal human capital are higher than returns to legal
human capital. If the unemployment spell is sufficiently long, then the criminal hu-
man capital grows for longer and the legal human capital stock depreciates further,
triggering more permanent criminal behaviour. The human capital mechanisms sug-
gest the following hypothesis: Unemployment initially shifts the individual towards
the threshold to crime, at the margin leading to a more persistent and potentially
increasing propensity of crime the longer the unemployment spell lasts.
At the beginning of an unemployment spell the unemployed typically receives
unemployment benefits. In many developed countries, the benefit amount depends
on previous wages and the employment history. If the unemployment duration
3See for example Baert and Verhofstadt (2015) for a recent empirical study on labour mar-
ket discrimination of former juvenile delinquents. In a field experiment, the authors find that
labour market entrants who disclose a criminal record receive about 22 percent less callbacks than
counterfactuals without a criminal record.
4The standard economic model described here applies to all types of crime. However, one may
argue that it is more applicable to income generating crime such as property crime or drug dealing
rather than to violent crime.
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exceeds a cutoff length, individuals are no longer eligible for unemployment benefits
and income is reduced to lower welfare benefits. All else equal, that further reduces
returns to legal activity. This income mechanism supports the above hypothesis
that at the margin the unemployed becomes more likely to commit crime the longer
the unemployment spell lasts.5
Unsurprisingly, other than the two mechanisms described above there are al-
ternative explanations for the associations between crime, unemployment and un-
employment duration which include for example the following. First, the arguments
above relate in a broader sense to the literature on the effect of low wages on crime:6
Decreasing returns to legal activity imply decreasing opportunity cost of crime for
longer unemployment durations. The potentially lost income from legal activity
when being caught for crime decreases compared to shorter periods of unemploy-
ment. The inverse deterrence effect, here triggered by longer unemployment dura-
tions, leads to higher crime propensities. Second, the literature on the impact of
education on crime discusses the role of patience.7 A similar argument might be
made here: If patience decreases over the course of an unemployment spell, e.g.
prompted by unsuccessful job search, the valuation of relative returns to criminal
action changes. At the margin, an individual might be shifted towards and across
the crime threshold who otherwise would not have committed crime. Other beha-
vioural patterns might change and affect crime behaviour in a similar way. Third,
it has been shown that social networks play an important role in determining crim-
inal behaviour: Once unemployed, social networks are likely to change. Entering
new social networks which include other criminals can affect and trigger criminal
behaviour.8
4.4 Data Description
The theoretical notions outlined above can be tested in an empirical framework.
In this chapter, I use U.S. state level data to estimate the link between unemploy-
ment duration and criminal behaviour. In the following, I describe the different data
sources and discuss the sample specifics.
5That argument implies that ceteris paribus unemployment benefits prevent individuals from
committing crime. I will discuss this point at a later stage.
6See for example Grogger (1998) or Machin and Meghir (2004), as well as the discussion in
chapter 2 of this dissertation.
7See for example Lochner (2004), Lochner and Moretti (2004) or Machin et al. (2011), as well
as the discussion in chapter 2 of this dissertation.
8See for example Glaeser et al. (1996) or Glaeser et al. (2003), as well as the discussion in
chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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4.4.1 Crime Data
Data on criminality comes from the master files of the Uniform Crime Reporting
programme, UCR hereafter. Since 1930, law enforcement agencies in the United
States have been participating in gathering crime statistics through the Uniform
Crime Reporting programme. The programme is administered by the FBI and
participation is voluntary for all agencies.
The UCR report the monthly number of arrests by state, age, gender and type
of crime. Types of crime include the FBI categories for property crime (burglary,
larceny, vehicle theft, arson), for violent crime (murder, rape, robbery, assault) and
for drug crime (substance sale and manufacturing, possession). The age variable in
the original data indicates single age years up to the age of 25, and five year brackets
for ages above 25 (25-29, 30-34, etc.). Here, the sample is restricted to the 16 to
39 year old population, reflecting typical crime demographics as well as potential
labour market entry ages. Furthermore, I aggregate the crime data up to the age of
25 to the age groups 16 to 19-years old and 20 to 24-years old. The resulting sample
is a monthly panel of the number of arrests by state, age group, gender and type of
crime.
The arrest data is matched to population data in order to produce arrest rates.
Population data is retrieved from the U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates.
The population is measured as the annual population by state, age and gender.
I match the population data to the arrest data by year, state, age and gender,
implicitly assuming that the population number is constant with respect to each
month within a year.9 Arrest rates are calculated as the number of arrests divided
by the population count in the observational unit, scaled by 100,000 for the ease of
interpretation.
Here, criminality is measured by arrests. Yet, the number of arrests does not
necessarily equal the number of crimes. First, not all arrestees are offenders. To my
knowledge consistent monthly data at a similar observational level as the arrest data
does not exist for the U.S., neither with respect to incarceration nor with respect
to convictions.10 Second, not all crimes lead to arrests. If a crime is not detected
or not reported to the police, no arrest can be observed. Victimisation data is more
informative in that respect, but again to my knowledge consistent monthly data at a
similar observational level as the arrest data does not exist for the U.S. Furthermore,
9To my knowledge, monthly population data is not available at the same level of observation.
Thus, alternatives to this approach would be to either calculate arrest rates relative to total popu-
lation numbers instead of observational cell specific population numbers, or to linearly interpolate
population numbers for each month in one year.
10See for example Pfaff (2011).
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victimisation data is typically collected from surveys and hence is subject to its own
type of measurement error.
Figure 4.1 shows the correlation between U.S. victimisations and arrests per 1,000
U.S. population as published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. As expected, the
number of victimisations is higher than the number of arrests, but there clearly is a
positive correlation between both measures of criminality. That suggests that arrests
are an informative measure of criminality.11 A particular problem may arise if petty
crimes lead to less arrests than felonies. The notion that individuals become more
likely to commit crimes while unemployed may be more applicable to petty crime
than to felonies, in particular with respect to first time offenders. If unemployment
triggers more petty crimes than felonies and if the likelihood of an arrest for petty
crimes is lower, the results in this paper would be downward biased.
For a number of states, the arrest data is either systematically missing or not
provided in every month within a year. States with systematically missing data
are excluded from my sample. Also excluded are states for which the arrest data
covers less than 95% of the state population.12 States with partly missing data
are included for the non-missing time periods and excluded otherwise, leading to
an unbalanced sample. Where it is appropriate, I impute single missing values
using linear interpolation. Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1 provide more details on the
geographical distribution of the sample.
4.4.2 Unemployment Data
Unemployment data comes from the Current Population Survey, CPS hereafter.
The CPS is a monthly cross-sectional survey of U.S. households conducted by the
Bureau of Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As such, the CPS provides
information about the employment situation of surveyed individuals and households.
The dataset contains information on the duration of an ongoing unemployment spell
of the interviewed person as well as a large number of other labour market and
demographic variables. The CPS is the basis for official unemployment statistics
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Here, unemployment is measured according to
the common definition by the International Labor Organiszation (ILO) as being not
11If arrest rates are in constant proportion to true unobserved crime rates, the proportionality
factor is an additive component of the logarithmic arrest rate. Further, if the unobserved pro-
portionality factor is independent of the explanatory variable in the regression model, then the
crime-arrest measurement problem is equivalent to the case of classical measurement error in the
outcome variable which does not result in an estimation bias (see Imbens and Hyslop (2001)).
12There is no evidence that suggests that the excluded states differ systematically from the
included states in terms of unemployment durations. Hence, unbalanced sample or selection biases
seem to be unlikely.
92
Chapter 4. Crime and Unemployment Duration
employed, available and looking for work. Unemployment duration is measured as
the elapsed duration of the ongoing unemployment spell.
In order to match the observational level of the arrest data, I compute unemploy-
ment rates and average unemployment durations as well as averages for composi-
tional control variables by month, state, gender and age group. The unemployment
rate is defined as the percentage of the labour force who is unemployed. Composi-
tional control variables include the share of married persons, the share of native born
persons, the share of high-school graduates and the share of the black population.
For this study, I calculate the average unemployment duration per observational
unit where unemployment duration is measured as the length of the ongoing unem-
ployment spell at the time of the interview. There are two main concerns with that
type of data. On the one hand, reported unemployment spells are uncompleted, i.e.
right-censored. Right-censoring means that the average unemployment duration is
underestimated. On the other hand, unemployment spells that occur between two
interview dates are not observed. Thus, short unemployment durations are under-
represented which leads to length-biased sampling and to an overestimation of the
average unemployment duration.13 The empirical results are tested using the median
instead of the average unemployment duration, but otherwise rely on the validity of
the duration measurement.
4.4.3 Unemployment Benefit Extensions
The U.S. unemployment insurance system consists of a federal-state unemploy-
ment insurance programme that provides temporary financial assistance to individu-
als who are unemployed and meet the eligibility criteria. Guidelines for eligibility,
benefit amounts and benefit periods are given by federal law, whereas the exact
legislation is determined by state law. Eligibility requirements include conditions
on wages and time worked during a certain period. Generally, eligibility is based
on employment in covered work for a base period of 12 months. Only workers who
are unemployed "through no fault on their own" meet eligibility requirements. The
benefit amount is determined based on a share of an individuals’s recent earnings.
The maximum benefit period typically lasts for a maximum of 26 weeks, but can
vary between states.14 Yet, the individual benefit period can vary substantially and,
13For a more detailed discussion of problems with the measurement of unemployment durations
in the CPS see for example Kiefer et al. (1985) or Kiefer (1988).
14For the considered sample period, the benefit period amounts to 26 weeks in all states except
for Massachusetts and Washington, where it amounts to 30 weeks. See the online unemployment
insurance state law information by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Department of Labor
for further details.
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dependent on eligibility criteria, can be as short as one week.
In times of economic downturn and high unemployment and based on state-level
criteria the maximum potential benefit duration (PBD hereafter) can be extended.
During the sample period 2003 to 2011 different benefit extension policies have
been in place. Information on unemployment benefit extension policies is retrieved
from weekly trigger reports published by the United States Department of Labor,
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The trigger reports indicate whether states
have triggered onto an extension programme, and indicate the number of weeks of
extension for the states who have triggered on. The reports are published on a weekly
basis. In order to match the observational level of the crime and unemployment data,
the median maximum potential benefit duration per state and month is calculated.
Figure 4.3 and table 4.2 summarise the unemployment benefit extension policies
and trigger mechanisms for the different policies as they are described in the fol-
lowing. A general extension programme, the Extended Benefit programme (EB
hereafter), is activated by trigger mechanisms based on the levels of the insured un-
employment rate (IUR hereafter) and the total unemployment rate (TUR hereafter)
in the respective state. Depending on the level of IUR and TUR the maximum num-
ber of weeks of unemployment benefits may be extended by 13 weeks or 20 weeks
in cases of particularly high unemployment. EB benefits are financed to equal parts
by the federal government and by the state government.
Additional extension programmes are put in place in times of economic crisis.
The Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC hereafter) is im-
plemented between March 2002 and March 2004. The TEUC provides additional
weeks of federally-funded unemployment benefits to workers who have exhausted
regular unemployment benefits. In all states, a maximum of 13 additional weeks
is available. In states that trigger onto the so-called TEUC-X programme, up to
another 13 weeks of unemployment benefits are made available.
In June 2008, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 (EUC08 here-
after) programme has been signed into law. The programme consists of different
tiers which are implemented at various points in time. Tier 1 of EUC08 provides 13
additional weeks of unemployment benefits to eligible individuals in all states, and
20 additional weeks respectively from November 2008 onwards. Tier 2 provides 13
weeks in states with high unemployment. High unemployment is again determined
by trigger thresholds of the insured and the total unemployment rates. Tier 2 is
changed to 14 weeks in all states independent of trigger mechanisms from November
2009 onwards. Also in November 2009, Tier 3 and Tier 4 are enacted. Under Tier
3, based on IUR and TUR trigger mechanisms, up to 13 additional weeks of unem-
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ployment benefits are made available. Under Tier 4, additional 6 weeks are provided
in states that fulfill again higher unemployment trigger criteria. In addition to the
tiers of EUC08, the EB programme is still in place during that period.15 Thus, if
a state triggers onto all tiers and the EB programme is in effect, up to 99 weeks of
unemployment benefits are available to an eligible individual.
In order to be eligible for claiming EUC08 benefits, regular unemployment be-
nefits have to be exhausted and the unemployed individual is required to have been
in insured employment for at least 20 weeks or to have the equivalent in insured
wages in the base period. If eligible, the EUC08 extended benefit amounts to the
equivalent of the unemployed’s regular weekly unemployment compensation scheme.
The EUC08 programme is a federally funded programme. From February 2009
onwards, states were not allowed to actively reduce unemployment compensation
benefits through changes to benefit amounts. Alternatively, some states respon-
ded by reducing the baseline benefit period. In the data used in this study, these
reductions in the baseline unemployment benefit period are taken into account.
The potential benefit duration can exceed the actual benefit duration due to
benefit eligibility criteria. Figure 4.4 shows the national average duration of persons
collecting unemployment insurance benefits. For the graph, these benefits include
regular unemployment insurance as well as EUC08 extended benefits. Clearly, the
actual benefit duration is shorter than the potential benefit duration for the reasons
above. However, one can see a steep increase in the average actual benefit duration
with the introduction of the extended benefits.
The trigger mechanisms for the policies and for the tiers within the policies
are explicit, as outlined in table 4.2. They are based on a combination of exact
thresholds with respect to the current and sometimes also the lagged insured and
total state unemployment rates, and thus not trivial to anticipate. Figure 4.5 shows
the share of states that offer any unemployment benefit extensions between 2003
and 2011. The strict trigger thresholds create variation in the maximum benefit
duration across states and over time, as shown in figure 4.6. As expected, most
variation evolves during the recessions towards the beginning and the end of the
sample period.
4.4.4 Sample and Sample Descriptives
The sample ranges from January 2003 to December 2011, and is restricted to
the 16 to 39 year old population. That results in a sample of 24,297 data points
at the state, month, age group and gender level. Table 4.3 provides sample sum-
15States governments decide whether EB or EUC08 is paid first in the respective state.
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mary statistics. The average number of arrests per 100,000 population amounts to
103 for property crime, 117 for violent crime and 107 drug related crime. Standard
deviations are larger for drug crime than for the two other types of crime. The
average unemployment duration amounts to 18.6 weeks with a relatively high vari-
ation, compared to an average potential benefit duration of 48.97 weeks. The mean
unemployment rate, averaged over the observational cells, is 9.97%. That unemploy-
ment rate is higher than the general BLS state unemployment rate, as the sample
is restricted to younger age groups. In terms of compositional control variables,
the average share of married persons in the sample is about 37%, the average share
of native born persons is about 86%, the average share of high-school graduates is
about 78% and the share of the black population is about 11%.
Figures 4.7 to 4.12 show the sample distribution and time trends of the U.S. av-
erage arrest rates with respect to property, violent and drug crime. The distribution
of the arrest rates is right skewed for all three crime types: Crime is a rare event,
and low arrest rates are more common than high arrest rates. Applying logarithms
to the arrest rates in the regressions, the distribution is more centred around zero
for all three types of arrest rates. The time trends of the average arrest rates suggest
an upwards trend in the property crime rate from 2006 onwards.16 For the violent
and drug crime rates, no trends are evident from the graphical analysis. Yet, it is
noteworthy that the arrest rates shown in the graphs are averages over the states
in the sample and do not necessarily reflect the state specific crime trends that are
used in the regression analysis.
Figure 4.13 shows the unemployment rate as well as the unemployment in- and
outflows for the U.S. from 2003 to 2011. The graph shows a steep increase in the un-
employment rate from 2008 onwards that coincides with an increase in the inflows
into unemployment and with constant outflows from unemployment. Figure 4.14
shows the average state unemployment duration as measured in weeks within the
sample. Most strikingly, there is a very large increase during the Great Recession:
While the average duration amounts to about 15 weeks at the beginning of the
sample period, the graph shows an almost 15 week increase in the average unem-
ployment duration. Two observations are particularly interesting here: First, the
increase in average unemployment rates starts around January 2008 whereas the
increase in average unemployment durations seems to start about one year later in
January 2009. Second, while unemployment rates are elevated during an earlier re-
cession at the beginning of the sample period, average unemployment durations do
16Note that the sample period follows a longer period of a sharp decline in crime in the U.S.
The trends seen in the graphs can be understood as a snapshot of longer term trends, and do not
offset the overall decline in crime over the last decades.
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not seem to be similarly affected then as they are later during the Great Recession.
These observations highlight the dramatic changes in the U.S. labour market during
the last recession. Whereas European labour markets have experienced long-term
unemployment for much longer, this is a more recent phenomenon for the U.S.
4.5 Empirical Strategy
In the following section, I outline the empirical strategy for the estimations
in this chapter. First, the causal effect of unemployment on crime is estimated
exploiting quasi-experimental variation in unemployment benefit durations caused
by the temporary policy changes as described above. Let CRtsag denote the arrest
rate for period t, state s, age group a and gender g. The dependent variable in
the regression model is the logarithmic arrest rate ln(CR)tsag, separated by crime
type for property, violent and drug crime. The explanatory variable of interest is
the logarithmic unemployment rate ln(UR)tsag for period t, state s, age group a
and gender g, defined as the percentage of the labour force who is unemployed.
Let Xtsag be a matrix of observable characteristics to account for compositional
differences between the data cells and let αs, αg and αa denote fixed effects for
state, gender and age group. Further, let f(ts) be a quadratic state-specific time
trend, and εtsag the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the state level,
and regressions are weighted by the population of the observational unit. The fixed
effects model, exploiting variation within and across states, can be written as:
ln(CR)tsag = β0 + β1 ln(URtsag) + β2 ln(URt−1,sag) + β3Xtsag
+
∑
i=s,g,a
αi + f(ts) + εtsag (4.1)
The fixed effects take unobserved heterogeneity problems into account which
occur when underlying unobserved differences between data cells are correlated with
the variables of interest. For example, if cultural differences between the sampled
regions systematically affect crime and labour market attitudes, one region may
display higher crime rates and worse labour market conditions independent of the
effect of interest for this study.
Still, ex ante the direction of causality between crime behaviour and unemploy-
ment is not obvious leading to reversed causality concerns. For the type of data used
in this analysis, one might be mostly concerned about a recession bias (Cook and
Zarkin, 1985, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). In particular, recessions not only
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affect labour markets but also the quality and quantity of criminal opportunities:
Potential victims for example have less income and consume less during recessions
than they would do during more buoyant times. If that is the case, then there is
procyclical variation in criminal opportunities which creates a downward bias in the
estimates of the impact of the (tautologically procyclical) unemployment rate and
crime.17 In order to address that identification problem, I employ an instrumental
variable strategy using quasi-experimental variation in unemployment benefit dura-
tions.
Let PBDts denote the maximum potential benefit duration in state s at time
t. That measure includes both the baseline plus the extension benefit duration,
and hence varies from 26 up to 99 weeks. The variation in the benefit durations
stems from quasi-experimental variation in the timing and the magnitude of the
benefit extensions within and across states. Using notation corresponding to the
fixed effects model, the reduced form of the model with respect to the instrument
can be written as:
ln(CR)tsag = δ0 + δ1PBDts + δ2 ln(URt−1,sag) + δ3Xtsag
+
∑
i=s,g,a
αi + f(ts) + εtsag (4.2)
The reduced form estimates the direct link between the potential benefit dur-
ation, varying over space and time with the extensions, and the crime rate. Two
competing mechanisms connect benefit extensions and criminal activity. On the
one hand, it has been argued in the literature that benefit extensions decrease un-
employment exit probabilities. Think about two otherwise identical unemployed
individuals, one of whom receives unemployment benefits for longer than the other
person. At the margin the person who receives the benefits is disincentivised, re-
mains unemployed and becomes more likely to commit crime than the re-employed
counterfactual. On the other hand, compared to an otherwise identical unemployed
individual who has expired unemployment benefits, that person is better off in fin-
ancial terms: At the margin, the unemployed who receives benefits is less likely to
17In general, there might be concerns over and above these reflections. First, individuals might
choose to participate in crime based on unobservable characteristics which correlate with equally
unobservable characteristics determining unemployment. If the unobservable characteristics are
positively correlated with unemployment and are also positively correlated with participation in
criminal activity, the fixed effects model is upwards biased. Second, firms choose locations. If
crime rates in a local labour market are high, firms may not enter that market but choose different
local labour markets with lower crime rates. In that case, the existing crime rate impacts on the
current and future local labour market conditions, again leading to a reversed causality problem.
Yet, these concerns are less applicable to the context of this study given the type of data I use.
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commit crime than the counterfactual without benefits, everything else being equal.
That is directly linked to the income mechanism outlined in section 4.3: The benefit
extension delays the negative income shock caused by benefit exhaustion, and thus
increases returns to legal activity compared to the counterfactual situation.18 The
reduced form link between crime and unemployment benefit extensions is the sum
of both effects: If δ1 > 0, the disincentive effect exceeds the income effect. If δ1 < 0,
the income effect exceeds the disincentive effect. Ex ante, the sign of the overall
effect is uncertain and remains to be determined empirically.
The first stage of the initial model links the unemployment rate for period t,
state s, age group a and gender g to the maximum potential benefit duration in
state s at time t:
ln(UR)tsag = γ0 + γ1PBDts + γ2 ln(URt−1,sag) + γ3Xtsag
+
∑
i=s,g,a
αi + f(ts) + εtsag (4.3)
As described in more detail in section 4.4, the benefit extension trigger mech-
anisms are based on statewide total and insured unemployment rates: If there is a
large inflow into unemployment, unemployment rates increase and eventually exceed
pre-defined thresholds triggering extension policies. Conditional on the previous un-
employment situation, one can argue that the policy is then as good as randomly
assigned. For example, consider a state with an unemployment rate of 4.99% in one
month and an unemployment rate of 5.01% in another month. The overall economic
conditions in these two months are likely to be comparable. However, if the benefit
extension trigger was based on an unemployment rate of 5%, individuals would face
different potential benefit spells.
Moreover, benefit extensions are implemented at the state level. The validity of
the instrument is supported by local labour markets within a state being differently
affected by economic conditions: The individual labour market experience is in
general independent from the policy which averages over all local labour markets
within that state. Unfortunately, the type of data I have does not allow me to
allocate individuals to local labour markets other than at the state level. Yet, a
similar, but due to autocorrelations somewhat weaker argument can be made with
respect to age and gender specific unemployment rates.
As outlined before, benefit extensions decrease unemployment exit probabilities.
18These reflections directly relate to the debate in the literature about the moral hazard losses
of unemployment benefits on the one hand and the insurance gains on the other hand.
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While the benefit extensions are enacted as a response to an increasing inflow into
unemployment, that implies that the relative outflow from unemployment decreases
and the unemployment rate increases as a consequence. Indeed, that is what can
be observed in the data as discussed above and illustrated in figure 4.13. In order
to incorporate these arguments into the empirical analysis, I thus condition on the
lagged unemployment rate. The two-stage least squares model can according to the
above be written as:
ln(CR)tsag = β∗0 + β
∗
1 ln(URtsag) + β
∗
2 ln(URt−1,sag) + β
∗
3Xtsag
+
∑
i=s,g,a
αi + f(ts) + εtsag
ln(UR)tsag = γ0 + γ1PBDts + γ2 ln(URt−1,sag) + γ3Xtsag
+
∑
i=s,g,a
αi + f(ts) + εtsag (4.4)
In order to be a valid instrument, potential benefit durations have to be exo-
genous with respect to crime rates. If potential benefit durations and crime both
directly correlated with recessions, the exogeneity assumption would be violated
and one would expect a recession bias. Cook and Zarkin (1985) discuss four pos-
sible linkages between crime and business cycles: Legitimate opportunities, criminal
opportunities, use of criminogenic commodities and the criminal justice system re-
sponse to crime. The empirical model captures the macro-elasticity of crime supply
with respect to unemployment conditional on the lagged unemployment rate, and
thus captures the crime response to a change in legitimate opportunities. Criminal
opportunities may increase during recessions if the government decreases spending
on the criminal justice system. In the empirical analysis, this can be taken into
account by controlling for the number of law enforcement employees in order to
rule out related confounding factors. If the identifying assumptions hold, β∗1 is the
elasticity of the crime rate with respect to unemployment.
4.6 Unemployment and Crime
The empirical results corresponding to the estimating equations (4.1) and (4.4)
are shown in table 4.4 for property crime, table 4.5 for violent crime and table 4.6
for drug crime. Columns (1) and (2), respectively, report the results for the OLS
estimation with and without control variables, columns (3) and (4) for the 2SLS
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estimation. Column (4) is the preferred specification for the reasons discussed in
the previous sections.
The OLS estimations yield mixed results across the three different crime types.
Whilst for property as well as for violent crime the coefficients are close to zero
and imprecisely estimated, a higher unemployment rate is associated with signi-
ficantly more arrests for drug crime. Yet, these associations do not have a causal
interpretation due to potential biases as outlined above. Indeed, confirming the ar-
guments listed in section 4.5 the results reveal a substantial downward bias of the
OLS compared to the 2SLS estimations.
For property crime, the 2SLS estimation yields a 0.15 elasticity of the arrest
rate with respect to the current unemployment rate which is statistically significant
at the 1% level. In order to interpret the magnitude of the elasticity, imagine a
fictional state with a property crime arrest rate of 100 per 100,000 population and an
unemployment rate of 10%. Assume that during a recession the unemployment rate
increases by 5 percentage points to 15%. The results suggest that such an increase
is linked to an increase in the property crime arrest rate by 7.5 arrests per 100,000
population. The results are in line with the arguments above: Higher unemployment
and even more so an increase in unemployment at a given level of unemployment
is linked to an increase in property crime. The corresponding elasticities for violent
crime and drug crime are not significantly different from zero.
In the exactly identified case, the two-stage least square estimator is equivalent
to the indirect least square estimator. Hence, it equals the ratio of the reduced form
coefficient on the instrument to the first stage coefficient:
β∗1 =
δ1
γ1
(4.5)
In order to better understand the mechanisms behind the impact of unemploy-
ment on crime, I thus discuss the reduced form and the first stage results in more
detail in what follows.
4.6.1 Reduced Form: Unemployment Benefits and Crime
The reduced form estimates the link between the potential benefit duration and
the crime rate as described in equation (4.2). In that model, δ1 can be interpreted as
the semi-elasticity of the crime rate with respect to the potential benefit duration.
Figure 4.15 illustrates the reduced form effect of the instrument on property crime
rate, figure 4.16 the effect on the violent crime rate and figure 4.17 on the drug
crime rate, respectively. Figure 4.15 suggests that the property crime rate partially
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correlates with the benefit duration. For violent crime and drug crime, that link is
not evident from visual inspection.
Panel A in table 4.7 shows the corresponding estimation results. Column (1)
displays the results for property crime, column (2) for violent crime and column (3)
for drug crime. For ease of interpretation, potential benefit duration is measured
in months rather than in weeks for all reduced form specifications.19 The results
suggest that a one month increase in the potential benefit duration increases the
property crime arrest rate by 0.34% and has no significant impact on the violent
or drug crime arrest rate. That corresponds to an elasticity at the mean of 0.04.
Using the fictional example from above, the results translate into an increase in the
property crime arrest rate by 1.02 arrests per 100,000 population if the potential
benefit duration is extended by 12 weeks.
As discussed above, the overall reduced form effect is the sum of competing
disincentive and income effects. Finding that δ1 > 0 suggests that the disincentive
effect outweighs the income effect: At the margin, individuals are disincentivised by
longer benefit durations with respect to job search, remain unemployed and become
more likely to commit property crime than they would have been otherwise.
A Placebo Test
The reduced form estimation suggests that the benefit extensions are associated
with incentives for criminal behaviour. That is surprising at first, and one might
be concerned that the effect of the unemployment benefits on crime is confounded
with underlying and unobserved factors which correlate with the recession period.
Hence, a placebo analysis is conducted in order to assess the validity of the findings.
In particular, I construct a placebo test by matching the benefit extensions during
the Great Recession to an earlier, and in terms of unemployment rates comparable
recession at the beginning of the 1980s, where the matching is based on months into
the recession. That allows me to estimate the effect of "fake" benefit extensions
during a recession that is similar to the Great Recession but without such extension
policies taking place at the time. The estimating equation for the placebo test can
then be written as follows, where ER designates the earlier recession in the 1980s
and GR the Great Recession:
ln(CR)ERtsag = δ
∗
0 + δ
∗
1PBD
GR
ts +
∑
i=s,g,a
αi + f(ts) + εtsag (4.6)
19A month is defined as four weeks in that specification.
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If the reduced form effect of the benefit extensions on crime, δ1 was driven by
underlying factors related to the business cycle during the Great Recession, one
would expect the "fake" benefit extension to have a similar impact δ∗1 on crime
during the 1980s recession, too.
Panel B and C in table 4.7 show the results for the placebo analysis. Panel B
shows the results when I restrict the reduced form analysis to the Great Recession
period only, whereas panel C shows the results for the actual placebo analysis as
detailed above. For property crime, the Great Recession sample coefficient on the
instrument amounts to 0.23% and hence is smaller than the full sample coefficient,
but within the standard error. The placebo coefficient is not significantly different
from zero and not within the standard error of the Great Recession sample coef-
ficient. For both violent and drug crime the estimated coefficients are again not
significantly different from zero, neither for the reduced form estimation nor for the
placebo analysis.
The findings from the placebo analysis support the hypothesis that there is
indeed a reduced form effect of the potential unemployment benefit duration on the
property crime rate. That result is striking in itself and demonstrates a disturbing
and unintended effect of extended unemployment benefit periods.
4.6.2 First Stage: Unemployment
The first stage of the model estimates the link between the potential benefit
duration and unemployment as described in equation (4.3), and helps to understand
the mechanisms behind the findings above. Here, γ1 is the semi-elasticity of the
unemployment rate with respect to the potential benefit duration. To reiterate,
the variation in the potential benefit duration stems from the quasi-experimental
variation in the timing and the magnitude of the benefit extensions within and across
states. Increases in the state unemployment rate trigger the benefit extension, while
the trigger thresholds as well as the magnitude of the extension are determined by
federal law. Changes in federal legislation lead to non-smooth changes in potential
benefit durations over time.
Figure 4.18 illustrates the first stage mechanism: An inflow into unemployment
increases the unemployment rate. If the unemployment rate exceeds the pre-defined
trigger threshold, the unemployment benefit period in that state is extended based
on federal legislation. Yet, the benefit extensions decrease unemployment exit prob-
abilities and relative outflows from unemployment. That is reflected by an increase in
the average unemployment duration, and a subsequent increase in the unemployment
rates. Conditional on the previous unemployment rate, the current unemployment
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rate thus depends - inter alia - on the benefit duration.
Table 4.8 shows the results which correspond to the first stage estimating equa-
tion (4.3). Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the first stage estimation with
respect to the current unemployment rate with and without control variables. For
ease of interpretation, the potential benefit duration is measured in months rather
than in weeks for this specification.20 The results suggest that a one month increase
in the potential benefit duration increases the unemployment rate by 2.4%. In the
fictional example above with an unemployment rate of 10% that translates into a
0.72 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate if the benefit duration is
increased by 12 weeks.
The evidence in this paper so far has been based on unemployment rates as
a measure of labour market conditions. Yet, the U.S. labour market has experi-
enced unprecedented changes in terms of unemployment durations. As discussed
above, unemployment durations have dramatically increased during and after the
most recent recession leading to ongoing policy debates on how to reduce long-
term unemployment. Following the same reasoning as above, disincentive effects
of the extended unemployment benefit periods can partially explain these patterns.
Table 4.8 shows the results for the first stage estimation with respect to the average
unemployment duration instead of the current unemployment rate, as reported in
columns (3) and (4).21 The results suggest that a one week increase in the poten-
tial benefit duration increases the average unemployment duration by 0.76%. If for
example the average unemployment duration is 20 weeks and the potential benefit
duration is extended by 12 weeks, that translates into a 1.8 week increase in the
average unemployment duration.
4.7 Unemployment Duration and Crime
The observations and arguments made above naturally lead to the question how
the increase in unemployment durations in the U.S. labour market is linked to crime,
or in other words to what extend the link between unemployment and crime is dur-
ation dependent. The empirical model follows the strategy described in section 4.5
and exploits the given quasi-experimental variation in unemployment and unem-
ployment benefit durations. Let UDtsag be the average unemployment duration for
period t, state s, age group a and gender g, measured in weeks. The empirical model
20A month is defined as four weeks in that specification.
21The corresponding estimation equation accordingly reads: ln(UD)tsag = c0 + c1PBDts +
c2 ln(URt−1,sag) + c3Xtsag +
∑
i=s,g,a αi + f(ts) + εtsag.
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can then be written as follows:22
ln(CR)tsag = b0 + b1 ln(UDtsag) + b2 ln(URtsag) + b3Xtsag
+
∑
i=s,g,a
αi + f(ts) + εtsag
ln(UD)tsag = c0 + c1PBDts + c2 ln(URtsag) + c3Xtsag
+
∑
i=s,g,a
αi + f(ts) + εtsag (4.7)
The empirical results for model (4.7) are shown in table 4.9 for property crime,
table 4.10 for violent crime and table 4.11 for drug crime. Columns (1) and (2) report
the results for the OLS estimation with and without control variables, columns (3)
and (4) for the 2SLS estimation respectively. Column (4) is the preferred specific-
ation. Each table shows a specification using the average unemployment duration
(Panel A), an interaction of that average unemployment duration with the unem-
ployment rate (Panel B) and the median unemployment duration (Panel C).
For property crime, the 2SLS estimation yields a 0.114 elasticity of the arrest rate
with respect to the average unemployment duration for the preferred specification.
The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. Again, imagine a fictional
state with a property crime arrest rate of 100 per 100,000 population and this time
with an average unemployment duration of 20 weeks. Assume that during a recession
the average unemployment duration increases by 10 weeks to 30 weeks. The results
suggest that such an increase is linked to an increase in the property crime rate
by 5.7 arrests per 100,000 population. This is the average effect: The effect for
more vulnerable population groups may be even larger.
When interacted with the unemployment rate, the elasticities are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level albeit smaller than in the initial specification.
Similarly, the elasticity of the property crime arrest rate with respect to the median
unemployment duration is smaller than the elasticity with respect to the mean
unemployment duration. This can be explained by the right skewed distribution
of unemployment durations: The median unemployment duration gives less weight
to longer unemployment durations than the average unemployment duration, hence
the smaller elasticity. Qualitatively, all results are in line with the arguments above:
Longer unemployment durations are linked to higher property crime propensities.
The corresponding elasticities for violent crime and drug crime are not significantly
22Note that in this model, one can explicitly control for the unemployment rate in order to avoid
a policy bias in the estimated coefficients.
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different from zero.
Compared to the estimation results of the OLS model, the magnitudes of the
coefficients are substantially higher in the 2SLS estimation. The direction of the
bias is consistent with the arguments made before as well as with the direction
of the bias found in the literature on unemployment and crime. In terms of the
magnitude of the bias, it is likely that the instrument captures a local effect: The
instrument particularly affects individuals with longer unemployment spells which
may in return lead to substantially higher results than found in the OLS model.
Robustness Checks and Further Results
In the following, I present the results of robustness checks and further analyses.
As mentioned in the discussion of the instrument validity, one might be concerned
about changes in the law enforcement system that confound the effect of unemploy-
ment and unemployment duration on crime. Table 4.12 shows the results of the 2SLS
estimation for property, violent and drug crime when an additional control variable
for the ratio of police employees per population per state and year is included in
the regressions. The elasticities of the property crime rate both with respect to the
unemployment rate (panel A) and the average unemployment duration (panel B)
are robust to that specification. The corresponding elasticities for violent crime and
drug crime again are not significantly different from zero.
Arguably, the ratio of police employees per population is an endogenous control
variable. Hence, column (4) in panel C of table 4.12 shows the results of a regression
of the police employment on the potential benefit duration. If local governments
did respond to the policy with changes in the law enforcement system, one would
expect to find a non-zero coefficient in that specification. However, the results show
that the effect is close to zero and not precisely estimated.
The overall reduced form effect of the instrument on criminality is the sum of
competing disincentive and income effects. In order to disentangle these two effects,
one can include income control variables in the regression specification. The income
information including income from unemployment benefits is available only for the
CPS March sample which leads to a substantial reduction in sample size and quasi-
experimental variation. Table 4.13 shows the estimation results for property, violent
and drug crime excluding and including the income control variables, respectively.
Column (1) shows the elasticities of the property crime rate with respect to the
unemployment rate (panel A) and the average unemployment duration (panel B)
when the income control variables are excluded, column (2) when the income control
variables are included. In general, the elasticities on the reduced sample are larger
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than the elasticities on the full sample due to sampling bias. Still, the results illus-
trate that the elasticities of arrest rates with respect to the unemployment variables
are larger once the income effect of the benefit extensions is taken into account.
So far, the elasticities of crime rates with respect to unemployment duration
refer to the average effect. In order to better understand the duration dependence,
one is interested in the effect of unemployment duration on crime at different points
along the duration distribution. Table 4.14 shows the results when the sample is
split into subsamples depending on whether the average unemployment duration is
shorter than the baseline benefit duration, longer than the baseline benefit duration
but shorter than the extended benefit duration, or longer than the extended benefit
duration. For property crime, the results suggest positive elasticities for the first
subsample while they are not significantly different from zero for the other two
categories. The first group comprises individuals who are at the margin of exhausting
regular benefits and hence are the most likely to be affected. Yet, sample sizes
decrease drastically for the last two categories and hence one has to be cautious
with regards to a stronger interpretation.
Table 4.15 presents the estimated elasticities when the sample is split by quintile
of the unemployment duration distribution instead. The lowest quintile ranges from
0 to about 7 weeks of average unemployment duration, the middle quintile from 12 to
about 18 weeks, and the highest quintile includes average unemployment durations
of 28 weeks and more. While the elasticities for violent crime and drug crime are
not significantly different from zero for any of the quintile subsamples with the
exception of violent crime in the fourth quintile, the elasticity of the property crime
rate with respect to the average unemployment duration amounts to 2.9% for the
middle quintile and only 0.46% for the lowest quintile. For the fourth quintile, the
effect decreases but is still significantly positive while for the highest quintile it is not
significantly different from zero and fades out. The results suggest that there is an
initial effect of unemployment on crime that is persistent for longer unemployment
durations, but fades away with very long-term unemployment.
Table 4.16 shows the results by type of unemployment. The average unemploy-
ment duration here is the average unemployment duration by type of unemployment:
Job losers, job leavers, re-entrants and new entrants. The elasticities of the prop-
erty crime rate with respect to the average unemployment duration are positive and
statistically significant for all types of unemployment. Yet, given the type of data
it is not possible to identify which group commits crimes. Job losers are directly
affected by the instrument, they fulfill at least one of the eligibility conditions to
receive extended unemployment compensation. The overall impact of unemploy-
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ment duration on crime is hence affected by the prolonged income compensation for
that group. In terms of the other groups, elasticities are even higher which can be
explained with externalities of the longer benefit duration: Higher unemployment
rates and longer unemployment durations increase the competition for jobs. That
lowers the relative returns to legal activity, and at the margin pushes individuals
into the crime market instead.
The empirical literature on crime typically looks at gender specific samples.
Table 4.17 shows the estimation results for different gender specifications with re-
spect to property crime rates. Columns (1) and (2) in panel A show the results
for separate male and female estimations. The estimated elasticities for the male
sample are estimated imprecisely, and are not significantly different from zero. For
females, the property crime elasticity is positive and statistically significant. These
results might be surprising at first, but can be explained by a decreasing gender
gap in property crime rates as shown in figure 4.19. Columns (3) and (4) show the
estimated elasticities for the male and female sample separately for the property
crime types burglary and larceny. The positive effect for the female sample is driven
by a strong and positive effect of unemployment durations on larceny arrest rates,
while the respective effect is positive but smaller for the male sample. Columns (1)
and (2) in panel B show the results for the elasticity of the male property crime rate
with respect to the average female unemployment duration and vice versa. Interest-
ingly, the results suggest strong effects for female property crime rates with respect
to male unemployment durations, suggesting the presence of cross-gender effects.
Typically, crime rates for younger age groups are higher than for older age groups,
in particular for property and drug crime. Table 4.18 shows the results by the
age group (16-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39). The elasticities with respect to
property crime are positive and statistically significant for the younger age groups
and robust between the age groups 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29. Further, for the 30 to 34
year-old group, the elasticity is much smaller and for the oldest group in the sample
it is not statistically different from zero anymore. These results are consistent with
typical crime demographics.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the relationship between labour market conditions and
crime in the context of temporary unemployment benefit extensions and increasing
unemployment durations in the United States. The identification of the crime elast-
icities with respect to unemployment rates and durations is based on variation in the
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timing and magnitude of unemployment benefit extensions within and across states.
Exploiting that quasi-experimental variation in unemployment and unemployment
benefit durations, I provide new evidence on the causal effect of unemployment on
crime. In line with previous findings, I find that higher unemployment is linked to
higher criminality. Moreover, I find that the effect is driven by unintended effects
of the benefit extensions on crime and underlying increases in unemployment rates
and durations. Linking these results to recent structural changes in the U.S. labour
market, I find that the link between unemployment and crime is duration depend-
ent. The main results are consistent with expectations from theoretical models on
labour markets and crime.
There are two main limitations to the analysis. The first concerns the external
validity of the quasi-experiment and is thus common to the literature using a similar
methodology. The increases in unemployment durations in the United States, unlike
in European countries, have been unprecedented and one might argue particular to
the Great Recession. Here, I identify the impact of unemployment on crime from
these changes and thus the analysis is likely to pick up a local effect. The second
limitation refers to concerns about compositional changes in unemployment. It has
been argued that the unemployment benefit extensions have led to reduced exits from
the labour force. That means that the composition of the unemployed population
changes with the policy compared to the pre-policy period. The implications for
this analysis are not obvious ex-ante, and unfortunately the type of data which I
have access to does not allow me to analyse that concern in more detail.
Overall, the chapter adds to the literature on labour markets and crime, and
yields new insights into the causal relationship between unemployment and crime
which can be important for well-targeted policy decisions. Moreover, the results
suggest that there are unintended effects of benefit extensions on property crime
rates. In terms of welfare considerations, it would be extremely interesting, but
beyond the scope of this study, to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the benefit
extensions taking these effects into account.
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4.9 Figures
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Figure 4.1: Victimisation versus Arrest Counts
Note: The figure shows the number of victims versus arrests per 1,000 U.S. population for property and violent
crime. Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), Data Analysis Tools, 1993-2011 and own calculations.
Figure 4.2: Sample Geography
Note: The map shows the federal states of the United States without Alaska (in the sample) or Hawaii (out of the
sample). The dark shaded areas represent states which are included in the sample, the light shaded areas show
states which are excluded from the sample. See the data description in section 4.4 for details. Source: UCR and
own calculations.
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Figure 4.3: Potential Benefit Durations, Schematic Representation
Note: The figure shows the a schematic representation of potential benefit durations in the U.S. between 2003 to
2011. The light shaded areas represent potential benefit durations which are implemented in all states and do not
depend on trigger mechanisms. The dark shaded areas represent potential benefit durations which are implemented
only if a state triggers on the respective policy. Source: U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
Figure 4.4: Actual Benefit Durations, U.S. Average
Note: The figure shows the monthly variation in the U.S. average duration of persons collecting unemployment
insurance benefits between January 2005 and December 2011, where unemployment insurance here includes regular
unemployment benefits as well as EUC08 benefits. Source: US Department of Labor and own calculations.
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Figure 4.5: Variation in Share of States with Benefit Extension
Note: The figure shows the variation in the share of states in the sample which have triggered onto any kind of
benefit extension in the U.S. between 2003 and 2011. Source: U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
Figure 4.6: Variation in Potential Benefit Durations
Note: The figure shows the variation in the maximum potential benefit duration for the U.S. between 2003 and
2011 across states in the sample. The horizontal line represents the baseline potential benefit duration. Source:
U.S. Department of Labor and own calculations.
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Figure 4.7: Arrest Rate Distribution, Property Crime
Note: The figure shows a histogram of the arrest rate for property crime per 100,000 population in the U.S. between
2003 and 2011. Source: UCR and own calculations.
Figure 4.8: Arrest Rate Trend, Property Crime
Note: The figure shows the trend of the average arrest rate for property crime per 100,000 population in the U.S.
between 2003 and 2011. Source: UCR and own calculations.
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Figure 4.9: Arrest Rate Distribution, Violent Crime
Note: The figure shows a histogram of the arrest rate for violent crime per 100,000 population in the U.S. between
2003 and 2011. Source: UCR and own calculations.
Figure 4.10: Arrest Rate Trend, Violent Crime
Note: The figure shows the trend of the average arrest rate for violent crime per 100,000 population in the U.S.
between 2003 and 2011. Source: UCR and own calculations.
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Figure 4.11: Arrest Rate Distribution, Drug Crime
Note: The figure shows a histogram of the arrest rate for drug crime per 100,000 population in the U.S. between
2003 and 2011. Source: UCR and own calculations.
Figure 4.12: Arrest Rate Trend, Drug Crime
Note: The figure shows the trend of the average arrest rate for drug crime per 100,000 population in the U.S.
between 2003 and 2011. Source: UCR and own calculations.
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Figure 4.13: Unemployment Rate and Flows, U.S. Average
Note: The figure shows the average unemployment rate as well as the raw in- and outflows from unemployment in
the U.S. between 2003 and 2011. Source: BLS and own calculations.
Figure 4.14: Unemployment Durations, U.S. Average
Note: The figure shows the average state unemployment duration in weeks in the U.S. fbetween 2003 and 2011.
Source: CPS and own calculations.
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Figure 4.15: Potential Benefit Duration and Property Crime
Note: The figure shows the average arrest rate for property crime per 100,000 population in the U.S. between 2003
and 2011, as well as the maximum potential benefit duration. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, UCR and own
calculations.
Figure 4.16: Potential Benefit Duration and Violent Crime
Note: The figure shows the average arrest rate for violent crime per 100,000 population in the U.S. between 2003
and 2011, as well as the maximum potential benefit duration. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, UCR and own
calculations.
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Figure 4.17: Potential Benefit Duration and Drug Crime
Note: The figure shows the average arrest rate for drug crime per 100,000 population in the U.S. between 2003
and 2011, as well as the maximum potential benefit duration. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, UCR and own
calculations.
Figure 4.18: Potential Benefit Duration and Unemployment
Note: The figure shows the average state unemployment rate in percent and the maximum potential benefit duration
as well as the average unemployment duration in weeks in the U.S. between 2003 and 2011.Source: U.S. Department
of Labor, BLS, CPS and own calculations.
119
Chapter 4. Crime and Unemployment Duration
Figure 4.19: Arrest Rates by Gender, Property Crime
Note: The figure shows the trend of the average arrest rate for property crime per 100,000 population in the U.S.
between 2003 and 2011 separately for women and men. Source: UCR and own calculations.
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4.10 Tables
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Table 4.1: Sample Geography
States in the sample States out of the sample: States out of the sample:
Systematically missing data Less than 95% of the
population covered by data
Arizona Georgia Alabama
California Kentucky Arkansas
Colorado Minnesota District of Columbia
Connecticut New Mexico Florida
Delaware North Dakota Illinois
Idaho Utah Indiana
Iowa Kansas
Maine Louisiana
Maryland Mississippi
Massachusetts Montana
Michigan Nebraska
Missouri New Hampshire
Nevada New York
New Jersey Ohio
North Carolina Pennsylvania
Oklahoma South Dakota
Oregon Washington
Rhode Island West Virginia
South Carolina Hawaii
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Alaska
= 26 states = 6 states = 19 states
Note: The first column lists the states that are included in the arrest data sample, the second
column lists the states that are excluded from the sample due to systematically missing data and
the third column lists the states that are excluded from the sample due to less than 95% of the
data being covered by the data. For details, see the data description in section 4.4).
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics, Estimation Sample
Variable Observations Mean S.D.
Arrest rate, property crime 24,297 103.222 77.690
Arrest rate, violent crime 24,297 117.222 79.813
Arrest rate, drug crime 24,297 107.178 99.944
Unemployment duration 24,297 18.630 14.615
Potential benefit duration 24,297 48.972 27.605
Unemployment rate:
- state-level (BLS) 24,297 6.432 2.359
- observational unit-level(CPS) 24,297 9.968 7.580
Share of married individuals 24,297 0.371 0.265
Share of native individuals 24,297 0.860 0.103
Share of high-school graduates 24,297 0.775 0.235
Share of black individuals 24,297 0.109 0.097
Note: The table shows the number of observations, means and standard deviations
of the named variables in the sample. The unit of observation is at the state, month,
age group and gender level (averages). Source: UCR, CPS, BLS and own calcula-
tions.
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Table 4.4: Unemployment and Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(PCR)
Z = PBD PBD
ln(UR) -0.0012 -0.0003 0.0856*** 0.1455***
(0.0064) (0.0047) (0.0236) (0.0404)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x
Control variables - x - x
F-Statistic >100 >100
Sample size 24,297 24,037 24,297 24,037
Control variables:
Share married -0.2250*** -0.1757
(0.0748) (0.0797)
Share native 0.0704 0.0246
(0.1328) (0.1331)
Share high-school -0.0352 0.0203
(0.1141) (0.1132)
Share black -0.2580 -0.3838**
(0.1617) (0.1633)
ln(UR)t−1 -0.0023 -0.0625***
(0.0039) (0.0184)
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the
state, year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables include the
share of married individuals, share of native born individuals, share of individuals
who finished high-school, share of black population, and the lagged unemployment
rate (period t-1). Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender are included. The
dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for property crime, where the arrest
rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population. The instrument
PBD is the potential benefit duration, measured in weeks. Unemployment rates are
computed as the number of unemployed individuals as a percentage of the labour
force in the observational unit. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Re-
gressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS,
UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.5: Unemployment and Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(VCR) ln(VCR) ln(VCR) ln(VCR)
Z = PBD PBD
ln(UR) 0.0012 0.0007 0.0219 0.0308
(0.0067) (0.0049) (0.0233) (0.0379)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x
Control variables - x - x
F-Statistic >100 >100
Sample size 24,297 24,037 24,297 24,037
Control variables:
Share married -0.2599*** -0.2497***
(0.0854) (0.0822)
Share native 0.1462** 0.1367*
(0.0704) (0.0698)
Share high-school 0.0384 0.0498
(0.0715) (0.0682)
Share black -0.0762 -0.0932
(0.0898) (0.0980)
ln(UR)t−1 -0.0039 -0.0164
(0.0055) (0.0185)
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the
state, year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables include the
share of married individuals, share of native born individuals, share of individuals
who finished high-school, share of black population, and the lagged unemployment
rate (period t-1). Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender are included.
The dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for violent crime, where the
arrest rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population. The in-
strument PBD is the potential benefit duration, measured in weeks. Unemploy-
ment rates are computed as the number of unemployed individuals as a percentage
of the labour force in the observational unit. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level. Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.6: Unemployment and Drug Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(DCR) ln(DCR) ln(DCR) ln(DCR)
Z = PBD PBD
ln(UR) 0.0317*** 0.0181*** -.0562 -0.1151
(0.0095) (0.0058) (0.0765) (0.1220)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x
Control variables - x - x
F-Statistic >100 >100
Sample size 24,297 24,037 24,297 24,037
Control variables:
Share married -0.5567*** -0.6018***
(0.1178) (0.1156)
Share native -0.7990 -0.7572
(0.5203) (0.5407)
Share high-school -0.9098 -0.8605***
(0.2421) (0.1986)
Share black 0.1753 0.2902
(0.2272) (0.2113)
ln(UR)t−1 0.0237*** 0.0787*
(0.0078) (0.0436)
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the
state, year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables include the
share of married individuals, share of native born individuals, share of individuals
who finished high-school, share of black population, and the lagged unemployment
rate (period t-1). Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender are included. The
dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for drug crime, where the arrest rate
is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population. The instrument PBD
is the potential benefit duration, measured in weeks. Unemployment rates are com-
puted as the number of unemployed individuals as a percentage of the labour force
in the observational unit. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Regres-
sions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR
and own calculations.
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Table 4.7: Reduced Form and Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(VCR) ln(DCR)
Panel A: Full sample, reduced form
PBD 0.0034*** 0.0008 -.0023
(in months) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0030)
Panel B: Great Recession sample, reduced form
PBDGR 0.0023* -0.0049* 0.0008
(in months) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0022)
Panel C: 1980s sample, placebo test
PBDGR -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0027
(in months) (0.0020) (0.0069) (0.0058)
State trend: t, t2 x x x
Fixed effects x x x
Sample size A 24,297 24,297 24,297
Sample size B 10,112 10,112 10,112
Sample size C 3,790 3,790 3,790
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at
the state, year, month, age group and gender level. Fixed effects for the state, age
group and gender are included. The dependent variables are the logarithmic ar-
rest rates for property crime, violent crime and drug crime respectively, where the
arrest rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population. The inde-
pendent variable PBD is the potential benefit duration, measured in weeks. Panel
A: January 2003 - December 2011. Panel B: December 2007 - June 2009. Panel
C: May 1981 - November 1982. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source:
CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.8: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Y = ln(UR) ln(UR) ln(UD) ln(UD)
Panel A: Current unemployment rate
PBD 0.0389*** 0.0238***
(in months) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Panel B: Average unemployment duration
PBD 0.0099*** 0.0076***
(in weeks) (0.0016) (0.0015)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x
Control variables - x - x
Sample size 24,297 24,037 24,297 24,297
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the
state, year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables include the
share of married individuals, share of native born individuals, share of individuals
who finished high-school, share of black population, and the lagged (panel A) or
current (panel B) unemployment rate. Fixed effects for the state, age group and
gender are included. The dependent variable is the unemployment rate computed
as the number of unemployed individuals as a percentage of the labour force in the
observational unit or the average ongoing unemployment duration in the observa-
tional unit. The instrument PBD is the potential benefit duration, measured in
weeks. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Regressions are population
weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS and own calculations.
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Table 4.9: Unemployment Duration and Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(PCR)
Z = PBD PBD
Panel A: Average unemployment duration
ln(UD) 0.0093** 0.0097** 0.0842*** 0.114***
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0218) (0.0316)
Panel B: Interaction with unemployment rate
ln(UD) x ln(UR) 0.0465***
(0.0118)
Panel C: Median unemployment duration
ln(UD) 0.0824***
(0.0214)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x
Control variables - x - x
F-Statistic A >100 >100
F-Statistic B >100
F-Statistic C >100
Sample size 24,297 24,297 24,297 24,297
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at
the state, year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables include
the share of married individuals, share of native born individuals, share of indi-
viduals who finished high-school, share of black population, and the lagged un-
employment rate (period t-1). Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender
are included. The dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for property
crime, where the arrest rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000
population. The instrument PBD is the potential benefit duration, measured in
weeks. Unemployment rates are computed as the number of unemployed indi-
viduals as a percentage of the labour force in the observational unit. Unemploy-
ment duration is computed as the average/median ongoing unemployment dur-
ation in the observational unit. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source:
CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.10: Unemployment Duration and Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(VCR) ln(VCR) ln(VCR) ln(VCR)
Z = PBD PBD
Panel A: Average unemployment duration
ln(UD) 0.0059** 0.0056** 0.0215 0.0204
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0220) (0.0291)
Panel B: Interaction with unemployment rate
ln(UD) x ln(UR) 0.0077
(0.0117)
Panel C: Median unemployment duration
ln(UD) 0.0136
(0.0210)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x
Control variables - x - x
F-Statistic A >100 >100
F-Statistic B >100
F-Statistic C >100
Sample size 24,297 24,297 24,297 24,297
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at
the state, year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables include
the share of married individuals, share of native born individuals, share of indi-
viduals who finished high-school, share of black population, and the lagged unem-
ployment rate (period t-1). Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender are
included. The dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for violent crime,
where the arrest rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 popula-
tion. The instrument PBD is the potential benefit duration, measured in weeks.
Unemployment rates are computed as the number of unemployed individuals as
a percentage of the labour force in the observational unit. Unemployment dura-
tion is computed as the average/median ongoing unemployment duration in the
observational unit. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Regressions
are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR
and own calculations.
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Table 4.11: Unemployment Duration and Drug Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(DCR) ln(DCR) ln(DCR) ln(DCR)
Z = PBD PBD
Panel A: Average unemployment duration
ln(UD) 0.0176* 0.0116 -0.0552 -0.0876
(0.0098) (0.0082) (0.0687) (0.0888)
Panel B: Interaction with unemployment rate
ln(UD) x ln(UR) -0.0373
(0.0373)
Panel C: Median unemployment duration
ln(UD) -0.0661
(0.0670)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x
Control variables - x - x
F-Statistic A >100 >100
F-Statistic B >100
F-Statistic C >100
Sample size 24,297 24,297 24,297 24,297
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at
the state, year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables in-
clude the share of married individuals, share of native born individuals, share
of individuals who finished high-school, share of black population, and the
lagged unemployment rate (period t-1). Fixed effects for the state, age group
and gender are included. The dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate
for property crime, where the arrest rate is computed as the number of arrests
per 100,000 population. The instrument PBD is the potential benefit dura-
tion, measured in weeks. Unemployment rates are computed as the number
of unemployed individuals as a percentage of the labour force in the observa-
tional unit. Unemployment duration is computed as the average/median on-
going unemployment duration in the observational unit. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.12: Robustness Test, Police Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(VCR) ln(DCR) police per capita
Z = PBD PBD PBD
Panel A: Current unemployment rate
ln(UR) 0.1465*** 0.0320 -0.1149
(0.0413) (0.0381) (0.1210)
Police per capita 0.1002* 0.1231*** 0.0220
(0.0562) (0.0452) (0.0857)
Panel B: Average unemployment duration
ln(UD) 0.1162*** 0.0223 -0.0879
(0.0296) (0.0286) (0.0888)
Police per capita 0.1566*** 0.1307*** -0.0233
(0.0531) (0.0493) (0.0762)
Panel C: Police per capita
PBD 0.0006
(0.0005)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x
Control variables x x x x
Sample size A 24,037 24,037 24,037
Sample size B 24,297 24,297 24,297
Sample size C 24,297
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the state, year,
month, age group and gender level. The control variables include the share of married individu-
als, share of native born individuals, share of individuals who finished high-school, share of black
population, and the lagged (panel A) or current (panel B) unemployment rate. Fixed effects for
the state, age group and gender are included. The dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest
rate for property, violent and drug crime respectively, where the arrest rate is computed as the
number of arrests per 100,000 population. The instrument PBD is the potential benefit dura-
tion, measured in weeks. Unemployment rates are computed as the number of unemployed in-
dividuals as a percentage of the labour force in the observational unit. Unemployment duration
is computed as the average ongoing unemployment duration in the observational unit. Police
per capita measures the ratio of police employees to the population per state and year. Stand-
ard errors are clustered at the state level. Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.13: Robustness Test, Income (CPS March Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(VCR) ln(VCR) ln(DCR) ln(DCR)
Z = PBD PBD PBD PBD PBD PBD
Panel A: Current unemployment rate
ln(UR) 0.225*** 0.299*** 0.114 0.135 0.133 0.122
(0.0538) (0.0977) (0.0728) (0.0853) (0.216) (0.262)
Income 0.000* 0.000* -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Welfare 0.0003*** -0.0004*** 0.0008***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
UB -0.0002* -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Panel B: Average unemployment duration
ln(UD) 0.172*** 0.206*** 0.0649 0.0722 0.110 0.105
(0.0661) (0.0949) (0.0539) (0.0583) (0.185) (0.208)
Income 0.000 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Welfare 0.0002 -0.0004*** 0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
UB -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x x x
Control variables x x x x x x
Income variables - x - x - x
Sample size 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the state, year, month, age
group and gender level. The control variables include the share of married individuals, share of native born
individuals, share of individuals who finished high-school, share of black population, and the lagged (panel A)
or current (panel B) unemployment rate. Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender are included. The
dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for property, violent and drug crime respectively, where the
arrest rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population. The instrument PBD is the poten-
tial benefit duration, measured in weeks. Unemployment rates are computed as the number of unemployed
individuals as a percentage of the labour force in the observational unit. Unemployment duration is computed
as the average ongoing unemployment duration in the observational unit. The income control variables in-
clude average income, welfare income and unemployment benefit income. The sample is reduced to the CPS
March sample only due to data availability. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Regressions are
population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.14: Unemployment Duration Dependence, Duration Intervals
(1) (2) (3)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(VCR) ln(DCR)
Z = PBD PBD PBD
Panel A: Average unemployment duration ≤ baseline PBD
ln(UD) 0.216*** 0.0903** -0.0753
(0.0419) (0.0430) (0.129)
Panel B: Average unemployment duration > baseline and
≤ extended PBD
ln(UD) 0.0154 -1.873* -0.0968
(0.263) (1.052) (0.573)
Panel C: Average unemployment duration > extended PBD
ln(UD) -0.0230 0.0054 -0.249*
(0.0594) (0.0460) (0.129)
State trend: t, t2 x x x
Fixed effects x x x
Control variables x x x
Sample size A 18,627 18,627 18,627
Sample size B 3,950 3,950 3,950
Sample size C 1,720 1,720 1,720
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the state, year,
month, age group and gender level. The control variables include the share of married individuals,
share of native born individuals, share of individuals who finished high-school, share of black pop-
ulation, and the current unemployment rate. Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender are
included. The dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for property, violent and drug crime
respectively, where the arrest rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population.
The instrument PBD is the potential benefit duration, measured in weeks. Unemployment duration
is computed as the average ongoing unemployment duration in the observational unit. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the state level. Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.15: Unemployment Duration Dependence, Duration Quintiles
(1) (2) (3)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(VCR) ln(DCR)
Z = PBD PBD PBD
Panel A: First quintile, ≤ 7 weeks
ln(UD) 0.462** 0.067 -0.704
(0.229) (0.252) (0.429)
Panel B: Second quintile, ≤ 12 weeks
ln(UD) 1.051 0.778 -1.741
(0.814) (0.790) (1.493)
Panel C: Third quintile, ≤ 18.26 weeks
ln(UD) 2.908*** 0.556 -0.702
(1.041) (0.553) (1.458)
Panel D: Fourth quintile, ≤ 28.14 weeks
ln(UD) 1.160** 0.531** -0.543
(0.476) (0.261) (1.050)
Panel E: Fifth quintile, > 28.14 weeks
ln(UD) -0.0932 -3.429 -3.987
(0.774) (3.663) (3.854)
State trend: t, t2 x x x
Fixed effects x x x
Control variables x x x
Sample size A 4,859 4,859 4,859
Sample size B 4,874 4,874 4,874
Sample size C 4,846 4,846 4,846
Sample size D 4,858 4,858 4,858
Sample size E 4,860 4,860 4,860
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the state, year, month,
age group and gender level. The control variables include the share of married individuals, share of nat-
ive born individuals, share of individuals who finished high-school, share of black population, and the
current unemployment rate. Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender are included. The de-
pendent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for property, violent and drug crime respectively, where
the arrest rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population. The instrument PBD is
the potential benefit duration, measured in weeks. Unemployment duration is computed as the average
ongoing unemployment duration in the observational unit. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR and
own calculations.
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Table 4.16: Unemployment Duration Dependence, Type
(1) (2) (3)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(VCR) ln(DCR)
Z = PBD PBD PBD
Panel A: Job losers
ln(UD) 0.0893** 0.0114 -0.0719
(0.0316) (0.0269) (0.0760)
Panel B: Job leavers
ln(UD) 0.137*** 0.0265 -0.134
(0.0330) (0.0317) (0.0978)
Panel C: New entrants
ln(UD) 0.128*** 0.0110 0.0072
(0.0338) (0.0298) (0.0811)
Panel D: Re-entrants
ln(UD) 0.129*** 0.0154 -0.0791
(0.0327) (0.0330) (0.101)
State trend: t, t2 x x x
Fixed effects x x x
Control variables x x x
Sample size A 19,691 19,691 19,691
Sample size B 9,676 9,676 9,676
Sample size C 7,317 7,317 7,317
Sample size D 17,696 17,696 17,696
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the state,
year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables include the share of mar-
ried individuals, share of native born individuals, share of individuals who finished high-
school, share of black population, and the current unemployment rate. Fixed effects for
the state, age group and gender are included. The dependent variable is the logarithmic
arrest rate for property, violent and drug crime respectively, where the arrest rate is
computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population. The instrument PBD is the
potential benefit duration, measured in weeks. Unemployment duration is computed as
the average ongoing unemployment duration in the observational unit. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.17: Robustness Test, Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(PCR) ln(PCR)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Burglary Burglary Larceny Larceny
Z = PBD PBD PBD PBD PBD PBD
Panel A: Gender specific estimation
ln(UD)male 0.0151 -0.0927 0.0907**
(0.0500) (0.0595) (0.040)
ln(UD)female 0.241*** -0.164 0.332***
(0.0343) (0.102) (0.040)
Panel B: Cross-gender estimation
ln(UD)male 0.166***
(0.0238)
ln(UD)female 0.0079
(0.0495)
State trend: t, t2 x x x x x x
Fixed effects x x x x x x
Control variables x x x x x x
Sample size A 12,199 12,098 12,199 12,098 12,199 12,098
Sample size B 11,694 11,694
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the state, year, month,
age group and gender level. The control variables include the share of married individuals, share of native
born individuals, share of individuals who finished high-school, share of black population, and the cur-
rent unemployment rate. Fixed effects for the state, age group and gender are included. The dependent
variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for property, violent and drug crime respectively, where the arrest
rate is computed as the number of arrests per 100,000 population. The instrument PBD is the potential
benefit duration, measured in weeks. Unemployment duration is computed as the average ongoing unem-
ployment duration in the observational unit. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Regressions
are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR and own calculations.
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Table 4.18: Robustness Test, Age Groups
(1) (2) (3)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Y = ln(PCR) ln(VCR) ln(DCR)
Z = PBD PBD PBD
Panel A: Aged 16-19
ln(UD) 0.154*** 0.0024 0.121
(0.047) (0.0608) (0.142)
Panel B: Aged 20-24
ln(UD) 0.186*** 0.0165 0.0124
(0.047) (0.0378) (0.0916)
Panel C: Aged 25-29
ln(UD) 0.200*** 0.0906* -0.120*
(0.070) (0.0530) (0.0695)
Panel D: Aged 30-34
ln(UD) 0.0814* 0.0516 0.137*
(0.043) (0.0428) (0.070)
Panel E: Aged 35-39
ln(UD) -0.0403 -0.0422 -0.348***
(0.043) (0.0393) (0.0891)
State trend: t, t2 x x x
Fixed effects x x x
Control variables x x x
Sample size A 4,988 4,988 4,988
Sample size B 4,933 4,933 4,933
Sample size C 4,856 4,856 4,856
Sample size D 4,710 4,710 4,710
Sample size E 4,750 4,750 4,750
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is at the state,
year, month, age group and gender level. The control variables include the share of married
individuals, share of native born individuals, share of individuals who finished high-school,
share of black population, and the current unemployment rate. Fixed effects for the state,
age group and gender are included. The dependent variable is the logarithmic arrest rate for
property, violent and drug crime respectively, where the arrest rate is computed as the num-
ber of arrests per 100,000 population. The instrument PBD is the potential benefit duration,
measured in weeks. Unemployment duration is computed as the average ongoing unemploy-
ment duration in the observational unit. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Regressions are population weighted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CPS, UCR
and own calculations.
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5.1 Introduction
In July 2014, Eric Garner, a 44-year old Afro-American, died in New York after
a police officer reportedly put him in a "chokehold" following a suspicion of illegal
cigarette sales. About one month later, the fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an
18-year-old Afro-American, triggered protests and unrest in Ferguson, Missouri. In
April 2015 the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year old Afro-American who died of
injuries which he sustained during arrest, led to days of severe riots in Baltimore.
Intense national and international media coverage of these events triggered an en-
hanced popular and political debate about racial discrimination in policing in the
United States, in particular against the Afro-American population. The findings
in an article by The Washington Post in May 2015 suggest that while half of the
victims of fatal shootings by police in 2015 were white, among the unarmed victims
two-thirds were Black or Hispanic.1 Moreover, the statistics shown in the article
reveal disproportional numbers of blacks being killed by the police when adjusting
for population counts at the census tract level.
In particular the death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York City, gave
rise to new and old concerns about the city’s stop-and-frisk practices. The stop-
and-frisk programme entitles police officers in New York City to stop, question and
frisk suspects based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The legal basis
for police officers in the U.S. to stop, question and frisk citizens was established in
1968 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Terry v. Ohio that a pedestrian stop
was constitutional if there was a reasonable suspicion that a crime was about to be
committed or in the process of being committed. In New York City, these stops
were legally enacted in 1971 by Criminal Procedure Law §140.50. Leading up to
the 1990s, stops were followed by frisks only under stricter requirements regarding
a suspicion of a weapon or an escalation of the situation. Stop-and-frisk practices
became more widely used in the 1990s when mayor Rudolph Giuliani and police
commissioner William J. Bratton implemented the zero-tolerance strategy in New
York City. The strategy was based on the so-called Broken Windows theory (Wilson
and Kelling, 1982) which suggests that disorder generates and sustains more serious
crime. In that context, the stop-and-frisk practices were expanded in order to target
minor crime more aggressively and, based on this notion, to deter and reduce more
serious crime.2
The policy has been controversial since then and in particular it has raised con-
1"Fatal police shootings in 2015 approaching 400 nationwide", The Washington Post, 30 May
2015. Link to the article: www.washingtonpost.com
2See section 5.2 for more details.
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cerns about racial profiling, the majority of individuals who are stopped being black
or belonging to another minority ethnicity.3 While the advocates of racial profiling
practices claim that the disproportional share of stops of blacks matches the dispro-
portional high crime rates among the black population, opponents argue that the
practices in New York City are racially discriminating against the black population.
In this chapter we examine the hypothesis of racial bias and the impact on crime
in New York City. First, we use a number of different empirical strategies in order to
identify racial bias in the stop-and-frisk practices. Second, we estimate the overall
impact of stop-and-frisk practices on crime in New York City and in particular we
investigate whether racial bias in policing affects crime rates or the probability of
being arrested. We use precinct level data on stop-and-frisks and reported crime on
the one hand, and individual level data on stop-and-frisks and subsequent arrests on
the other hand. Our empirical strategy exploits quasi-experimental variation from a
court decision in 2013 on the unconstitutionality of stop-and-frisk practices, as well
as exogenous variation from police officer killings. Applying a range of estimation
techniques we find that our results are qualitatively robust across the specifications:
While we find evidence that supports the hypothesis that Afro-Americans face a
disproportional probability of a stop-and-frisk encounter, our estimations suggest
that there is no knock-on effect on crime.
Overall, this chapter contributes to the literature on identifying racial bias, to
the literature on the effectiveness of stop-and-frisk practices to reduce crime as well
as to the larger literature on the causal effect of general policing on crime. Is there
any evidence for a racial profiling strategy in the stop-and-frisk practices which is
discriminatory against ethnic minorities? What are the implications for criminal be-
haviour? The main difficulty here is to disentangle preference-based discrimination
from statistical discrimination. Knowles et al. (2001) provide a model of police and
motorist behaviour from which they derive an empirical test for preference-based
discrimination in traffic stops. In their application, they use data from Maryland
and find no support for the racial bias hypothesis. Related to racial bias in traffic
stops, Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) develop a statistical test that is similar to
an auditing study: If there is no racial bias, then traffic stop behaviour should
be the same by day and by night, when the race of the motorist can not be seen
before the stop. Applying their test to Californian data, the authors find no evid-
ence that would support a racial bias hypothesis. Persico (2009) derives a model
3See for example the coverage of the issue by the New York Civil Liberties Union, or the topic
page by The New York Times.
http://www.nyclu.org/issues/racial-justice/stop-and-frisk-practices;
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/stop_and_frisk/index.html
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to identify preference-based discrimination in observational data. Antonovics and
Knight (2009) follow a different approach and exploit variation in the race of the
officer to identify racial bias in traffic stops and searches using data from the Boston
Police Department. They find that conditional on being stopped, the probability of
being searched is higher when the officer’s race is different from the motorist’s race.
Most related to our paper, Gelman et al. (2007) use police precinct-level data
from the stop-and-frisk programme in New York City. They find that indeed Afro-
Americans and Hispanics are stopped more often than Whites even after scaling by
race-specific crime rates and controlling for precinct heterogeneity. Their findings
suggest that there is racial bias in the case of New York City, contradictory to the
findings from the traffic stops studies. In contrast, Weisburd et al. (2014) argue that
stop-and-frisks are concentrated at crime hot spots. According to the authors, the
racial disparities in the probability of being stopped and frisked can be explained
by a hot spot focused policing strategy. In that sense, their argumentation suggests
statistical rather than preference-based discrimination. Coviello and Persico (2013)
develop a model that allows for two sources of bias at the police officer level on the
one hand and at the police chief (precinct) level on the other hand. The authors find
no strong evidence for racial bias in the stop-and-frisk practices in New York City.
Legewie (2014) uses an event study design and provides statistical evidence that the
killing of police officers triggers a disproportionate use of police force against ethnic
minorities during stop-and-frisk incidents.
Whether or not the stop-and-frisk practices as part of the more aggressive poli-
cing under the zero-tolerance strategy have contributed to the significant decrease in
crime in New York City over the last two decades is controversially discussed in the
literature. In their article Kelling and Bratton (1998) strongly support the Broken
Windows theory and argue that the decline in crime in New York City during the
1990s is mostly due to more effective and more aggressive policing with respect
to misdemeanour crime. Using time-series data for New York City from 1970 to
1996, Corman and Mocan (2000) find evidence to support that general police-crime-
deterrence hypothesis. Contrary to their findings, Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) do
not find any causal evidence from observational data to support the Broken Win-
dows theory for New York City. Moreover, evaluating the Moving-To-Opportunity
experiment their study suggests that moving families to neighbourhoods with less
social disorder does not lead to a reduction in their criminal behaviour, a finding
that contradicts the Broken Windows theory. MacDonald et al. (2015) evaluate
the effect of the impact zone programme in New York City with respect to crime.
Again, the authors find little evidence that the policy can be causally linked to a
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crime reduction. Rosenfeld and Fornango (2014) explicitly evaluate the impact of
the stop-and-frisk practices on annual, precinct level robbery and burglary rates in
New York City. The authors do not find any convincing support for a crime-deterring
effect.
This chapter also relates to the larger literature on the causal effect of policing on
crime. Levitt (1997), Levitt (2002) and Evans and Owens (2007) document a crime
reducing effect of policing in quasi-experimental settings. Other studies such as
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), Klick and Tabarrok (2005) or Draca et al. (2011)
exploit variation in police deployment triggered by terroristic events and find evid-
ence for crime deterrence effects of policing. In addition to these quasi-experimental
studies, there is a body of criminological literature studying the impact of police
deployment to crime "hot spots", i.e. particularly high crime areas, in randomised
controlled trials. For example, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) and Ratcliffe et al.
(2011) evaluate experiments in Minneapolis and Philadelphia, respectively, both
studies find that police deployment to crime hot spots significantly reduces local
crime rates.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we
provide more detailed background information on the stop-and-frisk practices and
racial profiling in New York City. In section 5.3, a theoretical model of racial bias
is introduced that motivates our empirical analysis. The different data sources and
the estimation sample are described in section 5.4 while the empirical strategy is
explained in section 5.5. We discuss our estimation results in section 5.6. Section 5.7
concludes.
5.2 Stop-and-Frisk in New York City
In the following, we provide more details with respect to the history of stop-and-
frisk policies in New York City as well as with respect to racial profiling and claims
of racial bias.
5.2.1 Stop-and-Frisk
Stop-and-Frisk is a crime prevention strategy which is used by the New York City
Police Department. As such, police officers are entitled to stop a person if there is
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and to subsequently frisk that person if
there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous (Rudovsky
and Rosenthal, 2013). When individuals are stopped by a police officer, first they
are questioned. Then, they are either allowed to move on or they are frisked. In
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some cases, police officers subsequently use physical force, search the person, arrest
the person or issue a summons (Jones-Brown et al., 2013).4
In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Terry v. Ohio that a pedestrian stop
was constitutional if there was a reasonable suspicion that a crime was about to be
committed or in the process of being committed, and hence established the national
legal basis for stop-and-frisk practices (Jones-Brown et al., 2013). In New York City,
these stops were legally enacted in 1971 by Criminal Procedure Law §140.50 which
states the following about temporary questioning of persons in public places and
search for weapons:5
1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest
without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located
within the geographical area of such officer’s employment when he reasonably
suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit
either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may
demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. [...] 3.
When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions
one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably
suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person
for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of
causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public
places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or
any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute
the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of
the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed,
or arrest such person. [...]
The policy has been controversial since then. In 1976, four different levels of
legally permissible stop-and-frisk encounters were established in People v. De Bour.
Here, level 1 requires the police officer to have an objective and credible reason to
approach an individual to request information, while level 2 relates to the common
law right of enquiry and requires a founded suspicion. A level 3 street encounter
requires the police officer to have a reasonable suspicion in order to forcibly stop
(and frisk, if there is a suspicion of a weapon being carried) the individual. The most
serious street encounter, level 4, requires a probable cause against the individual and
entitles the police officer to arrest and search the person.6
4A summons can be issued by the police officer for a range of misdemeanour crimes and then
requires the suspect to appear at court at a given date and time. Common crimes for which
summons are issued include for example consumption of alcohol on the street or disorderly conduct.
5See http://ypdcrime.com/cpl/article140.htm
6See for example (Jones-Brown et al., 2013) and sources cited within that report for more
details.
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Leading up to the 1990s, stops were followed by frisks only under these relat-
ively strict requirements regarding a suspicion of a weapon or an escalation of the
situation. In the 1990s, New York City’s mayor Rudolph Giuliani and police com-
missioner William J. Bratton adopted the stop-and-frisk strategy more widely as
part of the CompStat and zero-tolerance strategies.7 These strategies were inspired
by the Broken Windows theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) which suggests that
disorder (e.g. broken windows) generate and sustain more serious crime:
"[...] if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest
of the windows will soon be broken. One unrepaired broken window is a signal
that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing"
The theory is based on the notion that neighbourhoods that suffer from disorder
may have limited social control and self-regulation and thus trigger more serious
crime, these neighbourhoods predominantly being poor neighbourhoods. Hence,
the stop-and-frisk practices were expanded in order to target minor crime more ag-
gressively and, based on the ideas of the Broken Windows theory, to deter and reduce
more serious crime. Favouring the idea of the broken windows theory, Kelling and
Bratton (1998) indeed argue that more effective, targeted and aggressive policing,
including stop-and-frisk practices, with respect to misdemeanour crime has vastly
contributed to the big crime decline in New York City during the 1990s.
5.2.2 Racial Profiling
Over the last two decades, the stop-and-frisk policy has been subject to claims
of racial profiling and racial bias. Racial profiling in the context of stop-and-frisk
is a form of discrimination in which police enforcement is mainly based on a per-
son’s race or ethnicity (Legewie, 2014). Findings in the literature suggest that the
probability of being stopped and frisked by a police officer substantially depends on
the person’s race as well as the racial composition of the neighbourhood. Support-
ers of the stop-and-frisk practices on the one hand have defended racial disparities
in stop-and-frisks by racial disparities in crime rates, referring to the Broken Win-
dow theory and claiming reasonable and efficient police practices. Opponents of the
stop-and-frisk practices on the other hand have argued that police officers racially
discriminate against minorities and that such discrimination is not justified by stat-
istical discrimination as the Broken Windows theory would suggest (for discussions,
7CompStat essentially is a management process which relies on collecting and analysing crime
data in order to strategically and more effectively combat crime. It was introduced by William
Bratton in New York City in 1994.
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see for example Fagan (2002), Goldberg (1999), Kelling and Bratton (1998), or a
more recent essay by Bergner (2014)).
The stop-and-frisk practices have not only led to political controversies but also
to legal challenges. In 1999, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed a class
action lawsuit to challenge the NYPD for allegedly conducting stop-and-frisk prac-
tices without reasonable suspicions but with a racial bias. In Daniels, et al. v. The
City of New York, the parties agreed on a settlement which resulted in requirements
of stop-and-frisk data transparency as well as a written policy prohibiting racial
profiling (Jones-Brown et al., 2013). In 2008, the CCR filed another class action
lawsuit against the City of New York, the police commissioner Raymond Kelly and
mayor Michael Bloomberg being among the defendants, alleging unconstitutional
stop-and-frisk practices by the New York Police Department based on race rather
than reasonable suspicion. In August 2013, U.S. District Court Judge Shira Sheind-
lin ruled in Floyd, et al. v. The City of New York that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk
practices were racially discriminatory and in that sense unconstitutional. The judge
ruling was followed by a political and legal controversy when the City of New York
appealed, and Judge Sheindlin was withdrawn from the case. In January 2014, the
City of New York announced that it would drop its appeal. Later that year, mayor
Bill de Blasio pledged for a reform of the stop-and-frisk strategy as well as a strong
racial profiling bill.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, we examine the hypothesis of racial bias and the impact on
crime in New York City. In order to give our analysis a theoretical framework, in
the following we discuss a simple equilibrium model of racial profiling in police stops
as well as some basic welfare considerations with respect to crime reducing effects
of racial profiling.
5.3.1 A Simple Equilibrium Framework
The main challenge for an empirical test of racial bias in stop-and-frisk practices
is to distinguish between statistical discrimination and preference-based discrimin-
ation: If racial disparities in the stop-and-frisk frequencies coincide with racial dis-
parities in crime rates, the differences correspond to statistical discrimination. Yet,
if there are racial disparities in stop-and-frisk frequencies over and above differences
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in crime rates, that suggests preference-based discrimination or racial bias.8
In a seminal paper, Knowles et al. (2001) develop an equilibrium model of racial
bias in motor vehicle searches that leads to an empirical test of racial discrimina-
tion. While their model studies the behaviour of motorists when police officers stop
vehicles and search for contraband, it is straightforward to generalise the model to
pedestrian stops such as stop-and-frisk encounters in New York City. The following
model is hence based on Knowles et al. (2001), with small adjustments to fit the
purpose of our analysis.9
The model describes the behaviour of suspects and police officers in a setting
where police officers can stop suspects. In the model, suspects are either black (B)
or white (W). Let r ∈ {B,W} denote the suspect’s race. Let c denote characteristics
other than race which the police officer can use in order to decide whether or not to
stop the suspect. For example, c may include a particular type of clothing. Let c be
distributed according to the distribution functions F (c|B) and F (c|W ). Each police
officer decides whether to stop a suspect of type (c, r). The cost of stopping a suspect
of type (c, r) is tr with tW , tB ∈ (0, 1). The benefits of an arrest are normalised to 1.
Let G denote the event that the suspect who is stopped is found guilty of a crime,
for example illegally carrying a weapon. Further, let γ(c, r) = P (stop|c, r) denote
the probability that a police officer stops a suspect of type (c, r).
Suspects decide whether or not to commit a criminal offence, taking into account
four possible scenarios: A suspect commits crime or not, and in either case may or
may not be stopped by a police officer. If suspects do not commit crime, then their
payoff is zero independently of the stop. Here, the model abstracts from cost for a
suspect who is wrongly accused and stopped. If suspects commit crime, their payoff
is −j(c, r) if they are stopped and v(c, r) else.10 The expected payoff from crime for
a suspect S can then be written as:
ΠS = γ(c, r) · [−j(c, r)] + [1− γ(c, r)] · v(c, r) (5.1)
Given the probability of being stopped, the suspect decides whether or not to
8See Arrow (1973) and Becker (1957) for the seminal contributions on the notions of statistical
and preference-based discrimination.
9Subsequent papers extended the model to incorporate additional features. Dharmapala and
Ross (2004) allow for the fact that the police observes a share of the population of suspects only, and
accordingly scale the search probability by the probability of being observed by the police. Further,
the authors allow for heterogeneity in the offense severity. Bjerk (2007) derives a theoretical model
in which he allows for a noisy signal of the suspect’s guilt. Anwar and Fang (2006) and Antonovics
and Knight (2009) extend the model in Knowles et al. (2001) by introducing different races not
only for suspects but also for police officers.
10Here, we abstract from mechanisms of being caught for crime other than being stopped.
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commit crime while maximising the payoff.11 If ΠS > 0, the suspect chooses to
commit crime. If ΠS = 0, suspects in the model are willing to randomise between
committing and not committing crime.
Let P (G|c, r) be the probability that a suspect of type (c, r) commits crime. Tak-
ing that probability as given, police officers maximise their expected payoff taking
into account the number of successful stops, i.e. the number of stops of suspects who
are found guilty, as well as the cost of stopping suspects. Hence, they choose the
stopping probabilities γ(c, r) for each type (c, r) to solve the following optimisation
problem:
max
γ(c,W ),γ(c,B)
∑
r=W,B
∫
[P (G|c, r)− tr]γ(c, r)f(c|r)dc (5.2)
As Knowles et al. (2001) point out, one can think of the term ΠP = P (G|c, r)−tr
as the police officer’s payoff from stopping a suspect of type (c, r). If ΠP > 0, police
officers always stop a suspect of type (c, r). If ΠP = 0, police officers are willing to
randomise between stopping and not stopping the suspect.
In an equilibrium, where police officers randomise over whether to stop a suspect
and suspects randomise over whether to commit crime, it hence holds that both
ΠS = 0 and ΠP = 0. Therefore, we know that in that equilibrium, for all c it is true
that:
γ∗(c, r) =
v(c, r)
v(c, r) + j(c, r)
∀ r ∈ {B,W} (5.3)
and
P ∗(G|c, r) = tr ∀ r ∈ {B,W} (5.4)
There are two types of discrimination which correspond to the concepts of ra-
cial discrimination, or racial bias, and statistical discrimination. Police officers are
defined to be racially biased if they prefer stopping one suspect over another solely
based on the suspect’s race. In that case, police officers have a preference for dis-
crimination and thus the cost of stopping a suspect depends on the suspect’s race:
tB 6= tW . In contrast, police officers statistically discriminate against suspects if they
choose to stop suspects of one race with a higher probability γ(r) than suspect of
the other race, but yet without having a preference for discrimination. That implies
that γ(B) 6= γ(W ), where γ(r) = ∫ γ(c, r)dF (c|r) ∀ r ∈ {B,W}, while tB = tW = t.
11Note that the crime decision itself is similar to the setup in the seminal Becker (1968) model
of crime, instead of the probability of being caught for crime taking into account the probability
of being stopped.
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Therefore, if police officers are not racially biased, then it follows from (5.4) that
the probabilities of a suspect being guilty must be the same for each r ∈ {B,W}
and for all c:12
P ∗(G|c, B) = t = P ∗(G|c,W ) (5.5)
In order to construct an empirical test for racial bias, denote the frequency of a
suspect of race r, who is stopped and found guilty as:
D(r) =
∫
P ∗(G|c, r) γ
∗(c, r)f(c, r)∫
γ∗(s, r)f(s|r)dsdc (5.6)
Under the null hypothesis that police officers are not racially biased, (5.5) holds
and hence D(B) = t = D(W ). This is an implication that can be tested in the data.
In particular, under the null hypothesis that police officers are not racially biased
it must then hold that P (G = 1|c, r) = P (G = 1) ∀ c, r. Knowles et al. (2001) test
that in an empirical framework using a hit rate approach. Our empirical approach
differs from theirs, but the underlying notions of detecting racial bias are similar.
We test for racial bias in the stop-and-frisk practices in a regression framework which
is described in section (5.4).
5.3.2 Basic welfare considerations
The model above provides a theoretical framework for racial bias in the stop-
and-frisk practices in New York City. Yet, no broader conclusions can be drawn
from it with respect to welfare considerations. For example, the model explicitly
abstracts from harm for a suspect who is wrongly stopped and accused of crime and
does not say anything about the effectiveness of racial profiling as a police strategy.
Yet, these are important questions in order to evaluate the stop-and-frisk policy
as a public policy and in order to derive policy recommendations over and above
concerns about racial discrimination. Durlauf (2006) provides a framework for the
evaluation of racial profiling when it is considered as a public policy and welfare
considerations are taken into account.
What are the welfare benefits of racial profiling in the stop-and-frisk practices?
As outlined above, the policy is based on the notion of the Broken Windows theory
and targets a reduction in crime through deterrence mechanisms. Minimising the
overall crime rate P (G) subject to the stop rate γ = k · γ(B) + (1 − k) · γ(W ), k
being the share of the black population, yields a profiling strategy such that (Durlauf,
12Note that this does not imply that search intensities across races are the same, i.e. γ∗(c,B) =
γ∗(c,W ). The model explicitly allows for statistical discrimination.
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2006):
∂P (G|W, γ(W ))
∂γ(W )
=
∂P (G|B, γ(B))
∂γ(B)
(5.7)
The condition relates the sensitivity of crime decisions to changes in the stop-
and-frisk probability among blacks to those among whites. Thus, it differs from
equation (5.5) which refers to the guilt rates per group. While in the model above,
as in other models in the literature, racial profiling is interpreted as a police strategy
based on statistical discrimination, here it is seen as a deterrence mechanism based
on group-specific sensitivities of crime rates to the respective probability of being
stopped.13
What are the welfare cost of racial profiling in the stop-and-frisk practices? First,
there is individual-specific harm if an innocent person is stopped (and frisked) and
if there exist feelings of humiliation, harassment or injustice. There is anecdotical
evidence that this is indeed the case, and these issues have become very topical
in the context of the recent social unrests in Ferguson and Baltimore for example.
Second, as Durlauf (2006) argues, there is social harm if racial profiling leads to
self-perpetuating beliefs and the partial promotion of social stigma.
Our empirical analysis examines welfare benefits in terms crime deterrence effects
in the case of New York City, evaluating the impact of stop-and-frisk practices and
racial profiling on crime rates in the city. Unfortunately, we cannot explicitly test
for the welfare cost of racial profiling.
5.4 Data and Estimation Sample
In this section, we describe the different data sources and provide descriptive
statistics that illustrate and motivate our empirical analysis.
5.4.1 Data Description
We use data from a number of data sources. First, we exploit individual-level
data on stop-and-frisk encounters. Second, we have collected a weekly panel of
reported crime at the precinct level. Third, we use census tract population data
from the 2010 Decennial U.S. Census.
13In addition to the deterrence mechanism Durlauf (2006) discusses a retribution effect of racial
profiling. We will not discuss that in more detail here, but refer to the original essay.
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Stop-and-Frisk Encounters
As described in more detail above, the stop-and-frisk policy allows police officers
in New York City to stop, question and frisk pedestrians based on a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. The NYPD has a reporting policy for stop-and-frisks
made by their police officers. In particular, police officers are required to document
a stop under the following conditions: The stop involves the use of force, the person
is frisked or more extensively searched, an arrest occurs or the person refuses to
provide identification of him- or herself (Jones-Brown et al., 2013). These stops are
recorded by filling out the "Stop, Question And Frisk Report Worksheet", known as
the UF-250 form (see figure 5A.1 in the appendix). While some of the stops which
do not meet these requirements are still documented, not all of them are which
leads to concerns about underreporting of stop-and-frisk activity. According to an
estimate by Gelman et al. (2007) about 70% of the stops are recorded.14
Data on each documented stop-and-frisk encounter from 2003 until 2014 are
obtained from the NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database. The data provide
information about the exact date, time, duration and geographical location of the
stop. Furthermore, the data contain detailed demographic information about the
suspects such that we can identify the race, sex, age and gender. Moreover, the
suspected crime as well as the reason for the stop (e.g. furtive movements, see
figure 5A.1 for details) are documented. In addition, the outcome of the stop is
reported, i.e. we have information on whether the person who was stopped was
subsequently frisked, searched, arrested, whether force was used, whether a summons
was issued and whether contraband or weapons were found.
Reported Crime
The stop-and-frisk data provide information on the outcome of the stop and in
particular whether an arrest has been made or a summons has been issued. While
these outcomes are good indicators for whether a crime has been committed by
the suspect, there is no information on a subsequent conviction and thus there
is potential error if an innocent person has been arrested or issued a summons.
Therefore, we use an alternative data strategy to construct precinct-level crime
rates based on reported crime data.
Every Monday, the New York City Police Department publishes reported crime
statistics which document the weekly number of crimes by precinct and by offence
as well as weekly, monthly and annual changes in crime. We have collected the
14Lately, new concerns about underreporting have been raised. See for example Goodman and
Baker (2015).
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data since mid-2012 and we can trace reported crime back to the year 2009. Some
weeks are missing and in some weeks information is partly missing, hence we have
an unbalanced weekly panel starting in 2009. In order to produce precinct-level
crime rates, we match the reported crime panel to population data from the 2010
Decennial U.S. Census obtained from the American Fact Finder. We aggregate
the census tract level population data to police precincts in order to match the
population data to the crime panel.15
5.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The estimation sample contains 75 police precincts which are located across the
five boroughs of New York City. Note that we aggregate police precincts 120, 121
and 123, all placed in the borough of Staten Island, into one: Precinct 121 was
established in 2013 only and is located in areas that formerly belonged to precincts
120 and 123. In order to ensure that our results are comparable over time, we
thus subsume all three precincts under one artificial precinct. Figure 5.1 shows the
geographical distribution of the police precincts by borough. In the following, we
restrict the estimation sample to males and in addition we consider the black and
white population only.
Variation across Precincts
What is the share of stop-and-frisk encounters of black compared to white indi-
viduals? Figure 5.2 shows a map of New York City’s police precincts by the average
percentage share of stop-and-frisks of black individuals. The stops are pooled over
the years 2003-2014 and the precincts categorised into the quartiles of the distribu-
tion of the average percentage share. Two things can be observed from figure 5.2:
First, the average share of stops of blacks compared to whites appears to be high,
accounting to up to 62% even in the lowest quartile of the distribution of precincts.
Note that the median share of blacks being stopped amounts to about 78%. Second,
the map illustrates spatial concentration of high shares of blacks being stopped by
the police in the Bronx, east Brooklyn and southeast Queens.
Do these stop-and-frisk concentrations of high shares of blacks being stopped
correspond to the geographical concentration of different ethnic groups? Figure 5.3
shows a map of the police precincts by the average percentage share of the black
compared to the white population. The pattern seems to be similar, although not
identical, to the previous map. In particular, there are nominal differences in the
15We use geocoding data provided online by John Keefe:
http://johnkeefe.net/nyc-police-precinct-and-census-data.
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average share of blacks being stopped and the average share of the black population
in the precinct: While the median share of stops of blacks amounts to about 78%,
the median share of the black population amounts to only 21.5%.
In order to measure the concentration or segregation of the black population, we
can compute the index of dissimilarity for white and black males in New York City.
Let bp and wb denote the black and white male population count in precinct p, and
B and W the total black and white male population count in New York City. The
index of dissimilarity is defined as:
DI =
1
2
75∑
p=1
∣∣∣∣ biB − wiW
∣∣∣∣
When we compute the index of dissimilarity for the black and white male popula-
tion in New York City, we find that DI = 0.625 or 62.5%. According to the standard
interpretation of the index, that implies that 62.5% of the black population in New
York City would have to move to another precinct in order to achieve a uniform
distribution of whites and blacks across all precincts. That indeed shows that there
is a high level of segregation in New York City which might be one contributing
factor to the geographical pattern of the stop-and-frisk activity with respect to the
black population as seen in 5.2.
Racial profiling strategies do not only take the population share into account
but in fact the share of crime committed by one group compared to the other.
Unfortunately, the data on reported crime that is available for this study does not
provide any demographic information about the offender. Yet, the overall crime rate
is still informative in order to understand geographical patterns of the stop-and-frisk
activity. Figure 5.4 shows a map of the police precincts by average crime rates. The
crime rate here is the weekly number of reported crime per 1,000 male population
pooled over the years 2009 to 2014. Again, we categorise the precincts according
to the quartiles of the average crime rate distribution. The map suggests that the
precincts with the highest shares of stops of blacks are not necessarily congruent
with the precincts with the highest crime rates.
Variation over Time
Not only the geographical distribution of police stops and crime rates is of interest
here, but also the trends over time. Figure 5.5 shows the number of police stops of
black and white individuals, respectively, averaged by week and over all precincts of
New York City. The average number of stops of blacks more than doubles between
the beginning of 2003 and the end of 2012 with an upward trend throughout. While
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the average number of stops of whites shows a slight increase over the same time
period, there are substantially fewer stops throughout. The left of the two vertical
lines in the figure marks the beginning of 2012 when the number of stops of blacks
decreases dramatically at the same time as the number of stops of white decreases
albeit more moderately. There is anecdotical evidence that this decrease in the stop-
and-frisk activity is due to increased criticism of the policy. In August 2013, marked
by the right of the two vertical lines, a court decision ruled that the stop-and-frisk
practices as carried out by the New York Police Department was unconstitutional
and asked for a written policy in order to specify authorised stops (see section (5.2)
for details). As shown in figure 5.5, the decision is followed by an immediate kink
in the trend of the average number of stops of blacks and whites, respectively. Note
that the number of stop-and-frisk encounters is positive even after the judge ruling:
The policy was not abolished, but largely scaled down after the judge ruling. In our
empirical analysis, we exploit these discontinuities in the stop-and-frisk activity in
order to identify the existence and the impact of racial profiling on crime.
Conditional on being stopped, what happens during a police stop? Figure 5.6 to
figure 5.9 illustrate the trends in the potential outcomes of stop-and-frisk encounters.
The figures show the average weekly number of black and white individuals who are
frisked, searched or arrested or who are issued a summons after they have been
stopped and questioned by a police officer. The trends for blacks and whites look
strikingly similar to the trends of the average number of stops. Naturally, absolute
levels differ as not every stop results in the respective outcome. Indeed, only a small
fraction of stop-and-frisk encounters lead to an arrest or a summons being issued.
Note that if a summons is issued, the individual is assigned a day and time at which
he or she has to show up at court. Typically, summons are issued for misdemeanour
and not commonly for felony crime, whereas arrests might follow the suspicion of a
more serious crime. Arguably, the probability of a crime to have happened is higher
when a summons is issued than when an arrest is made.
How do these trends in stop-and-frisk compare to trends in crime? Figure 5.10
and figure 5.11 show the trends in the raw as well as seasonally adjusted reported
crime numbers for property and violent crime, respectively. The figures suggest that
the crime numbers do not follow the same trends as the stop-and-frisk numbers.
In particular, the number of reported crime is almost flat between 2011 and 2014
once seasonal fluctuations are taken into account. The figures suggest that the
discontinuities in the stop-and-frisk activity do not translate into discontinuities in
crime numbers.
To what extend does the stop-and-frisk strategy contribute to the overall number
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of arrests in New York City? Table 5.1 shows the total number of arrests and the
share of arrested black and white persons, obtained from the NYPD Year End 2008-
2014 Enforcement Reports16, the number of arrest in our stop-and-frisk sample as
well as the percentage share of these arrest in the total number of arrests. The num-
bers show that the annual total number of arrests has rather moderately increased
between 2008 and 2014 while the share of black and white individuals being arrested
appears to be fairly constant over the years with the exception of a slightly higher
share of arrests of whites in 2014. Concerning the share of the number of arrests that
have been made following a stop-and-frisk encounter compared to the total number
of arrests, there is an increase between 2008 and 2010, a moderate decrease between
2010 and 2012 and a much more dramatic decrease after 2012. These figures are
in line with the previous findings and suggest that the stop-and-frisk strategy has
been drastically scaled down from 2012 onwards whereas overall crime appears to
be much more constant over time.
5.5 Empirical Strategy
In the following, we describe how we test the hypotheses derived in section 5.3 in
a regression framework: First, we test the existence of racial bias in the the stop-and-
frisk practices by studying the probability across white and black individuals that
an individual who is stopped and questioned by a police officer is guilty. Second,
we evaluate the stop-and-frisk policy as a police strategy and examine the impact
on crime rates in New York City. We pursue a number of empirical strategies which
are described in detail in what follows.
5.5.1 Individual-Level Analysis
As outlined in the data description, we exploit two different data sources. In the
following, we describe the empirical approach for the individual-level analysis based
on the stop-and-frisk data. In that data, potential outcomes of a police stop include
frisks, searches, arrests and summons. We do not observe whether the individual
has committed crime or is about to commit crime. Hence, arrests and summons
following a police stop are approximations for criminal activity that has taken place
or is about to take place. Throughout this section, the subscripts i, p, y, w and d
denote the individual, precinct, year, week and day of the observed stop. Let t be
the calendar date summarising the year, week and day in order to ease notation.
16The reports are available online at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and
_planning/crime_and_enforcement_activity.shtml
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Linear Probability Model and Logit Model
We start our analysis with a linear probability model and estimate the effect
of being black on the probability that a police stop leads to the individual being
frisked, searched, arrested or a summons being issued:
Yipt = β0 + β1 ·BLACKi + αp + αy + αw + ipt (5.8)
Here, Yipt ∈ {FRISKipt, SEARCHipt, ARRESTipt, SUMMONSipt} is a binary
variable that takes the value 1 if the respective outcome occurs and 0 otherwise.
Likewise, BLACKi is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the person who
is stopped is black, and the value 0 if he is white. We include precinct, calendar
year and calendar week fixed effects αp, αy and αw, ipt is the error term. As an
alternative to the linear probability model, we specify a logit model using the same
set of outcomes and explanatory variables.
Both models exploit variation over time and space, but do not identify the effect
of interest from any exogenous variation. Yet, there may be underlying factors
that correlate both with race and the outcomes, as for example income or expected
schooling level. In order to identify causal effects we therefore exploit exogenous
variation as described in the following.
Regression Discontinuity Design
As discussed above, there is an obvious discontinuity in the stop-and-frisk activ-
ity after the judge ruling on August 12, 2013. Stop-and-frisk practices as they were
carried out by the NYPD before that date were ruled unconstitutional, and the
NYPD was asked to clarify the requirements under which police officers are author-
ised to stop, question and frisk individuals. We exploit the resulting discontinuity in
the number of stop-and-frisk encounters in a regression discontinuity design (RDD).
Here, the running variable is the (normalised) calendar date. Let D∗ denote the day
of the judge ruling. We restrict the estimation window to six weeks before and after
the judge ruling. We exploit a sharp discontinuity in stop-and-frisks and estimate
the following model:
Yipt = f(DATEi) + ρ · I[DATEi≥D∗] + ηipt (5.9)
where DATEi is the calendar date, f(·) is a polynomial function, I is the indic-
ator function and ηipt is the error term. Arguably the judge ruling led to a sharp
discontinuity in the stop-and-frisk practices: The change might be probabilistic
rather than deterministic. Therefore, we alternatively estimate a fuzzy RD model.
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The fuzzy RD model has the advantage that we can interpret it as an instrumental
variable model, where we instrument the treatment BLACKi with a post-judge
ruling dummy Di = I[DATEi ≥ D∗].
Event Study Design
A second quasi-experimental approach to retrieve causal estimates is based on
a different type of exogenous variation. We exploit events related to police officers
being killed in New York City. Information on police officers who were killed in
New York City, including the corresponding police precinct, is retrieved from the
Officers Down Memorial Page.17 Here, an event is defined as the killing of one
or more police officers. We have 10 such events during our sample period. Let
EV ENTp be a binary variable which takes the value 1 if there ever is an event
in precinct p, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, let POSTt be a binary variable that
takes the value 1 for any date post the event. We restrict the event window to
four weeks before and after the event where the coefficients are estimated relative to
the non-event precincts five weeks before the event. The following model estimates
the average effect of an event happening in a precinct p on the outcome Yipt ∈
{FRISKipt, SEARCHipt, ARRESTipt, SUMMONSipt}:
Yipt = γ0 + γ1 · (EV ENTp x POSTt) + δy + δw + νipt (5.10)
where δy and δw denote year and week fixed effects, and uipt is the error term.
This model identifies the average effect of an event in precinct p. Yet, we are further
interested in the timing of these effects. In particular, is there a change after the
event occurs and is this is very short-term or a longer lasting effect? Thus, we
allow the coefficient on the event dummy to vary by week to and after the event
EV ENTTIME:
Yipt = γ
∗
0 + γ
∗
1 · (EV ENTp x EV ENTTIMEt) + δ∗y + δ∗w + ν∗ipt (5.11)
The event study design provides additional evidence over and above the local
treatment effect of the judge ruling in 2013 which we exploit in the RD design.
One drawback of all the empirical strategies described so far is that we lack
data on actual crime, and rely on the approximations arrests and summons. In the
following, we describe the precinct level analysis which allows us to estimate the
impact of the stop-and-frisk strategy on crime in New York City.
17https://www.odmp.org/agency/2758-new-york-city-police-department-new-york
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5.5.2 Precinct-Level Analysis
In the stop-and-frisk data, we do not observe whether the individual truly has
committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Hence, we construct a precinct-
level panel of reported crime. We aggregate the number of stop-and-frisk encounters
to the precinct level and match these to the crime panel. That allows us to study
reported crime rates as an outcome variable. In the following, let the crime rate
CRpt denote the number of reported crimes per 1,000 male population. Further, let
BSTOPpt, be the percentage share of stops of blacks and BPOPp the percentage
share of the black population.18 Accordingly, BSTOPpt/BPOPp is the share of stops
of blacks relative to the black population share. If BSTOPpt/BPOPp = 1, the share
of blacks who are stopped compared to whites corresponds to the population share.
If BSTOPpt/BPOPp > 1, the share of black who are stopped is over-representative
compared to the population share in the police precinct.
Linear Regression Model
We start the precinct-level analysis with a log-linear regression model (OLS) of
the crime rate on the share of stops of black individuals. We include fixed effects
ap, ay and aw for the precinct, year and week, respectively.
lnCRpt = b0 + b1 · lnBSTOP pt + ap + ay + aw + uipt (5.12)
Alternatively, we use the relative share of stops of blacks to the black population
BSTOPpt/BPOPp as an explanatory variable. In the OLS model, one might be
concerned about reversed causalities: On the one hand, if criminals respond to the
police behaviour, then the share of black stops should affect the crime rate. On the
other hand, if the police responds to the criminals’ behaviour, then the crime rate
should affect the share of stops of blacks. That would lead to an endogeneity bias
in the estimate of b1. In order to recover causal estimates, we employ three different
strategies as described in the following.
Difference-in-Differences
First, we exploit the variation in the number of stop-and-frisk encounters after
the judge ruling on August 12, 2013 using a difference-in-differences strategy. Here,
we restrict the sample to the time period 2012-2014. Let POSTt be a binary variable
that takes the value 1 for all observations after August 12, 2013 and 0 otherwise.
18Note that the population shares are constant and do not vary over our sample period. This is
due to the fact that we obtained population numbers from the 2010 Decennial Census.
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We define the treatment group as precincts in which the relative share of black stops
relative to the share of the black population is above the average at the beginning
of the sample period t∗:
TREATp = I
[
BSTOPpt∗
BPOPp
>
1
P
P∑
p=1
BSTOPpt∗
BPOPp
]
That means that the treatment group consists of precincts in which initially the
black population was over-represented in the number of stop-and-frisks compared
to the population share and compared to the relative shares across all precincts. If
this is due to racial bias, then one would expect these precincts to be affected by the
judge ruling. Accordingly, we estimate the following first stage and reduced form
equations:
lnBSTOPpt = b
∗
0 + b
∗
1 · TREATp + b∗2 · POSTt + b∗3 · (TREATp x POSTt)
+a∗p + a
∗
y + a
∗
w + u
∗
ipt (5.13)
lnCRpt = b
∗
0 + b
∗
1 · TREATp + b∗2 · POSTt + b∗3 · (TREATp x POSTt)
+a∗p + a
∗
y + a
∗
w + u
∗
ipt (5.14)
Regression Discontinuity Design
Alternatively, we exploit the same discontinuity in the stop-and-frisk activity
but in a regression discontinuity design. The idea is very similar to that in the
individual-level analysis. Yet, using precinct-level data allows us to estimate the
reduced form effect of the discontinuity on actual crime rates instead of arrests or
summons. Hence, we estimate the following model:
lnCRpt = f(DATEt) + b · I[DATEt≥D∗] + ept (5.15)
Similarly to the individual-level analysis, we first specify a sharp RD model and
then estimate a fuzzy RD model which can be interpreted as an instrumental variable
model.
Event Study Design
Last, we use an event study design which exploits variation in the stop-and-frisk
activity caused by specific events. The advantage of that approach again is that
it provides us with additional evidence over and above the local treatment effect
of the judge ruling in 2013. While we use the deaths of police officers as events
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in the individual-level data analysis, we have a slightly different approach here:19
We use data on individuals who were killed during encounters with the police and
define events as the deaths of these individuals.20 We classify the events into three
different categories: A black suspect was killed when he or she attacked one or more
police officers (4 events), a black suspect was killed when he or she attacked one
or more police officers during a police operation (9 events), or a black suspect was
killed during a stop-and-frisk related police operation (12 events).
Again, let EV ENTp and POSTt be binary variables which take the value 1 if
there ever is an event in precinct p and for any date post the event, respectively,
and 0 otherwise. Again, we restrict the event window to four weeks before and after
the event where the coefficients are estimated relative to the non-event precincts five
weeks before the event. We estimate the first stage and reduced form effects of the
events for the outcomes Ypt ∈ {BSTOPpt, CRpt} as:
lnYpt = c0 + c1 · (EV ENTp x POSTt) + dy + dw + vpt (5.16)
Same as in the individual-level analysis, we are interested not only in the average
effect of the events but in particular in the timing: Is there a reaction in terms of
stop-and-frisk and crime after a black suspect has been killed? The following model
allows us to investigate that question, where EV ENTTIME denotes the week to
and after the event:
lnYpt = c
∗
0 + c
∗
1 · (EV ENTp x EV ENTTIMEt) + d∗y + d∗w + v∗pt (5.17)
5.6 Results
In this section, we discuss the results from our empirical analysis. The results
correspond to the estimating equations described in the previous section. First we
address the results from the individual-level analysis, before we present the results
from the precinct-level analysis.
19The sample period for the precinct-level data unfortunately is not long enough to include a
sufficient number of events when events are defined as police officers being killed.
20Data is retrieved from Brian Burghart’s website: www.fatalencounters.org. The events can be
verified from news reports.
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5.6.1 Individual-Level Analysis
Tables 5.2 to 5.11 show the results from the individual-level estimations. Table
5.2 displays the results for the linear probability model and corresponds to estimat-
ing equation (5.8). Conditional on being stopped, the probability of being frisked,
searched or arrested positively correlates with being black, the coefficients being
statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas the probability of a summons being
issued is negatively related to being black. Note that summons typically are issued
for minor crime but require the suspect to go to court. In that sense, a summons
being issued compared to an arrest being made suggests that indeed a crime has
been committed but one which might not be severe enough to arrest the individual.
For the outcomes search and arrest the estimates are imprecise once we cluster the
standard errors at the precinct level.
Next, we split the analysis by type of crime (property crime, violent crime, sex
crime and drug crime) where the type of crime refers to the crime that is suspected
when the police officer stops the individual. We find that conditional on being
stopped the correlations between the probability of an arrest or a summons and
being black are heterogenous across the different categories of crime (see table 5.3).
In particular, we find significantly positive associations between the probability of
an arrest and being black for property and sex crime, and significantly negative
correlations for violent and drug crime. In terms of summons issued, we find negative
correlations for all four types of crime.
Table 5.4 shows the estimation results when we specify a logit instead of a linear
probability model. The results are in line with the findings above in the sense that
they suggest a significantly positive correlation between being frisked and being
black, conditional on being stopped, as well as a significantly negative correlation
between summons issued and being black.
When we estimate the logit model separately by type of suspected crime (see
Table 5.5), we find results which are again in line with the findings from the linear
probability model: There is a significantly positive association between the probabil-
ity of an arrest for property or sex crime and being black, and a significantly negative
association between the probability of being arrested for violent or drug crime and
being black. For summons issued, we find significantly negative correlations for all
types of suspected crime, conditional on being stopped.
Whilst descriptive, these results suggest that conditional on being stopped there
are less successful stops of blacks compared to whites for violent and drug crimes and
more successful stops of blacks compared to whites for property and sex crimes in
terms of arrests. In terms of summons being issued the findings imply less successful
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stops of blacks compared to whites for all types of crime. At this point we cannot
draw causal conclusions, but the descriptive results are interesting for our analysis in
two aspects: First, they suggest the hypothesis that police officers screen differently
by type of suspected crime. That means that there may be racial profiling for
example for violent crime but not so much for other crime types such as sex crime.
Second, the fact that the correlation between the probability of a summons being
issued and being black is negative conditional on being stopped implies that black
individuals might either be stopped based on less conclusive evidence of a crime
being committed or for more severe crime that would lead to an arrest rather than
to a summons.
In order to retrieve causal effects, we then estimate an RD model as specified
in estimating equation (5.9). First, we interpret the discontinuity that followed the
judge ruling in August 2013 as a sharp discontinuity. The corresponding results are
shown in table 5.6. Column (1) shows the first stage of the RD model, i.e. the change
in the probability that a person who is stopped is black. We find only marginally
significant increases, yet not robust across different bandwidth choices. Similarly, we
do not find any evidence for changes in the probability of being frisked, arrested or
summons being issued when we estimate the reduced form. However, we find that the
probability of being searched conditional on being stopped increases after the judge
ruling. We interpret that as an indication that police officers stopped individuals
based on more sophisticated suspicions after the judge ruling than before.21
Table 5.7 shows the results when we estimate a fuzzy RD model instead. We
interpret the fuzzy RD model as a two-stage least square model. The results do
not yield any evidence for causal effects of being black on the probability of being
frisked, searched or arrested or a summons being issued.
Last, we exploit variation from a different type of quasi-experiment in an event
study design as specified in estimating equations (5.10) and (5.11). The results are
shown in table 5.8. The first stage results are found in column (1) and the reduced
form results in columns (2) to (7). In terms of the first stage, we find that the
probability that the person who is stopped being black is higher in precincts where
a police officer was killed. Further, the timing of the effect suggests that this is a
causal relationship: Up to the time of the event, the probability of a black compared
to a white stop is not significantly higher in the treated precincts relative to non-
treated precincts, but becomes significantly higher in week two and three after the
event.
21Indeed, anecdotical evidence suggest that police officers were uncertain about optimal stop-
and-frisk behaviour after the judge ruling and reacted by restricting their stops to those which
they knew would be successful and hence non-controversial.
163
Chapter 5. Crime and Racial Profiling
The reduced form effects for the outcomes frisks, searches, arrests and summons
yield somewhat mixed evidence. On average, the overall probability of an arrest
conditional on a stop decreases in precincts where a police offer was killed. The
coefficient is almost identical with the coefficient when we restrict the sample to
blacks only, which suggests that the decrease in arrests is due to a decrease in
arrests of blacks. There are two possible mechanisms that would yield such a result:
First, stops might be less successful. That implies that there are more stop-and-frisk
encounters and police officers stop individuals on lower levels of suspicion after an
event. Second, crime might go down after an event leading to less arrests given a
constant number of stop-and-frisks. For example, that would be the case if there
were police deployment effects similar to those found in the literature on policing
after terror attacks. Unfortunately, we do not have access to data that would allow
us to investigate that in more detail. Yet, the fact that we do not find any impact on
the probability of summons being issued favours the first over the second hypothesis.
What about the timing of the negative effect on arrests? While there seems to be
a significantly negative effect on arrests in the week just after the event, the results
are not yet conclusive as the probability of arrests conditional on being stopped
appears to be higher in the treated compared to the non-treated precincts during
some weeks before the event, too.
Tables 5.9 to 5.11 show the results for the event study design when we restrict
the sample to stop-and-frisk encounters following a suspicion of property, violent
and drug crime, respectively. For property crime, we find on average a significant
increase in the probability of the person who is stopped being black, yet the timing
of the event effect does not appear to support a causal link. Moreover, contrary
to the previous analysis the results show that there is a significant increase in the
probability of a summons being issued in the week after the event but no impact
on the probability of arrests. For violent crime, we find a marginally significant
coefficient at the first stage, but no causal impact of the events on the probabilities
of being arrested or a summons being issued following a police stop. For drug crime,
we find mixed evidence. While the average first stage effect suggests an increase in
the probability of a person who is stopped being black, the timing of the effects does
not support a causal impact. Yet, the reduced form estimations yield an increase in
the probability of being frisked or searched following a police stop two weeks after
the event and an increase in the probability of being arrested three weeks after the
event.
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5.6.2 Precinct-Level Analysis
Tables 5.12 to 5.16 show the results for the precinct-level analysis. We start the
analysis with the linear regression model (5.12) relating crime rates to the share and
relative share of black individuals who are stopped, frisked or searched. The results
are shown in table 5.12. We find significantly positive elasticities of the crime rate
with respect to the share of stops of black, both for property and violent crime.
Yet, when we cluster the standard errors at the precinct level, the estimates are
more noisy. When we estimate the effect of the relative share of stops of blacks, the
coefficient is very similar to the coefficient on the absolute share of stops of blacks.
This is not surprising given the specification of the estimating equation: The share
of the black compared to the white population is constant over the sample period
for the reasons explained above, and thus is an additive component in the log-linear
regression model. Further, we find a significantly positive elasticity of the property
crime rate with respect to the share of black individuals being frisked, and zero effect
for violent crime. Elasticities with respect to the share of black individuals being
searched are not significantly different from zero.
The linear regression model suffers from the endogeneity problem outlined above
and thus the estimates can not be interpreted as causal effects. Our first approach
in order to recover causal estimates in the precinct-level analysis is the difference-
in-difference model specified in estimating equation (5.14). The results are shown
in table 5.13. If the judge ruling in August 2013 stopped previously existing ra-
cial profiling strategies, then one would expect that precincts with higher shares of
stops of blacks are affected by the judge ruling to a greater extent than other pre-
cincts. When we estimate the first stage, we indeed find that the share of stops of
black compared to white individuals decreases significantly in the treated precincts
compared to the control precincts.
Does the decrease in the share of stops of black individuals translate into changes
in crime? If the stop-and-frisk strategy and in particular racial profiling is indeed
an efficient police strategy, one would expect crime rates to increase following a
decrease in the intensity of the policy. Columns (3) to (8) show the results of the
reduced form estimations. We do not find any evidence that the changes after the
judge ruling in 2013 affect overall, property or violent crime rates. That means that
we do not find any evidence that crime rates increase when the share of black stops
decreases, as you would expect in the case of racial profiling being in line with the
Broken Windows theory. Thus, the findings from the difference-in-differences model
imply that there was indeed a decrease in racial profiling after the judge ruling that
did no have any effect on crime rates. One interpretation is that this supports the
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existence of racial bias before the discontinuity.
One threat to the identification of the difference-in-difference model is whether
or not allocation to treatment is random. Thus, in order to provide additional
evidence we estimate the RD model described in estimating equation (5.15). The
results are shown in table 5.14 and confirm the previous estimation results: We
find significantly negative effects on the share of stop-and-frisk encounters of black
persons at the first stage, but again no evidence that this translates into changes in
crime rates. This is true both for property and for violent crime. When we estimate
a fuzzy instead of a sharp RDD model, we find imprecise estimates both for the first
stage and for the reduced form (see table 5.15).
Similarly to the individual-level analysis, we further exploit variation from events
other than the judge ruling in 2013. The advantage of that approach is that we are
able to provide additional quasi-experimental evidence that does not rely on the
variation from the judge ruling which contributes to the external validity of our
results. In particular, we use an event study design as specified in equations (5.16)
and (5.17) and exploit the following events: A black suspect was killed when he
or she attacked one or more police officers (event type 1), a black suspect was
killed when he or she attacked one or more police officers during a police operation
(event type 2), or a black suspect was killed during a stop-and-frisk related police
operation (event type 3). The results are shown in table 5.16 where columns (1)
and (2) correspond to the first type of events, (3) and (4) to the second type and
(5) and (6) to the third type.
For each event type, we estimate the first stage effect on the share of stops
of blacks as well as the reduced form effect on the crime rate. For the first type
of events, where a black suspect was killed when he or she attacked one or more
police officers, there is on average a significant increase in the share of stops of black
compared to white individuals in the treated relative to the non-treated precincts.
Yet, the timing of the effect suggests that this is not necessarily a causal impact:
The share of stops of blacks appears to be significantly higher in all weeks leading
up to the event and following the event which suggests a selection of precincts into
the treatment group rather than a causal increase in the share of stop-and-frisk
encounters for blacks due to the events. For the remaining two types of events,
where a black suspect was killed when he or she attacked one or more police officers
during a police operation or a black suspect was killed during a stop-and-frisk related
police operation, the estimations do not yield any evidence for an impact of the
events neither on the share of blacks being stopped nor on the crime rate.
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5.7 Conclusion
The stop-and-frisk policy entitles police officers in New York City to stop, ques-
tion and frisk suspects based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The legal
basis for police officers in the U.S. to stop, question and frisk citizens was established
in 1968 and legally enacted in New York City, in 1971. Stop-and-frisk became more
widely used as a police strategy in the 1990s in order to reduce crime in the city.
The policy itself and in particular racial profiling as one of its features has been
controversial since then. The political and popular debate about the pros and cons
has received a lot of attention from the media.
In this chapter, we examine the hypothesis of racial bias in the stop-and-frisk
practices in New York City and evaluate the impact on crime. We introduce a
theoretical framework of racial bias in police stops and basic welfare considerations.
The empirical analysis is based on a number of different strategies in order to identify
racial bias in the stop-and-frisk practices and to evaluate the overall impact on crime
in New York City. In particular, we base our analysis on detailed individual-level
data on stop-and-frisk encounters between 2003 and 2014 as well as precinct-level
data on reported crime. For identification, we exploit discontinuities in the stop-
and-frisk activities due to a judge ruling in 2013 and due to events related to police
officers being killed or black suspects being killed by police officers.
Supporters of the stop-and-frisk policy and racial profiling have used the Broken
Windows theory to promote the policy as a police strategy that efficiently targets
minor crime and serves as a deterrent more serious crime. The results of our em-
pirical analysis disagree with these arguments in the sense that they suggest the
existence of a racial bias in the probability of stop-and-frisk encounters over and
above what can be explained by statistical discrimination. Moreover, we find no
evidence that these stop-and-frisk practices indeed reduce crime and hence we can
not conclude that the policy is an efficient crime deterrence mechanism.
In this chapter, we evaluate a police strategy as a public policy but do not con-
duct a full welfare analysis. In terms of policy implications, our results imply that
the stop-and-frisk policy is not an efficient police strategy. Our analysis does not
yet take into account any harm caused to individuals who are innocently stopped
by the police. Recent unrests and riots in other U.S. cities, which were triggered by
shootings of black suspects and a perception of unjust behaviour of the police to-
wards Afro-Americans, suggest that these considerations are indeed very important
and should enter the policy debate.
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5.8 Figures
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Figure 5.1: New York City Police Precincts
Note: The map shows the 75 police precincts of the estimation sample by borough. We subsume Staten Island’s
police precincts 120, 121 and 123 to one precinct, see the data description for more details. The five boroughs of
New York City include Staten Island, Queens, Brooklyn, Bronx and Manhattan. Source: http://johnkeefe.net/nyc-
police-precinct-and-census-data and own calculations.
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Figure 5.2: Percentage Share of Stop-and-Frisks of Black Individuals
Note: The map shows New York City’s police precincts categorised into quartiles of the distribution of the average
percentage share of stop-and-frisk encounters involving black compared to white individuals. The average percentage
share is computed for each precinct as the average weekly percentage share between 2003 and 2014. Source: NYPD
Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
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Figure 5.3: Percentage Share of Black Population
Note: The map shows New York City’s police precincts categorised into quartiles of the distribution of the percentage
share of black compared to white population. Source: 2010 U.S. Decennial Census and own calculations.
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Figure 5.4: Reported Crime Rate
Note: The map shows New York City’s police precincts categorised into quartiles of the distribution of the average
crime rate. The average crime rate is computed for each precinct as the average weekly number of reported crimes
per 1,000 male population between 2009 and 2014. Source: NYPD Crime Statistics and own calculations.
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Figure 5.5: Stop-and-Frisk Encounters, Stops
Note: The figure shows the average number of stop-and-frisk encounters between police officers, and black and white
individuals, respectively. The average number of encounters is computed for New York City as the the average weekly
number of encounters between 2003 and 2014. The vertical lines mark the start of the decline in the stop-and-frisk
activity in 2012 and the day of the judge ruling in August 2013 (see the data description for details). Source: NYPD
Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
Figure 5.6: Stop-and-Frisk Encounters, Frisks
Note: The figure shows the average number of stop-and-frisk encounters during which the suspect was frisked for
black and white individuals, respectively. The average number of frisks is computed for New York City as the the
average weekly number of frisks between 2003 and 2014. The vertical lines mark the start of the decline in the
stop-and-frisk activity in 2012 and the day of the judge ruling in August 2013 (see the data description for details).
Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
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Figure 5.7: Stop-and-Frisk Encounters, Searches
Note: The figure shows the average number of stop-and-frisk encounters during which the suspect was searched for
black and white individuals, respectively. The average number of searches is computed for New York City as the the
average weekly number of searches between 2003 and 2014. The vertical lines mark the start of the decline in the
stop-and-frisk activity in 2012 and the day of the judge ruling in August 2013 (see the data description for details).
Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
Figure 5.8: Stop-and-frisk Encounters, Arrests
Note: The figure shows the average number of stop-and-frisk encounters during which the suspect was arrested for
black and white individuals, respectively. The average number of arrests is computed for New York City as the the
average weekly number of arrests between 2003 and 2014. The vertical lines mark the start of the decline in the
stop-and-frisk activity in 2012 and the day of the judge ruling in August 2013 (see the data description for details).
Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
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Figure 5.9: Stop-and-Frisk Encounters, Summons
Note: The figure shows the average number of stop-and-frisk encounters during which a summons was issued for
black and white individuals, respectively. The average number of summons issued is computed for New York City
as the the average weekly number of summons issued between 2003 and 2014. The vertical lines mark the start
of the decline in the stop-and-frisk activity in 2012 and the day of the judge ruling in August 2013 (see the data
description for details). Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
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Figure 5.10: Reported Crime, Property Crime
Note: The figure shows the average number of reported property crimes in raw numbers as well as seasonally
adjusted. The average number of reported property crimes is computed for New York City as the average weekly
number of reported property crimes between 2009 and 2014. Seasonal adjustment is relative to the same week in
the previous year. The vertical lines mark the start of the decline in the stop-and-frisk activity in 2012 and the day
of the judge ruling in August 2013 (see the data description for details). Source: NYPD Crime Statistics and own
calculations.
Figure 5.11: Reported Crime, Violent Crime
Note: The figure shows the average number of reported violent crimes in raw numbers as well as seasonally adjusted.
The average number of reported violent crimes is computed for New York City as the average weekly number of
reported violent crimes between 2009 and 2014. Seasonal adjustment is relative to the same week in the previous
year. The vertical lines mark the start of the decline in the stop-and-frisk activity in 2012 and the day of the judge
ruling in August 2013 (see the data description for details). Source: NYPD Crime Statistics and own calculations.
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5.9 Tables
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Table 5.1: Total Arrests vs Stop-and-Frisk Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Arrests: Total Arrests: Total Arrests: Stop-and-Frisk: Stop-and-Frisk:
All % Black % White Arrests % of Total
2008 93,962 48.61 12.28 32,206 34.28
2009 93,040 48.23 12.36 34,919 37.53
2010 93,184 48.89 12.12 41,084 44.09
2011 97,104 48.13 12.89 40,084 41.28
2012 97,331 48.55 12.69 32,315 33.20
2013 104,470 47.71 12.29 15,443 14.78
2014 120,539 47.08 13.34 6,898 5.72
Note: The table shows the number of total arrests in New York City for the years 2008-2014 and the per-
centage shares of blacks and whites of all arrestees, as well as the number of arrests following a stop-and-frisk
encounter both as the total number and as a percentage share of all arrests in New York City. Source: NYPD
End of Year Enforcement Report 2008-2014, NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
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Table 5.4: Logit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Logit Logit
Y= FRISK SEARCH ARREST SUMMONS
BLACK 0.4135*** 0.068 0.051 -0.3530***
(0.0462) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0547)
Precinct FE x x x x
Year FE x x x x
Week FE x x x x
VCE cluster cluster cluster cluster
Cluster-Var precinct precinct precinct precinct
Sample Size 2,852,279 2,852,279 2,852,279 2,852,279
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to a logit model as
described in section 5.5. The sample runs from 2003 to 2014. All regressions
include fixed effects for the police precinct, the calendar year and the calendar
week. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the
10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates
significance at the 1 percent level. Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk
Database and own calculations.
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Table 5.6: Regression Discontinuity Design, Sharp Discontinuity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RDD RDD RDD RDD RDD
First stage Reduced form Reduced form Reduced form Reduced form
Y= BLACK FRISK SEARCH ARREST SUMMONS
POST 0.0509 -0.0433 0.0526* 0.0198 0.0173
(0.0299) (0.0344) (0.0231) (0.0227) (0.0138)
POST 0.0261 -0.0150 0.0623*** 0.0364* 0.0174
(half bw) (0.0190) (0.0221) (0.0161) (0.0155) (0.0095)
POST 0.0424* -0.0194 0.0504*** 0.0255 0.0099
(double bw) (0.0201) (0.0219) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0094)
Est.BW 2.26 2.56 2.66 2.63 2.39
Est.BW 1.13 1.28 1.33 1.32 1.20
Est.BW 4.51 5.12 5.32 5.27 4.79
Sample Size 12,974 12,974 12,974 12,974 12,974
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equation (5.9). The sample runs from
six weeks before to six weeks after a judge ruling on August 12, 2013. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates sig-
nificance at the 1 percent level. Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
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Table 5.7: Regression Discontinuity Design, Fuzzy Discontinuity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRD FRD FRD FRD
Y= FRISK SEARCH ARREST SUMMONS
BLACK -0.8807 1.0777 0.4046 0.3454
(0.9336) (0.7994) (0.5147) (0.3394)
BLACK -0.5743 2.3853 1.3945 0.6677
(half bw) (0.9888) (1.8289) (1.1720) (0.6065)
BLACK -0.4732 1.2723 0.6398 0.2337
(double bw) (0.6004) (0.6887) (0.4634) (0.2439)
Est.BW 2.56 2.66 2.63 2.39
Est.BW 1.28 1.33 1.32 1.20
Est.BW 5.12 5.32 5.27 4.79
Sample Size 12,974 12,974 12,974 12,974
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to the fuzzy RD model described
in section 5.5. The sample runs from six weeks before to six weeks after a judge ruling on
August 12, 2013. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10
percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the
1 percent level. Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database and own calculations.
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Table 5.8: Event Study Design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ES ES ES ES ES ES ES
Y= BLACK FRISK SEARCH ARREST ARREST SUMMONS SUMMONS
all blacks all blacks
Panel A: Average Effects
EVENT x POST 0.1078** 0.0168 -0.0164 -0.0246** -0.0248** -0.0106 -0.0131
(0.0347) (0.0415) (0.0142) (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0087)
Panel B: Timing of Effects
EVENT x (-5) 0.0625 -0.0257 -0.0309* -0.0128 -0.0116 -0.0043 -0.0083
(0.0405) (0.0444) (0.0127) (0.0151) (0.0164) (0.0103) (0.0126)
EVENT x (-4) 0.0565 -0.0365 -0.0001 -0.0227* -0.0244* 0.0058 0.0064
(0.0399) (0.0584) (0.0127) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0114)
EVENT x (-3) 0.0672 0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0242*** -0.0230** 0.0075 0.0004
(0.0425) (0.0429) (0.0199) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0106) (0.0124)
EVENT x (-2) 0.0708 0.0106 -0.0295* -0.0262* -0.0241* -0.0116 -0.0132
(0.0497) (0.0359) (0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0098)
EVENT x (-1) 0.0628 0.0952* 0.0188 0.0002 -0.0048 0.0173 0.0127
(0.0484) (0.0464) (0.0215) (0.0124) (0.0102) (0.0164) (0.0176)
EVENT 0.0631 0.0987 0.0337 -0.0081 -0.0055 0.0033 -0.0031
(0.0450) (0.0545) (0.0173) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0194) (0.0207)
EVENT x (+1) 0.0776 0.0800 -0.0181 -0.0332** -0.0298* 0.0130 0.0042
(0.0449) (0.0402) (0.0144) (0.0110) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0138)
EVENT x (+2) 0.1098* 0.1057* -0.0037 -0.0021 -0.0033 0.0086 0.0013
(0.0477) (0.0468) (0.0232) (0.0170) (0.0174) (0.0168) (0.0171)
EVENT x (+3) 0.1097** 0.1213 0.0271 -0.0014 0.0034 0.0177 0.0122
(0.0405) (0.0635) (0.0199) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0128) (0.0142)
EVENT x (+4) 0.0591 0.0602 0.0056 -0.0089 -0.0063 0.0125 0.0108
(0.0371) (0.0627) (0.0163) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0146)
Year FE x x x x x x x
Week FE x x x x x x x
VCE cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Cluster-Var precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct
Sample Size 322,051 322,051 322,051 322,051 267,994 322,051 267,994
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equations (5.10) and (5.11). The sample
runs from 2003 to 2014. All regressions include fixed effects for the calendar year and the calendar week. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5
percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database,
Officers Down Memorial Page and own calculations.
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Table 5.9: Event Study Design, Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ES ES ES ES ES ES ES
Y= BLACK FRISK SEARCH ARREST ARREST SUMMONS SUMMONS
all blacks all blacks
Panel A: Average Effects
EVENT x POST 0.2208*** -0.0563 -0.0252* -0.0268** -0.0285** 0.0187 0.0173
(0.0386) (0.0649) (0.0098) (0.0079) (0.0090) (0.0196) (0.0175)
Panel B: Timing of Effects
EVENT x (-5) 0.1916*** -0.0051 -0.0460*** -0.0341** -0.0389** 0.0298 0.0320
(0.0480) (0.0511) (0.0108) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0397) (0.0418)
EVENT x (-4) 0.1314 -0.1525 -0.0146 -0.0205 -0.0245 -0.0017 -0.0044
(0.0740) (0.0885) (0.0242) (0.0234) (0.0251) (0.0299) (0.0302)
EVENT x (-3) 0.1932** -0.0913 -0.0340 -0.0593*** -0.0752*** 0.0579* 0.0689*
(0.0615) (0.0835) (0.0187) (0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0286) (0.0324)
EVENT x (-2) 0.1216 -0.1006* -0.0668** -0.0311 -0.0396 -0.0047 -0.0037
(0.0689) (0.0502) (0.0226) (0.0204) (0.0225) (0.0238) (0.0245)
EVENT x (-1) 0.1297 -0.0370 -0.0457* -0.0144 -0.0276 0.0745* 0.0859*
(0.0974) (0.0702) (0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0169) (0.0338) (0.0392)
EVENT 0.1281 0.1497 0.0173 0.0073 -0.0019 0.0396 0.0547
(0.0783) (0.1085) (0.0330) (0.0236) (0.0247) (0.0427) (0.0444)
EVENT x (+1) 0.0818 0.0361 -0.0234 -0.0041 -0.0143 0.1056** 0.0993**
(0.0735) (0.1028) (0.0341) (0.0257) (0.0291) (0.0317) (0.0315)
EVENT x (+2) 0.0042 -0.0077 -0.0694** 0.2108 -0.0498 0.2651 0.3620
(0.2356) (0.1819) (0.0240) (0.1508) (0.0287) (0.2292) (0.2694)
EVENT x (+3) 0.0864 0.1259 0.0109 0.0176 -0.0001 0.0367 0.0334
(0.1005) (0.1129) (0.0435) (0.0339) (0.0389) (0.0248) (0.0255)
EVENT x (+4) 0.2084* 0.0307 -0.0071 -0.0131 -0.0096 0.0243 0.0378*
(0.0930) (0.1445) (0.0124) (0.0092) (0.0124) (0.0171) (0.0173)
Year FE x x x x x x x
Week FE x x x x x x x
VCE cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Cluster-Var precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct
Sample Size 65,701 65,701 65,701 65,701 46,230 65,701 46,230
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equations (5.10) and (5.11) for property
crime only. The sample runs from 2003 to 2014. All regressions include fixed effects for the calendar year and the
calendar week. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates
significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source: NYPD Stop, Question
and Frisk Database, Officers Down Memorial Page and own calculations.
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Table 5.10: Event Study Design, Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ES ES ES ES ES ES ES
Y= BLACK FRISK SEARCH ARREST ARREST SUMMONS SUMMONS
all blacks all blacks
Panel A: Average Effects
EVENT x POST 0.0670*** -0.0106 -0.0177 -0.0163 -0.0176* -0.0139* -0.0148
(0.0188) (0.0307) (0.0194) (0.0095) (0.0074) (0.0068) (0.0074)
Panel B: Timing of Effects
EVENT x (-5) 0.0313 -0.0858 -0.0383*** -0.0123 -0.0079 -0.0004 -0.0048
(0.0253) (0.0519) (0.0090) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0102) (0.0083)
EVENT x (-4) -0.0031 -0.0807 0.0243 0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0143 -0.0161
(0.0443) (0.0578) (0.0201) (0.0155) (0.0113) (0.0181) (0.0198)
EVENT x (-3) 0.0453 0.0102 -0.0177 -0.0120 -0.0073 -0.0477* -0.0521*
(0.0271) (0.0433) (0.0201) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0215) (0.0217)
EVENT x (-2) 0.0790** -0.0192 -0.0109 -0.0196 -0.0157 -0.0593* -0.0607*
(0.0285) (0.0441) (0.0188) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0236) (0.0246)
EVENT x (-1) 0.0849* 0.0532 0.0478 0.0173 0.0200 -0.0432 -0.0448
(0.0384) (0.0478) (0.0271) (0.0224) (0.0210) (0.0347) (0.0352)
EVENT x 0.0563 0.0999 0.0890* 0.0105 0.0101 -0.0615 -0.0611
(0.0354) (0.0578) (0.0384) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0578) (0.0599)
EVENT x (+1) 0.0639* 0.0393 0.0312 -0.0121 -0.0087 -0.0939 -0.0939
(0.0282) (0.0380) (0.0202) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0539) (0.0555)
EVENT x (+2) 0.0865 -0.1131 0.0707 -0.0238 -0.0206 0.0792 0.0413
(0.0489) (0.1979) (0.0704) (0.0235) (0.0240) (0.0481) (0.0416)
EVENT x (+3) 0.0471 0.0654 0.1063*** 0.0104 0.0105 -0.1128 -0.1102
(0.0334) (0.0633) (0.0274) (0.0179) (0.0162) (0.0667) (0.0679)
EVENT x (+4) 0.0583* 0.0226 0.0000 -0.0158 -0.0194 0.0871 0.0889
(0.0292) (0.1085) (0.0250) (0.0130) (0.0107) (0.0525) (0.0528)
Year FE x x x x x x x
Week FE x x x x x x x
VCE cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Cluster-Var precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct
Sample Size 118,794 118,794 118,794 118,794 108,146 118,794 108,146
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equations (5.10) and (5.11) for violent
crime. The sample runs from 2003 to 2014. All regressions include fixed effects for the calendar year and the cal-
endar week. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates
significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source: NYPD Stop, Question
and Frisk Database, Officers Down Memorial Page and own calculations.
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Table 5.11: Event Study Design, Drug Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ES ES ES ES ES ES ES
Y= BLACK FRISK SEARCH ARREST ARREST SUMMONS SUMMONS
all blacks all blacks
Panel A: Average Effects
EVENT x POST 0.1095*** -0.0042 -0.0167 -0.0083 -0.0056 -0.0183 -0.0276
(0.0303) (0.0444) (0.0219) (0.0166) (0.0174) (0.0139) (0.0165)
Panel B: Timing of Effects
EVENT x (-5) 0.0348 -0.0034 0.0399 0.0787 0.0740 -0.0791*** -0.0772***
(0.0559) (0.0672) (0.0680) (0.0596) (0.0467) (0.0099) (0.0099)
EVENT x (-4) 0.0609 0.0005 0.1666 0.2308* 0.2294* 0.0510 0.0563
(0.0597) (0.1261) (0.0934) (0.1111) (0.1070) (0.0525) (0.0571)
EVENT x (-3) 0.0190 -0.1136 -0.0652 -0.0524 -0.0331 0.0132 0.0241
(0.0976) (0.0799) (0.0440) (0.0741) (0.0817) (0.0342) (0.0354)
EVENT x (-2) -0.0339 -0.1565 -0.0346 0.0144 0.0201 -0.0194 -0.0119
(0.1071) (0.1113) (0.0431) (0.0473) (0.0456) (0.0315) (0.0317)
EVENT x (-1) 0.0819 -0.0065 -0.0449 0.0374 0.0160 0.0347 0.0346
(0.0663) (0.1131) (0.0442) (0.0469) (0.0491) (0.0380) (0.0351)
EVENT 0.0523 0.1766 0.0755 0.0337 0.0236 0.0327 0.0458
(0.0722) (0.1606) (0.0613) (0.0574) (0.0546) (0.0465) (0.0439)
EVENT x (+1) -0.0333 0.0027 0.0455 0.0640 0.0270 0.0538 0.0609
(0.0822) (0.2074) (0.0695) (0.0787) (0.0641) (0.0519) (0.0511)
EVENT x (+2) 0.1146 0.7773*** 0.6680*** 0.0367 0.0336 0.1005 0.1175
(0.0943) (0.1409) (0.0643) (0.0657) (0.0567) (0.0808) (0.0800)
EVENT x (+3) -0.0236 0.0999 0.1132 0.1572** 0.1360** 0.0604 0.0652
(0.0931) (0.2646) (0.0823) (0.0574) (0.0488) (0.0649) (0.0645)
EVENT x (+4) 0.0405 0.1404 -0.0152 -0.0156 0.0010 0.0300 -0.0077
(0.0529) (0.1920) (0.0328) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0481) (0.0373)
Year FE x x x x x x x
Week FE x x x x x x x
VCE cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Cluster-Var precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct
Sample Size 26,235 26,235 26,235 26,235 22,170 26,235 22,170
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equations (5.10) and (5.11) for drug crime.
The sample runs from 2003 to 2014. All regressions include fixed effects for the calendar year and the calendar week.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance
at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source: NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk
Database, Officers Down Memorial Page and own calculations.
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Table 5.14: Regression Discontinuity Design, Sharp Discontinuity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RDD RDD RDD RDD RDD
First stage First stage Reduced form Reduced form Reduced form
Y= logBSTOP logBFRISK logCR logPCR logVCR
POST -1.2691* -1.0340 0.0947 0.0939 0.3251
(0.5275) (1.0418) (0.1649) (0.1734) (0.2414)
POST -1.8849* -0.8000 0.0673 0.0588 0.2330
(half bw) (0.8281) (0.7890) (0.1333) (0.1408) (0.1799)
POST -1.2630** -1.4653* 0.0424 0.0194 0.1929
(double bw) (0.4817) (0.7104) (0.1122) (0.1175) (0.1509)
Est.BW 5.33 3.27 3.76 3.80 3.99
Est.BW 2.67 1.63 1.88 1.90 1.99
Est.BW 10.67 6.53 7.52 7.61 7.98
Sample Size 975 975 975 975 975
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equation (5.15). The sample runs
from six weeks before to six weeks after a judge ruling on August 12, 2013. Standard errors are shown in par-
entheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; ***
indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source: NYPD Crime Statistics, NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk
Database and own calculations.
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Table 5.15: Regression Discontinuity Design, Fuzzy Discontinuity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRD FRD FRD FRD FRD FRD
Y= logCR logCR logPCR logPCR logVCR logVCR
logBSTOP -0.0652 -0.0649 -0.2272
(0.1179) (0.1229) (0.1999)
logBSTOP -0.0539 -0.0471 -0.1865
(half bw) (0.1068) (0.1119) (0.1625)
logBSTOP -0.0337 -0.0154 -0.1531
(double bw) (0.0905) (0.0934) (0.1376)
logBFRISK -0.0952 -0.0944 -0.3274
(0.1990) (0.2019) (0.4239)
logBFRISK -0.0842 -0.0735 -0.2912
(half bw) (0.1854) (0.1877) (0.3666)
logBFRISK -0.0276 -0.0126 -0.1240
(double bw) (0.0744) (0.0763) (0.1154)
Est.BW 3.76 3.76 3.80 3.80 3.99 3.99
Est.BW 1.88 1.88 1.90 1.90 1.99 1.99
Est.BW 7.52 7.52 7.61 7.61 7.98 7.98
Sample Size 975 975 975 975 975 975
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to the fuzzy RD model described
in section 5.5. The sample runs from six weeks before to six weeks after a judge ruling on
August 12, 2013. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10
percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1
percent level. Source: NYPD Crime Statistics, NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Database and
own calculations.
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Table 5.16: Event Study Design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ES ES ES ES ES ES
Event Type 1 Event Type 2 Event Type 3
Y= logBSTOP logCR logBSTOP logCR logBSTOP logCR
Panel A: Average Effects
EVENT x POST 2.3598** 0.1452 0.9843 0.0148 1.2371* 0.1074
(0.6585) (0.2154) (0.6799) (0.2685) (0.5703) (0.2261)
Panel B: Timing of Effects
EVENT x (-5) 2.4347** 0.2270 -1.0908 0.4083 1.2036* 0.1299
(0.7993) (0.2181) (2.2049) (0.4419) (0.5180) (0.4028)
EVENT x (-4) 3.0331* 0.0726 -2.6121 0.1022 -0.7992 0.1790
(1.1700) (0.2564) (2.8330) (0.4965) (1.4730) (0.3103)
EVENT x (-3) 2.4303** 0.1402 0.3032 0.1403 -0.0974 0.2075
(0.7986) (0.2535) (2.2586) (0.4414) (1.6012) (0.3433)
EVENT x (-2) 2.3186** 0.1141 -0.3765 0.0510 0.1780 0.0103
(0.7509) (0.2406) (1.8409) (0.3879) (1.3835) (0.2895)
EVENT x (-1) 2.4021** 0.1126 1.6497 -0.0148 1.2141 0.0600
(0.7835) (0.2651) (1.0570) (0.4244) (0.6917) (0.3254)
EVENT 2.3925** 0.2066 0.2289 -0.0259 0.0668 0.0987
(0.7798) (0.2215) (1.8403) (0.4368) (1.3802) (0.3087)
EVENT x (+1) 2.3316** 0.0852 0.5801 0.0905 0.6204 0.0103
(0.7940) (0.2274) (1.0151) (0.3257) (0.6941) (0.3361)
EVENT x (+2) 2.3696** 0.0444 2.6333* -0.3796 1.0409 -0.3095
(0.7795) (0.2925) (1.1667) (0.4180) (0.6512) (0.3681)
EVENT x (+3) 2.4173** 0.0285 1.8097 -0.1631 1.0197 0.0326
(0.8081) (0.2504) (1.1097) (0.3629) (0.6236) (0.2580)
EVENT x (+4) 2.1992** 0.1037 1.2385 -0.1395 0.8176 -0.0331
(0.7362) (0.2403) (0.8779) (0.3437) (0.6464) (0.3122)
Year FE x x x x x x
Week FE - - x x x x
VCE cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Cluster-Var precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct precinct
Sample Size 1092 1092 1632 1632 2579 2579
Note: The table shows the regression results corresponding to estimating equation (5.16) and
(5.17). The sample runs from 2009 to 2014. Regressions include fixed effects for the police pre-
cinct, the calendar year and the calendar week where indicated. Standard errors are shown in par-
entheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent
level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Source: NYPD Crime Statistics, NYPD
Stop, Question and Frisk Database, Fatal Encounters online database and own calculations.
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Figure 5A.1: UF-250 Form
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Figure 5A.2: UF-250 Form (cont.)
196
Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks
Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks
197
Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation, I study aspects of the relationship between labour markets,
public policies and crime. In particular, I apply a number of economic concepts
and statistical methods to the context of illegal activity and different factors that
potentially trigger or deter such criminal behaviour.
In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I review and discuss the existing theoretical and
empirical literature on labour markets and crime that addresses questions about how
and why individuals choose to participate in illegal activity. Labour economists have
in particular been interested in understanding who the individuals at risk of criminal
behaviour are, and how they are affected by the state of the labour market in general
and their individual labour market performance in particular. In that chapter I first
discuss the seminal economic models of crime as well as subsequent models that take
a more dynamic view of criminal choices. Second, I discuss examples of empirical
work on different aspects of labour markets and crime.
The literature yields evidence across countries that supports the hypothesis that
labour markets indeed matter for crime outcomes. Still, there are open research
questions with respect to the underlying mechanisms as well as with respect to the
magnitudes of the effects, which are both crucial to establish for broader policy
implications. The chapter identifies a number of these open research questions some
of which are addressed in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
In particular, there appears to be the need for more research in order to under-
stand the exact impact of unemployment on crime: While there is evidence that
suggests that such a link indeed exists, we do not yet know as much about the
mechanisms. Chapter 3 of this dissertation contributes to solving that gap in the
literature by addressing the question of how criminal careers are initiated, and in
particular whether labour market conditions at the time when youth leave school
play a role in forming criminal choices. Existing research has demonstrated scarring
effects of criminal behaviour on labour market opportunities later in life, but we do
not know whether there is a reverse scarring effect. Yet, these effects plausibly exist
as recessions typically lead to an increase in youth unemployment: If these tight
labour markets at labour market entry make it more difficult for youths to find jobs,
that might trigger initial involvement in crime and prompt criminal careers.
In that chapter, we empirically analyse whether such long-term effects exist.
We use a variety of U.S. and UK data sources at the individual and birth cohort
level. The estimations yield robust evidence that young people who graduate from
school during recessions are significantly more likely to become involved in crime
than those who leave school while labour markets are more buoyant. The majority
of criminal offenders has a criminal record that dates back to relatively young ages,
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first-time offenders at older ages are observed less often. In combination with our
results this leads to the conclusion that recessions do play a role in the making of
career criminals by triggering initial involvement in crime. Indeed, the hypothesis
is supported by additional results in the chapter which show that crime scars from
higher entry level unemployment rates are both long lasting and substantial.
In our analysis, we show that there is a more long-term impact of unemployment
on crime than has been previously shown in the literature, which has predominantly
studied the contemporaneous link between labour markets and illegal activity. One
strength of our empirical approach is that we are able to use a variety of data sources
and find robust results across all specifications. A potential limitation exists in terms
of the type of data that is available: We track birth cohorts over time and observe
crime rates in these cohorts. Whilst the results very strongly support the hypothesis
that labour market conditions at the time of graduation initiate criminal careers,
we are not able to ultimately prove that those individuals in a cohort who commit
crime at older ages are the same who have committed crime at younger ages when
triggered by the labour market conditions. Yet, as stated above, first-time offenders
at older ages are the exception which implies that it is unlikely for this not to be
the case. Thus, we believe that the data restriction is not a major limitation of our
analysis and does not affect the overall conclusion.
Chapter 4 focuses on a more contemporaneous relationship between unemploy-
ment and crime: I study the impact of recent and unprecedented structural changes
in the U.S. labour market on crime. During the Great Recession unemployment
rates in the U.S. were very high, to a very similar extent as during previous reces-
sions. However, during the Great Recession contrary to previous recessions, there
has been a substantial increase in the average duration of unemployment spells.
In particular, there has been an unprecedented occurrence of long-term unemploy-
ment which stands in clear contrast to European labour markets with a history
of long-term unemployment. Labour economists have associated these increases in
unemployment durations with temporary unemployment benefit extensions which
were implemented by policy makers in order to delay the time of benefit exhaustion
in times of financial hardship. Here, I use quasi-experimental methods to estimate
the impact of these labour market and policy changes on crime.
In line with previous findings in the literature, I find that higher unemployment
is linked to higher crime rates and more surprisingly that this is driven by the un-
employment benefit extensions. Existing economic models which suggest that the
probability of criminal behaviour increases with the duration of unemployment, for
example due to human capital effects or behavioural responses, lead to the hypo-
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thesis that the unemployment-crime relationship is duration dependent. Given the
increase in unemployment durations associated with the benefit extensions, that of-
fers an explanation for the findings above. Indeed, I find empirical evidence that
the relationship between unemployment and crime varies with the duration of un-
employment.
There are two major contributions of that chapter to the literature on unemploy-
ment on crime. First, I evaluate the impact of the recent labour market and policy
changes on crime in the U.S. Second, I provide evidence for a contemporaneous link
between unemployment and crime which underlies dynamics that have not yet been
captured in the empirical literature. Again, the study is limited by the kind of data
which is available. Unfortunately, I do not have access to individual-level data which
would allow me to study the unemployment duration dependence of crime in greater
detail and to entirely abstract from general equilibrium effects which potentially bias
the results, such as compositional changes in the unemployed population.
While the literature on unemployment on crime focuses on the determinants of
criminal behaviour, economists have also shown great interest in evaluating mechan-
isms of deterrence from crime. On the one hand, there is the need to understand the
relationship between unemployment and crime in order to evaluate the implications
of labour market policy design on criminality and the broader prevention of initial
criminal behaviour. On the other hand, understanding crime deterrence mechan-
isms and their effectiveness is crucial for policy decision with respect to the efficient
allocation of resources. A particular interest has hence been shown in establishing
the causal impact of policing on crime.
In chapter 5, we analyse a prominent example of such a police strategy that
targets crime deterrence: The stop-and-frisk policy in New York City. This policy
allows police officers to stop, question and frisk pedestrians in New York City based
on a reasonable suspicion. The policy has been legally established in New York
City in the 1970s and has been widely expanded in the 1990s as one feature of
the zero-tolerance strategy. Since then, the policy has been controversial: Whilst
supporters have argued that the stop-and-frisk practices have strongly contributed
to the decline in criminality in the city over the last two decades and have defen-
ded racial profiling strategies under the policy as effective policing being based on
statistical discrimination, opponents have argued that the policy has been racially
discriminating and that there has been no causal impact on crime.
In that chapter, we use a variety of data sources and empirical strategies in
order to examine the hypothesis of racial bias and the impact on crime in New York
City. Our analysis employs a number of quasi-experimental estimation techniques
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in order to identify racial bias in the stop-and-frisk practices and to estimate the
overall impact of these practices on crime. We use police precinct level data on
stop-and-frisk encounters and reported crime on the one hand, and individual level
data on stop-and-frisk encounters and subsequent arrests on the other hand. Quasi-
experimental variation stems from a court decision in 2013 that led to a discontinuity
in the stop-and-frisk practices, as well as from police officer killings and killings of
black individuals by police officers. Applying a range of estimation techniques we
find that our results are qualitatively robust across the specifications: While we find
evidence that supports the hypothesis that Afro-Americans face a disproportional
probability of a stop-and-frisk encounter, our estimations suggest that there is no
knock-on effect on crime.
One strength of our analysis lies in the fact that we are able to employ a number
of estimation techniques exploiting different sources of quasi-experimental variation
which leads to the same qualitative results and hence supports a wider external
validity of the analysis. Yet, the major limitation of the study is restricted data
availability. In particular, we are not able to track individuals over time in order
to link stop-and-frisk events to convictions. Moreover, we do not have access to
information on police deployment following the killings of police officers which could
potentially bias our results.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the empirical literature on labour mar-
kets, public policies and crime. The findings add to the findings in the literature
and contribute to the knowledge that is not only of interest for researchers, but also
crucial for policy makers with regard to policy design and policy evaluation in the
context of crime prevention and efficient resource allocation.
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